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CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA: ASIAN VIEWS OF 
THE AMERICAN INFLUENCE 
PREFACE TO THE 1988 EDITION 
This volume was inspired by the 1976 Bicentennial of the 
Declaration of Independence of the United States of America. 
(Regarding the related symposium program, see the Preface to 
the 1979 edition, below.) The decade since its publication has 
been eventful for constitutionalism in Asia. 1 The book now reap-
pears in bicentennial commemoration of a series of events be-
tween 1787 and 1791, from the signing of the Constitution of the 
United States in Philadelphia on September 17, 1787 to the ratifi-
cation of the American Bill of Rights on December 15, 1791. 
Here I note a few historic constitutional developments and 
problems in Asian countries during the years spanning the two 
bicentennial eras. In terms of such principles of constitutional-
ism as limited, responsive and responsible government, civil liber-
ties, and criminal justice rights, my sense is that more Asian 
polities have improved than have regressed since the late 1970s. 
The hundreds of cultures of Asia differ in many respects 
with each other as with those of other world regions; but all 
Asian nation-states now share adoption of a government institu-
tion invented by the United States in the eighteenth century, the 
single-document constitution setting forth a country's public 
principles, its governmental structures, and the relationships be-
tween its leaders and governed. All of Asia's current constitu-
tions are of post-World War II origin. Very few nations 
anywhere (e.g., Norway, 1814; Colombia, 1886) have constitu-
tions dating from the nineteenth century. Of the 165 single-doc-
ument national constitutions in force as of January, 1989, well 
over 100 have been ratified since 1970. 
With the end of world wars and the passing of Western colo-
nial dominance, many Asian countries regained not only their 
independence, but also their sense of national political identity. 
Ever since, they have been redefining their legal and governmen-
tal institutions and practices to fuse perennial indigenous values 
1. Both the 1979 edition (University of California Press) and the 1981 Japa-
nese-language version (Gakuyo Shobo Publishing Co., Tokyo; Isao Sato, sup. trans.) 
are out of print. 
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with transcultural forms, ideologies, and constitutional princi-
ples. The latter half of the twentieth century may well be the 
most dynamic period in history of worldwide experimentation 
with governmental institutions. Moreover, for the first time, edu-
cated elites in most if not all major cultural zones and legal tradi-
tions mutually comprehend a set of constitutional ideas (e.g., 
parliament, elections, presidency, rights, independent courts), 
however much they disagree on priorities. While conflict and 
disorder here and there in Asia may draw the bulk of American 
media attention, the dawning of an unprecedented age of docu-
mentary and substantive constitutionalism is ultimately more ex-
citing. To an increasing degree, scholars and practicioners can 
speak to each other across cultural boundaries about constitu-
tional alternatives and imperatives, about the distinctive yet intel-
ligible traits peculiar to each constitutional system, and about 
related legal technicalities. Although political and economic ide-
ologies continue to divide countries, parties and scholars 
throughout Asia, in 1989 rigidities seem to have softened; ethnic 
and religious divisions, smooth leadership transition, individual 
rights, and economic problems more insistently call for the atten-
tion of leaders than do the theoretical varieties of socialism and 
democracy. Promotion of tolerance for diversity of beliefs and 
subcultures remains perhaps the most intractable project for con-
stitutional states. 
The current constitutions of Asia were ratified in the indi-
cated years: Afghanistan, 1980; Bangladesh, 1972; Brunei, 1984; 
Burma, 1974; Republic of China, Taiwan, 194 7; People's Repub-
lic of China, 1982; India, 1949; Indonesia, 1945 (in force since 
1959); Japan, 1946; Kampuchea (Cambodia), 1981; Lao, 1975; 
Malaysia, 1963; Mongolia, 1960; Nepal, 1962; Democratic Peo-
ple's Republic of Korea, 1972; Republic of Korea, 1987; Paki-
stan, 1973; Papua-New Guinea, 1975; The Philippines, 1987; 
Singapore, 1963; Sri Lanka (Ceylon), 1978; Thailand, 1978; and 
Vietnam, 1980. 
Three themes seem to stand out in the Asian constitutional 
politics of the 1980s: leadership succession problems, the mili-
tary's role in government, and human rights issues. Leadership 
changed hands in many Asian countries, not just in the sense of 
one leader succeeding another-after election, assassination, nat-
ural death, popular upheaval, coup d'etat, or oligarchic selec-
tion-but in the deeper sense of a generation passing away and 
established modes of governance beginning to change direction. 
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Elsewhere, nepotistic succession occurred, as with Prime Minis-
ter Rajeev Gandhi in 1984, or was awaited, as with the sons of 
North Korea's Kim 11-sung and Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew. 
By 1989, militarized and military-dominated regimes ap-
peared to be receding in importance, and civilian constitutional-
ism advancing, except perhaps in Indonesia. Human rights 
concerns found fresh emphasis in the diplomacy of President 
Jimmy Carter (1977-1981), with the expanding acceptance of 
United Nations and regional human rights documents, and with 
the growth of human rights studies (e.g., Human Rights Quar-
terly [Johns Hopkins University Press]). Pol Pot's massacre of 
his Kampuchean countrymen after the Vietnam War, the subse-
quent protracted civil-international war involving Vietnam, and 
the great exodus of Indochinese refugees since 1975 raised world 
awareness of human rights violations notably through the 1980s. 
China frankly disclosed the excesses of the Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution ( 1966-197 6, especially 1966-1969), and pop-
ular movements called for individual rights and freedoms in, for 
example, South Korea, China, The Philippines, Pakistan, and 
Burma. 
In 1976 the United Nations' "International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights" and "International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights" came into effect for ratifying 
nations; other human rights instruments further defined specific 
issues, such as the 1979 "Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women" and the 1984 "Con-
vention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrad-
ing Treatment." Constitutional rights issues on such matters 
transcend differences of culture, but present different challenges 
for different civilizations. The Human Rights Committee of the 
nongovernmental Law Association for Asia and the Pacific pro-
vided a forum for refining understandings of human rights in 
Asia; its multi-national membership has formulated "Basic Prin-
ciples of Human Rights" as guidelines, and publishes a Human 
Rights Bulletin on performance. At the fortieth anniversary of 
the United Nations' Declaration of Universal Human Rights on 
December 10, 1988, on balance, the increased rhetorical and doc-
umentary prominence of individual rights in Asia seemed to be 
matched by more serious government and private efforts than in 
the past to better institutionalize constitutional rights in law. 
A generational change of leadership has been linked in many 
cases with shifts in the status of military politics and human 
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rights. One symbol of such transitions was the passing on Janu-
ary 7, 1989 of Emperor Hirohito of Japan after over sixty-two 
years on the throne. Although postwar Japan has been marked 
by stable democracy and constitutional pacifism, Hirohito had 
continued to call to mind for some, at home and abroad, the ag-
gressive, repressive and militaristic government ending in Sep-
tember, 1945. Upon becoming powerless, hereditary monarch, 
Emperor Akihito and his commoner Empress Michiko, both ed-
ucated to internationalism, adopted the era name "Achieving 
Peace" (Heise1). 
Other examples of major transition are the current govern-
ments of The Philippines and South Korea. They shared what 
has been a crucial constitutional problem for some other Asian 
countries: the unwillingness of an incumbent to relinquish power 
after a legally set period in office, the absence of clear democratic 
constraints on a leader's tenure, and/or the lack of any effectively 
routinized system in law and politics for passing from one na-
tional leader or group of leaders to the next. Ferdinand Marcos 
was the first Filipino President elected for a second term; his sub-
sequent manipulation of law and constitution to perpetuate his 
leadership and damage democracy and economy suggests the 
wisdom of the 1987 Philippine Constitution in institutionalizing 
the earlier constitutional custom of allowing only one term in of-
fice. President Corazon Aquino and her successors are allowed 
only one six-year term. The Sixth Republic of Korea Constitu-
tion (1987) provides for the direct election of a president to only 
one five-year term. Some scholars and former Presidents of the 
United States have wisely recommended that a constitutional 
amendment be adopted to limit the American president to a sin-
gle term of five or six years, in part to assure that the business of 
governance is not overshadowed by reelection politics during a 
first term. 
Another provision of the Philippine Constitution which rec-
ommends itself to other Asian countries with family-based sys-
tems of sociopolitics is the anti-nepotism provision of Article 7, 
Section 13, which prohibits presidential appointment of relatives 
to high public office. It may be that a son or daughter of a na-
tional leader has excellent credentials, as in the case of Chiang 
Ching-kuo of the Republic of China on Taiwan and, apparently, 
Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan, the first woman prime minister of a 
major Islamic country; or it may be that legitimate doubts exist 
about the stature of a leader's offspring, as in the case of Rajeev 
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Gandhi of India and Kim Jong 11, son of Kim 11 Sung, North 
Korea's leader since 1948. Special problems are created if, as in 
Thailand, the monarch is of central constitutional importance 
and the heir apparent's qualities excite considerably less respect 
than those of the incumbent, King Bhumibol Adulyadej. Re-
straint of various forms of family power remains a seminal issue 
for constitutional debate in Asia. 
Since 1948, South Korea has experienced a series of consti-
tutional crises and has lived under six constitutions. In dramatic 
prelude to Seoul's hosting of the 1988 Olympics, a widely sup-
ported popular movement in 1987 demanded and won constitu-
tional establishment of direct popular election of the president, 
increased protection of human rights, and a strict limit (noted 
above) on a president's term of office. The current Republic of 
Korea Constitution was ratified in the fall of 1987. After defeat-
ing a divided opposition majority in December 16, 1987 elections, 
President Rob Tae Woo succeeded President Chun Doo H wan 
on February 25, 1988. This marked the first peaceful transfer of 
power under law since the founding of the Republic in 1948. 
Chun was the first incumbent to leave office after one term (seven 
years), albeit as part of a transition to a new constitutional order, 
and amid charges of family corruption. These events of 1987 and 
1988 may augur lasting democracy. Besides Korea's rights pro-
tection record in years to come, the main test for constitutional-
ism may come at the end of President Rob's five-year term: Will 
the military allow transition to a civilian president? 
Since 1961, South Korea's presidents have been former 
generals first chosen by their military colleagues rather than by 
popular election. Park Chung Hee (1961-1979) was assassinated 
and Chun Doo Hwan (1979-1988) soon took over the Republic 
by coup d'etat; Rob Tae Woo is also a retired general. To con-
cerned Koreans, the general question in the background is: Will 
the military permit Korea's democratic constitutional system to 
operate without interference? Analogous questions face other 
Asian countries in transition, such as Burma, Bangladesh, Paki-
stan, the Philippines, and Thailand. This is not to deny the note-
worthy accomplishments of some of Asia's peacetime military-
dominated governments since the 1940s; nor is it to suggest that 
one-party civilian governments may not be even more inimical to 
constitutionalism than military governments. These points are 
clear from the repressive record of Asia's communist states and 
from instances of military leaders yielding elsewhere to civilian 
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democracy. Nevertheless, a military is an irregular, non-consti-
tutional center of government power. In general, the primacy of 
military power in a government is as concrete an indicator of 
weak constitutionalism as are the absence of adequate provisions 
for democratic leadership succession and defects in the protec-
tion of freedom of expression or criminal justice rights. 
A new generation of demilitarized governments may be 
emerging in the latter 1980s in East, Southeast and South Asia, 
but that is yet problematic. Will Pakistan and Bangladesh con-
tinue toward less military power in government? General Ne 
Win and the Burma Socialist Program Party dominated Burmese 
politics for decades. After the 1988 demonstrations and leader-
ship changes, will the military in Burma allow pluralization of 
politics and/ or demilitarization of government? In Thailand, 
General Prem Tinsulanond's eight years as prime minister made 
him the longest serving elected leader in the history of Thai de-
mocracy. After the July, 1988 elections, he yielded the premier-
ship to Chatichai Choonhaven, the choice of the civilian 
coalition. Will Thailand's military permit the evolution of multi-
party civilian democracy to continue, or will it revert to govern-
ment by coup? In the Philippines, will the tradition of military 
subordination to civilian government regain strength after the ab-
errational Marcos period and the strains of governing since the 
People's Revolution of 1986? 
The Republic of China has moved on from the Chiang era 
with peace and prosperity. Taiwan's constitutional situation 
presented an unusual mixture of elements in 1989. Like the Phil-
ippines and South Korea, Taiwan entered a period of apparent 
transition toward constitutional democracy in 1987, but at the 
initiative of its popular leader, President Chiang Ching-kuo 
(1910-1988), not primarily in response to citizen demands or 
strong opposition to the government. The Constitution of the 
Republic of China first went into effect during civil war on De-
cember 25, 194 7. At the first meeting of the National Assembly, 
"Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of Mobiliza-
tion for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion" (Temporary 
Provisions) were passed, and were promulgated on May 10, 1948. 
These Temporary Provisions were later amended four times, last 
in 1970. In substance, they delayed full implementation of con-
stitutional democracy on Taiwan on grounds of continuing war-
time conditions, and martial law was proclaimed. The 
Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT), founded by Sun Yat-sen 
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and long headed by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975), 
has held sway over government, law and politics. 
In an historic action on July 14, 1987, party Chairman and 
President Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law on Taiwan; it had 
been in effect a remarkable thirty-eight years. The law of the 
constitution could now begin to function more autonomously; 
but Taiwan remains in transition. A "National Security Law for 
the Period of Rebellion Suppression" was enacted to continue 
some restraints on freedom characteristic of the martial law pe-
riod, when government was quite sensitive to any criticism. 
However, law and policy now seem on the way to favoring sub-
stantially increased tolerance for political diversity. Among 
other signs, five political parties have been allowed to exist and to 
engage in vigorous competitive party politics. In early 1988, af-
ter the death of Chiang Ching-kuo, a Taiwanese technocrat, Lee 
Teng-hui, became President to serve out the remainder of Chi-
ang's term till 1990.2 
In the People's Republic of China, an historic leadership 
transition continued in 1989 which had begun with the deaths in 
the mid-1970s of Mao Zedong and colleagues such as Chou Enlai 
who had ruled the Chinese Communist Party for forty years. 
The succession process has no precedent in China and will not 
end as long as Deng Ziaoping remains on the scene as an authori-
tative guiding hand; but he and his supporters have been putting 
in place a generation of new leaders in the 1980s. Ziao Ziyang 
has become General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, 
and Li Peng Premier of the government. The currently operative 
"constitution" of China is composed of the 1982 Constitution 
and the Party's rules after the Thirteenth National Party Con-
gress (October 25-November 1, 1987). In the absence of any 
transition since 1949 from the charismatic founders to a new gen-
eration ofleaders under well-tried procedures, post-Deng China's 
leadership and course seem unpredictable. Increased interna-
tional openness to foreign capital and technology has not implied 
serious official interest in constitutional democracy, but has 
spurred development of the stronger legal system essential to pre-
dictable economic relations and more regularized government-
citizen relations. Much new law has been promulgated in areas 
2. For a comprehensive study on the influence of American Constitution on the 
Republic of China, see Ray S. Cline and Hungdah Chiu, The U.S. Constitution and 
the Development of Constitutionalism in China, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Global 
Strategy Council, 1988, pp. 7-69, 135-150. 
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subject to capricious change in the past, such as criminal law. 
Limited periods of vigorous public discourse and demonstrations 
have occurred. However, besides government acceptance of the 
supremacy of the constitution and well-drafted laws, criminal 
justice rights and constitutionalism in general require a solid in-
frastructure of institutions (e.g., independent courts) and trained 
professionals. Even should China decisively favor adoption of 
democratic practices of criminal justice, it would take considera-
ble time and resources to develop the expertise necessary for na-
tional implementation of that policy. With their legal institutions 
and expertise and with their measure of democratic education, 
countries such as Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea and 
Taiwan have great advantages China lacks: they have only to opt 
for constitutional democracy and they have the infrastructure to 
put it into practice. It is easy to forget, ideological differences 
aside, that in ruling over one billion people, the government of 
China is engaged in the greatest organizational task in the history 
of humankind. 3 
The American constitutional experience continues to be one 
of the perennial reference points in world discourse about gov-
ernment, law and human rights. The intensification of peaceful 
American relations with Asian countries in the past ten years, 
and the recent apparent tendency in a number of nations toward 
strengthened constitutionalist government make it more impor-
tant than in the past that we understand the foundations of gov-
ernment and law in Asia on their own terms and in comparison 
with American constitutionalism. This book is offered again in 
commemoration of the United States bicentennial and in honor 
of Asian constitutionalists. 
In closing, a word about the current status of the Asian au-
thors. Former President Chowdhury continues to provide diplo-
matic services for Bangladesh in international meetings. 
Professor Ma is now Grand Justice in the Judicial Yuan of the 
Republic of China. Professor P.K. Tripathi continues to teach 
law at the University of Delhi, while former Chief Justice Seno 
Adji has returned to teach law at the University of Indonesia. 
Honored by Japan's government for exceptional public service as 
a scholar and educator, Professor Ukai passed away in Tokyo 
3. For Chinese mainland scholars' views toward U.S. Constitution, see Fengm-
ing Liu, "Studying United States Constitutional Law: A Personal Experience of a 
Chinese Students," Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 37 (1987), pp. 346-351 and 
Cline and Chiu, supra note 2, pp. 70-86, 150-153. 
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early in 1987. Lord President Tun Suffian is in active retirement 
from Malaysia's highest court. Professor Fernando completed 
his tenure as Chief Justice of the Philippines in 1985 and now 
practices law. Professor Jayakumar has continued active in the 
government of Singapore, as Law Minister and as Home Minis-
ter. Finally, sincere thanks to Professor Hungdah Chiu for his 
assistance in bringing this book to light of day. 
LAWRENCE W. BEER 
P.M. Kirby Professor of Civil Rights 
Lafayette College 
Easton, Pennsylvania 
December 31, 1988. 
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Preface 
The purposes of this symposium are to further knowledge of Asian law 
and to advance the comparative study of law and constitutionalism. 
This volume presents a wealth of data and expert opinion concerning 
law and constitutionalism in Asia which hitherto has been unavailable 
to Americans or difficult to obtain except in indigenous sources. It also 
sheds light on the degree and manner of the relevance of the Declara-
tion of Independence and the American constitutional experience to the 
modern legal and political life of Asian nations which stretch in an 
enormous arc from India and Pakistan to Japan. Asian constitutional 
and legal realities are here presented, not through the sometimes tinted 
glasses of Western legal scholars, but as perceived by eminently quali-
fied indigenous jurists and legal scholars: Mr. Justice Abu Sayeed 
Chowdhury, past President of Bangladesh; Professor Herbert H. P. 
Ma, College of Law, National Taiwan University, Taipei; Dr. P. K. 
Tripathi, Faculty of Law, University of Delhi, and past Member, Law 
Commission of India; Chief Justice Dr. Oemar Seno Adji of the 
Supreme Court of Indonesia; Professor Nobushige Ukai of Senshu 
University, Tokyo, and past President, Public Law Association of 
Japan; Lord President Tun Mohamed Suffian of the Federal Court of 
Malaysia; Senior Associate Justice Enrique Fernando of the Supreme 
Court of the Philippines; and Dean S. Jayakumar, Faculty of Law, 
University of Singapore. (A biographical sketch on each Asian author 
(xiv) 
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can be found at the back of this book.) The Committee on Asian Law 
thanks the Asian contributors for taking time to honor us with their 
views. 
A word of explanation on the background of this symposium and 
on the Committee on Asian Law is in order. In the spring of 1976, the 
Committee on Asian Law of the Association for Asian Studies offered a 
month-long Bicentennial program centered on the theme "Asian per-
spectives on the American constitutional influence in Asia." The Com-
mittee on Asian Law is an elected committee of legal scholars special-
izing in one of the four subregions of Asia, as Asia is divided for 
organizational purposes by the Association for Asian Studies (AAS): 
Northeast Asia (Japan and Korea); China and Inner Asia; Southeast 
Asia; and South Asia. The Association is the principal learned society 
for many thousands of scholars in a wide range of academic disciplines 
who have a special interest in one or more nations of Asia, from Japan 
to Afghanistan. 
The Committee on Asian Law is the primary meeting ground for 
legal practitioners and academics in the fields of law, political science, 
sociology, anthropology, and history who share a professional interest 
in Asian law and legal systems. The Committee's goals include the 
advancement of research and teaching on Asian law, and the develop-
ment of reliable information concerning available expertise on Asian 
law. See, for example, the Committee's annual publication, Asian Law 
Forum, and the Directory of Persons Interested in Asian Law (Chin 
Kim, ed.), which is up-dated periodically by the Committee. Of related 
interest is a survey of American law schools and Asian Studies pro-
grams, "Asian Legal Studies in the United States: A Survey Report,'' 
Journal of Legal Education 29, no. 4 (1978), a product of Committee 
collaboration with the International Legal Center. 
The Bicentennial program of the Committee on Asian Law con-
sisted in a series of public panel presentations and seminars in March 
and April, 1976, at the annual convention of the Association for Asian 
Studies (Toronto), and in Buffalo, New York City, Washington, D.C., 
and San Francisco. In all, some thirty programs were offered as a 
group; additional talks and seminars were presented in other cities 
during the portions of the itinerary when the Asian jurists were 
traveling singly. Earlier versions of many of the contributions to this 
volume were presented and candidly discussed on those occasions. The 
present writer served as program coordinator and an official escort 
throughout. 
The Committee on Asian Law was assisted in this project by the 
Office of East Asian and Pacific Programs, U.S. Department of State; 
the Asia Foundation; the Asia Society in New York and Washington, 
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D.C.; and the Visitor Program Service of Meridian House Interna-
tional. In addition, law schools, the American Bar Association, the 
Federal Bar Association, Barry Metzger of the Coudert Brothers law 
firm, and a number of local bar associations and World Affairs 
Councils lent a helping hand. Generous cooperation was also forth-
coming from the White House, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger of the 
United States Supreme Court, the Committee on the Judiciary of the 
U.S. House of Representatives, the U.S. Justice Department, and both 
federal and local courts. To all of these, and to the officers and able 
staff of the Association for Asian Studies, the Committee and the 
Bicentennial guests wish to express their deep gratitude. 
Members and associates of the Committee on Asian Law have 
assisted in the preparation of the manuscript for publication, especially 
the following: Daniel S. Lev and Ronald G. Brown of Seattle; Marc 
Galanter and Robert Hayden of Madison, Wisconsin; James L. Maga-
vern of Buffalo, New York; Hungdah Chiu of Baltimore, Maryland; 
and Henry F. Goodnow and Roger K. Paget of Boulder, Colorado. 
The views of the Asian authors are their own and are not to 
be construed as official statements of the policies of their respec-
tive nations or as the opinions of the Committee on Asian Law or 
the Association for Asian Studies or the cosponsors of the 1976 
Bicentennial program. In some papers, informational footnotes have 
been added by the editor and his assistants to clarify the context or to 
indicate sources to which the reader may turn for further enlighten-
ment on the subject under discussion in the text. Modification and 
adaptation of English-language phraseology has been necessary in a 
number of places because English is the second, third, or fourth 
language of our Asian contributors; in this editing process we have 
scrupulously avoided any modification of the author's intent. The 
opinions of the authors of editorial notes before chapters and of the 
present writer (expressed herein and in chapter I) do not necessarily 
mirror those of the Committee on Asian Law or any agency cosponsor-
ing or supporting the Bicentennial program or chapter authors. 
The sequence of chapters was determined solely on the basis of the 
alphabetical order of the names of the countries dealt with herein, in 
keeping with the system of protocol adopted for the Bicentennial 
presentations of 1976. The number of Asian countries represented by 
the writings we offer in this symposium is of necessity limited. Our 
intent has been, not comprehensive coverage of all the many nations in 
that vast area encompassing almost two-thirds of humankind, but 
rather the inclusion of a sufficient number and diversity of nations to 
provide representation of most Asian legal traditions operative at the 
present time. For obvious if regrettable political reasons, we do not 
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have the benefit of a contribution by an indigenous scholar of Asian 
socialist legalism. Final responsibility for the selection of the Asian 
nations represented and the distinguished contributors rests with the 
Committee on Asian Law. 
Thanks are due, finally, to Ms. Bee Peterson of the Department of 
Political Science, University of Colorado at Boulder, for typing most of 
the manuscript; to my parents, Lucile H. Beer of Portland, Oregon, and 
the late Norman H. Beer, for teaching me to Jearn from other lands 
while critically appreciating our own; and to my wife, Keiko, and our 
children for patience with scholarly absenteeism. 
The ideas and institutions espoused in the Constitution of the 
United States and the Declaration of Independence are among the 
finest contributions of the United States to the world in the past two 
hundred years. In the years ahead, Americans may well learn to grasp 
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I 
Introduction 
Constitutionalism in Asia and the United States 
Lawrence Ward Beer 
The Constitution and the Declaration of Independence of the United 
States of America emerged in the particularistic historical context of 
British North America; but the constitutional values enunciated and 
institutionalized therein were seen from the beginning as having uni-
versal relevance for humankind. These documents still speak forcefully, 
not only to most citizens of the United States,' but also to many peoples 
of different history and heritage around the world. American constitu-
tionalism is one of the major models available two centuries later. 
What is striking is not that some elements of the Declaration and 
the Constitution are out of tune with the indigenous power structure, 
legal perceptions, social values, economic systems, or constitutional 
needs of many nations, but that so much of their spirit has become part 
of the evolving perennial wisdom of democratically inclined countries 
I. The Bicentennial occasioned an outpouring of commentaries on the Declaration 
of Independence and the constitutional and moral foundations of American government 
in the American mass media. For some recent scholarly analyses, see Paul Eidelberg, On 
the Silence of the Declaration of Independence (Amherst: University of Massachusetts 
Press, 1976); Robert H. Horwitz, The Moral Foundations of the American Republic 
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1976); Walter Berns, The First Amendment 
and the Future of American Democracy (New York: Basic Books, 1976); and Norman A. 
Graebner (ed.), Freedom in America: A 200- Year Perspective (College Station: Pennsyl-
vania State University Press, 1976). 
(1) 
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in so many regions of the world. As the distinguished Ceylonese jurist 
C. G. Weeramantry has said: 
Aversion for colonialism and all it meant and a respect for the antiquity 
of Third World tradition must not obscure the fact that one of the 
grandest intellectual concepts that has emerged in the long history of 
justice-thinking is the concept of the Rights of Man as developed in the 
West. The philosophy of natural law, built upon an ancient base by such 
philosophers as Locke, Rousseau and Bentham in Europe, and Thomas 
Paine and Thomas Jefferson in America, and their flowering in the 
American Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of 
the Rights of Man-all these are the property, the achievement and the 
inheritance of all mankind. Third World cultures did not bring their 
formulations of human rights to this degree of explicitness, and it would 
be unwisdom indeed to jettison this stream of tradition merely because 
it had its greatest development in the West. Indeed, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the other basic international formula-
tions around these themes, on which the world order of the future needs to 
be built, draw heavily upon this stream of thought. The very notion of 
the economic rights and duties of States, on which much of the future of 
the Third World depends, must rest in the ultimate analysis on a bedrock 
of natural law.2 
The United States Bicentennial era of the mid-1970s was ill timed to 
generate enthusiasm, pride, and confidence in the rule-of-law principles 
behind the American constitutional endeavor from its inception. The 
period preparatory to the Bicentennial observance was coincident with 
the early aftermath of the Vietnam War, probably the most excruciat-
ingly divisive conflict since the American Civil War, and attendant 
communist victories in Cambodia and Laos. lt'l addition, the balance 
and cohesion among the elements of the American constitutional struc-
tures have been disrupted in recent years by abuses of power symbol-
ized by the Watergate affair. American citizens differed deeply among 
themselves on what this all meant and on whether the republic emerged 
strong or weak from the ordeals. The inflation, recession, unemploy-
ment, and new concern for energy resources of the mid-1970s provided 
almost welcome distraction from the exposed national wounds of war 
and corruption for many Americans. 
2. C. G. Weeramantry. Equality and Freedom: Some Third World Perspectives 
(Colombo: Hansa Publishers, Ltd., 1976), p. 67. The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 
1948. The United Nations Charter, which came into force on October 24, 1945, 
affirmed human rights particularly in Articles I and 55. Some of the other major 
international documents dealing with human rights are the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopted in 1948); the International Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ( 1965); the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (I 966); and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). The United States has chosen not to 
participate in some such covenants. 
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Some noted that the number of nations abroad adhering to princi-
ples, laws, and governmental practices compatible with those of Ameri-
can constitutionalism seemed to be shrinking perceptibly year by year, 
and nowhere perhaps more noticeably than in Asia. 3 Moreover, setting 
aside for present purposes the merits of the conflicting positions taken 
in the American debate over the causes and effects of the Vietnam War, 
Asian peoples and leaders seemed to see America as either an enemy 
defeated, a disturbingly unskilled great power, an unreliable ally, or in 
some other light unflattering to the American ego. The winds were not 
favorable for human rights and limited government. 
It was a good time for mature reflection on the nation's founda-
tions in light of the experience and knowledge of some of Asia's most 
able jurists and legal scholars. President Jimmy Carter had not yet been 
nominated, and his controversial and dramatic emphasis on human 
rights had not yet become an essential element of American foreign 
policy. Given the costs of three American conflicts in Asia since 1941, 
and the complexities of wise implementation of the current human 
rights policy, legal scholars and policy makers might well bend their 
efforts to understand accurately what friend, foe, and neutral in Asia 
say and do with respect to law and constitutionalism. Little informa-
tion, let alone perspective, has been readily available in America on 
the law and constitutionalism of many Asian nations.4 Knowledge will 
not necessarily bring agreement, but it can lead to a valuable state of 
mind that is difficult to achieve-genuine disagreement. Those who 
stand in alleged disagreement in Asia and the United States often lack 
an accurate understanding of their respective positions. One must 
understand what the other party is saying before he can correctly say he 
disagrees with that party; this applies with force to dialogue between 
those of contrasting legal cultures. This symposium serves the causes of 
both understanding and disagreement between the legal systems of the 
United States and of some Asian countries. This chapter briefly sketch-
es the colonialist background of constitutionalism in modern Asia, 
3. For example, during the early 1970s South Korea. the Philippines, and India 
joined the list of Asian nations which systematically increased restrictions on public 
liberties. See "Authority, Emergency, and Development: A Symposium," Asian Survey, 
April, 1978; Raymond D. Gastil, "Comparative Survey of Freedom," Freedom at Issue 
(this periodic survey, the Freedom House Survey of Human Rights, focuses on political 
rights, not socioeconomic rights); and the following journals which review progress in this 
field: American Bar Association, Human Rights; and International Institute of Human 
Rights (Strasbourg), Revue des droits de l'homme; and United Nations, Yearbook on 
Human Rights, from 1946. 
4. A brief bibliography on Asian law and constitutionalism is at the end of this 
book. Concerning the debate on human rights, see, for example, Stanley Hoffman, "The 
Hell of Good Intentions," Foreign Policy, no. 29 (Winter, 1977-78), p. 8, and Mumtaz 
Soysal, "Refle~tions on Peace and Human Rights," 1977 Nobel Peace Prize Lecture, 
Matchbox, Wmter, 1978. 
4 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
comments on a few problems attendant on comparative studies of 
Asian law and constitutionalism, and identifies views held in common 
by a number of the Asian authors regarding Asian and American consti-
tutionalism today. 
Colonialism and Constitutionalism in Modern Asia 
Obviously there is no such thing as "Asian" constitutionalism and law. 
Asia is a vast region with many countries and over 60 percent of the 
world's population; each Asian nation-and indeed, each of many 
subgroups within some Asian countries-has its own separate history 
and distinctive laws, customary law, and constitutional system. More-
over, many Asian nations have shared as little in common with each 
other in premodern times as they share now with the United States. 
Each of the Asian contributors relates history to the law of his country, 
but some brief comments on the modern colonial setting in Asia are in 
order here for the reader who is not an Asia specialist. 
Elements of cross-national similarity-in traditional governmental 
system, legal concepts, religion, and colonial history-do loosely link 
some Asian countries, in sentiment if not often in practical politics. For 
example, the majority of the world's Muslims live in Asia, as the 
primary religious grouping in Indonesia, Malaysia, Bangladesh, and 
Pakistan, and as significant minorities in India, China, the Philippines, 
and Singapore; the Islamic legal tradition remains an important force in 
most of those nations. Confucian legal concepts and assumptions 
continue to affect social, legal, and political life in varying ways in 
Japan, Korea, China, Vietnam, Singapore, and Malaysia. Particularly 
in the area of law and constitutional ideas, the British colonial system 
has left a common mark on India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Sri 
Lanka (Ceylon), Burma, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Much earlier, 
Hindu notions of kingship spread from India over a period of centuries 
into the Southeast Asia region, and either Mahayana or Theravada 
Buddhism entered deeply into the life of many East, Southeast, and 
South Asian peoples. But kaleidoscopic variety greets the student of 
modern Asia more often than clues to commonality. 
The United States and its law have had very little in common with 
most Asian nations; the context of "revolution'' in late-eighteenth-
century America bears little resemblance to the circumstances of Asian 
revolutions and independence movements of the twentieth century. In 
most parts of Asia, the very discussion of the principles of democratic 
constitutionalism imbedded in the Declaration of Independence, the 
United States Constitution, and other Western legal-political docu-
ments did not begin until the nineteenth century; independence and 
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consideration of these principles as a desirable or possible alternative 
approach to law and government usually came much later. 
The patterns of colonial history in East Asia differ from those in 
Southeast and South Asia. Japan fared best in the confrontation with 
the West during the nineteenth century. After its forced opening in 1854 
by the United States, Japan achieved by the early 1900s full indepen-
dence from the unequal treaty system imposed by the Western imperi-
alist nations, rose to a status of significant international power, and 
established new legal and constitutional systems based on European 
civil law models.s But Japan's laws and constitution went through 
fundamental alteration short decades later during the American-domi-
nated Allied Occupation (1945-1952) following World War 11.6 
The territory now divided into the Republic of Korea (South 
Korea) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) 
was an ancient state, unified since A.D. 668, when the "hermit King-
dom" reluctantly opened to intercourse with Japan and the West in the 
1870s;7 it was annexed by Japan in 1910, and remained in that status 
until the "Liberation" and tragic fissure of 1945, at the hands of the 
United States, Russia, and other Allied Powers. North Korea and South 
Korea became opposing independent nations in 1948.8 The communist 
North Korean Constitution was changed formally in late 1972, and in 
effect it enhances the position of Kim Il-sung, leader of that nation since 
1948.9 South Korea's political history has been turbulent, with consti-
tutional modifications attending changes of national leadership in 1960 
5. A good analysis of legal developments in pre-1945 modern Japan is Dan Fenno 
Henderson's "Law and Political Modernization in Japan." in R. E. Ward (ed.), Political 
Development in Modern Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 387-456. 
On the history of China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam generally, see John K. Fairbank et 
al., East Asia: Tradition and Transformation (New York: Houghton-Mifflin, 1973). 
6. See J. A. A. Stockwin's survey of the Occupation period in Japan: Divided 
Politics in a Growth Economy (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975), pp. 35-61. Among 
notable early assessments are Thomas L. Blakemore, "Postwar Developments in 
Japanese Law," 1947 Wisconsin Law Review, pp. 632-653; and Washington Law 
Review, "Legal Reforms in Japan during the Allied Occupation," special reprint volume, 
1977. See also, Theodore McNelly, "American Political Traditions and Japan's Postwar 
Constitution," World Affairs (Summer, 1977), pp. 58-66. 
7. Pyong-choon Hahm, The Korean Political Tradition and Law (Seoul, Korea: 
Hollym Corporation, Publishers, 1967). 
8. Takashi Hatada, A History of Korea, trans. W. Smith and B. Hazard (Santa 
Barbara: ABC Clio Press, 1969); Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968). 
9. A translation of the Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
(DPRK) of September 9, 1948 (as amended October 22, 1962), can be found inS. Kim 
and C. Cho, Government and Politics in Korea (Silver Spring, Maryland: Research 
Institute on Korean Affairs, 1972), p. 316. The new Constitution of the DPRK 
proclaimed on Decem~er 27, 1972, is in Journal of Korean Affairs, 2, no. 3 (January: 
1973): 46-57; useful articles o? law and constitution in North Korea by Sung Yoon Cho 
and Ilpyong J. K1m appear 111 the same issue of that journal. 
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and 1961, IO and solidifying Park Chung-hee's hold on power in the 
1970s. 
China's law and government had been evolving within a perennial 
framework controlled by the Imperial Court and scholar-gentry elites 
for thousands of years when the Opium War (1839-1842) wrenched 
open China's doors to trade and led to disruptive challenge of Chinese 
legal assumptions. 11 After seventy years of encroachments by many 
Western nations and Japan, the Republic of China was formally 
established in 1912; but China was still wracked by warlordism, im-
posed upon by foreign powers under unequal treaties, and then torn by 
war with an aggressive Japan from 1937 to 1945. 12 All this was followed 
soon by a costly civil war in fact suspended, but officially continued on 
either side, with the establishment in 1949 of Mao Tse-tung's People's 
Republic of China and the migration to Taiwan of the Republic of 
China under Chiang K'ai-shek and Sun Yat-sen's "Three Principles of 
the People." The Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) and the Constitution 
of the Republic of China (1947) on Taiwan, and the Chinese Com-
munist Party and the Constitution of the People's Republic of China 
( 1954, 1975, and 1978) on the mainland, continue to direct their 
respective peoples along widely separated legal paths. Each regime 
disputes the legitimacy of the other's claim to rule all China's land and 
people. 13 
Thus, the present political order in East Asia took shape between 
1946 and 1949 after a century of colonialism and internal constitutional 
10. Concerning the constitutional developments of 1959 to 1961, see Sungjoo Han, 
The Failure of Democracy in South Korea (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1974). The "Text of the South Korean Constitution" adopted by 
referendum on November 21, 1972, is published in Journal of Korean Affairs, 3, no. I 
(April, 1973): 39-53. The previous Constitution of the Republic of Korea ( 1948, as 
amended through 1969) can be found in Kim and Cho, op. cit., pp. 294-315. 
II. See Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris, Law in Imperial China (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1967). 
12. Li Chien-nung, The Polirica/ Hisrory of China, 1840-1928 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1956). 
13. Concerning Republican Chinese law and constitution, see Herbert H. P. Ma's 
chapter and the works cited therein. An English translation of the Constitution of the 
Republic of China (December 25, 1946) can be found in Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, The 
Governmenr and Polirics of China. 1912-1949 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1970}, pp. 447-461. Also of interest for perspective on earlier legal history is Harold S. 
Quigley, "Constitutional and Political Development in China under the Republic," The 
Annals of rhe American Academy of Polirical and Social Science, no. 211 (November, 
1925}, pp. 8-14. In general, see Jerome A. Cohen (ed.}, Conremporary Chinese Law: 
Research Problems and Perspecrives (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970). On 
law in the People's Republic of China (PRC) of the 1970s, see James L. Seymour, China: 
The Polirics of Revolutionary Reinregrarion (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 
1976), particularly chap. 3; the 1975 Constitution of the PRC is included as an appendix, 
pp. 287-295. 
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redefinition. The colonial period there was characterized by shared and 
partial control by many foreign powers (Great Britain, the United 
States, France, Russia, Italy, Germany), for varying time periods, ofthe 
relatively homogeneous peoples of China, Japan, and Korea, and by 
the rise of Japan to full participation in colonialist exploitation and 
eventual outright control of Taiwan, Korea, and much of Manchuria. 
In contrast, the patterns in the colonial history of South Asia and 
Southeast Asia show numerous Western nation-states individually 
asserting exclusive colonialist rights over different specific regional 
segments, most of which are characterized by ethnic, linguistic, and 
religious heterogeneity. Great Britain was the paramount power not 
only in South Asia but also in Singapore and Malaya, following long 
periods there of first Portuguese and then Dutch colonialism. France 
dominated the Indochinese area of present-day Vietnam, Cambodia, 
and Laos, and the Netherlands pursued colonialist profit in that great 
sprawl of thousands of islands across the southern seas, the Dutch East 
Indies. The late-coming United States replaced the Spanish as colonial 
masters of the Philippines at about the turn of the century. What is now 
the independent state of Papua-New Guinea was under German, Brit-
ish, and finally, until 1975, Australian administration. Much of South-
ern Asia was also briefly but significantly affected during World War II 
by Japan, the Asian colonialist that broke the back of Western exploi-
tation and domination in Asia for both Pan-Asian and self-centered 
motives.J4 To this day, many Asians are much more knowledgeable 
about their former colonial masters than they are about neighboring 
Asian nations. 
Under dramatically various circumstances post-colonial indepen-
dent government has come to South and Southeast Asian countries 
only since 1945. Independence, earned sometimes by rebellion and 
sometimes through negotiations and cooperation between Asian and 
Western men, was achieved at different points in the decades following 
World War II. Where a few colonial empires once prevailed in South 
and Southeast Asia, today there stand independent (since the year in 
parentheses) the Philippines (1946),15 Vietnam(l954),Cambodia(l953), 
14. On the South Asian and Southeast Asian contexts, see Keith Buchanan, The 
Southeast Asian Wor/d(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1968); Robert N. 
Kearney (ed.), Politics and Modernization in South and Southeast Asia (Cambridge: 
Schenk man Publishing Company, 1975); and Joel Steinberg (ed.), In Search of Southeast 
Asia (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971). For recent developments and data on all 
Asian nations, see the annual Asia Yearbook published by the Far Eastern Economic 
Review (Hong Kong), Asiaweek (Hong Kong), and the monthly Asian Surver (University 
of California Press). · 
15. Concerning the modern constitutional and legal development of the Philippines, 
and for related comment on other Asian nations, see chapter 8 and works cited therein. 
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Laos (1953), Burma (1948), Indonesia (1945),16 Malaysia (1963),17 
Singapore (1965), 18 Bangladesh (1972),19 India (1947),20 Sri Lanka 
(Ceylon) (1948),21 Pakistan (1947),22 and Papua-New Guinea (1975).23 
Monarchical Thailand, the exception, had retained a significant mea-
sure of independence throughout the trying colonial period.24 Attain-
ment of independence did not imply political stability; over the past three 
decades, major changes of regime and territorial definition in South 
and Southeast Asia have obstructed efforts to nurture new legal orders 
in these regions. 
Although Asian nations can boast of a richness of cultural heritage 
equal to that of countries in any world area, all Asian legal systems are, 
at least in important part, of relatively recent origin. The legal impact of 
the Western world on Asia has been great. Indigenous legal institutions 
and ideas have developed alongside of or been deftly integrated or 
replaced with newer concepts, forms, and processes derived from the 
Western world.25 One aspect of these Asian legal developments has 
been an explosion of innovative, significant, and fascinating consti-
tutional thinking as Asian nations have made, amended, and occasion-
ally remade their constitutions. This phenomenon has been part of a 
worldwide pattern. The period since World War II has seen more 
constitution-making and legal change than any comparable time span 
m world history. 
Over two-thirds of the [world's] existing national constitutions were 
drafted and promulgated in the last three decades; in the same period 
16. Concerning Indonesian constitutionalism, see chapter 5 and works cited therein. 
Also, Daniel S. Lev, Islamic Courts in Indonesia (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University 
of California Press, 1972). 
17. On Malaysia, see chapter 7 and works cited therein. 
18. Concerning Singapore's law and constitution, see chapter 9 and works cited 
therein. 
19. Regarding constitutionalism in Bangladesh, see Justice Chowdhury's chapter 2 
in this volume. 
20. See chapter 4 and writings cited therein. 
21. T. Nadaraja, The Legal System of Ceylon in Its Historical Setting (Leiden: 
E. J. Brill, 1972), and Joseph A. L. Cooray, Constitutional and Administrative Law of Sri 
Lanka (Ceylon) (Colombo, Sri Lanka: Hansa Publishers, Ltd., 1973). 
22. Concerning Pakistan and the split with East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, see 
Kearney, op. cit. (n. 14 above). 
23. On the diverse law of pre-independence Papua and New Guinea and constitu-
tional developments there, see B. J. Brown (ed.), Fashion of Law in New Guinea (Sydney: 
Butterworth and Company Ltd., 1969). 
24. See David M. Engle, Law and Kingship in Thailand (Ann Arbor: CSSEAS 
Publications, 1975); and D. D. Nash and S. Valaisathien, 'Thailand: The Courts and the 
Legal Profession," Lawasia, 5 (December 1974), p. 61. Other monarchical nations and 
principalities in South and Southeast Asia include Nepal, Brunei, Sikkim, Bhutan, and, 
until it was incorporated into China, Tibet. 
25. Henry W. Ehrmann, Comparative Legal Cultures (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, 1976), chap. I. 
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constitutions of many old established nations were either partly or totally 
revised to fit the new era and its new needs and values.26 
Sudden twists and turns in constitutional politics having profound 
impact on legal life continue unabated in the late 1970s, in Asia as in 
many areas of the world. 
The Comparative Study of 
Constitutionalism and Law: Asia 
Because of the colonial era and a continuing interest among Asian elites 
in Western legal institutions and processes, Asian legal scholars are 
commonly familiar with Western legalism and constitutionalism, while 
their legal counterparts in the West are generally ignorant of law and 
constitutionalism in Asia. Not only are the Asian authors of this book 
eminently qualified to comment as scholars on the constitutional 
struggles and legal characteristics of their respective countries, they 
have also experienced these revolutionary changes personally and 
directly. However, as in the rest of the world, so also in Asia and about 
Asia, there has been too little cross-national dialogue on constitutional 
and legal issues. Detailed studies of specific problems or aspects of 
individual nations-or, in some cases, of a specific ethnic subgroup 
within a given country-are a necessary basis for the development of 
constitutional theory and comparative perspective on legal doctrines; 
and too few such studies yet exist. Moreover, even when the scholarly 
stage has been carefully set for the exploration of modest binational, 
bilegal comparative speculation on a specific issue, it is difficult for the 
social scientist or legal scholar to see the terms of the comparison in 
accurate perspective and avoid the temptation to attribute meanings to 
words, institutions, and sociopolitical contexts that are characteristic of 
his own country or peculiar to the experience of only one of the nations 
being compared. Presumptuous and hasty data interpretation and 
theorizing from a weak basis in knowledge of foreign systems may be 
encouraged by an academic climate in the social sciences or the legal 
profession which presumes a priori, as some Americans do, sometimes 
unwittingly, that the theoretical model necessary for transcultural 
qualitative judgments on laws, constitutions, politics, and judicial 
behavior already exists in refined form in the Western world. Indeed, 
American scholars sometimes assume that their own are precisely the 
practical standards against which the legal and constitutional behavior 
26. Jvo D. Duchacek, Rights and Liberties in the World Today: Constitutional 
Promise and Reality (Santa Barbara: ABC Clio Press, 1973), p. 4. See also, by the same 
author, Power Maps: Comparative Politics of Constitutions (Santa Barbara: ABC Clio 
Press, 1973); and Richard P. Claude (ed.), Comparative Human Rights (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1976). 
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of other nations may best be judged, without reference to what might be 
called the ecology of the specific constitutional issue in a foreign 
society-its history, social environment, and legal background, and the 
direct effects and probable by-products of alternative solutions to the 
problem. A further obstacle to the development of a transcultural 
understanding of constitutionalism and law is the contrary assumption 
that each cultural system is so unique and separate from the world 
community that virtually all apparent similarities unearthed by careful, 
country-specific, and comparative legal studies must be regarded as 
illusory or insignificant. 
Admittedly, the comparative study of legal systems, constitution-
alism, and constitutional law is still in its infancy; it will never advance 
into childhood until the experience of the Asian two-thirds of human-
kind, as well as that of Africa, is routinely incorporated into compara-
tive discussions of law and constitution. During their Bicentennial visit, 
data and perspectives on Asian constitutionalism were exchanged by 
the Asian authors in the process of considering the influence in Asia of 
America's constitutional ideas and legal institutions. Although each 
participant spoke or wrote primarily of his own country, some similar 
concerns and convictions emerged, regarding both Asian and American 
law and constitutionalism. The remainder of this chapter will indicate 
the nature and limits of the influence of American law and constitu-
tionalism in Asia, and will highlight some of the common views 
expressed in the other chapters or in oral dialogue during the Bicenten-
nial program of the Committee on Asian Law in the spring of 1976. 
Constitutionalism in Asia 
and the United States: Some Comparisons 
Americans tend to regard the United States as a young country and 
European and Asian nations as ancient and mature civilizations. If one 
disregards the antiquity of the foundations of American civilization, 
this may be a tenable position; but, as was pointed out by Chief Justice 
Seno Adji, in the history of documentary constitutionalism the United 
States can more accurately be considered a hoary-headed pioneer of 
venerable status.27 The Declaration of Independence, the Constitution 
of the United States of America, and other early and basic American 
documents antedate most of the world's foundation documents of 
constitutional government. The antiquity and relative success of these 
documents as guides in American constitutional and legal development 
is one basis for the unfeigned respect shown for American constitu-
tionalism by the Asian contributors and many other Asians. For 
27. See chapter 5. 
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example, former Justice C. G. Weeramantry, mixing praise with criti-
cism, notes: 
America, the first country in the modern world wherein the formulations 
of human rights and dignity received State recognition without reserva-
tion or class distinction, has thus many claims to leadership concerning 
human rights. It would be ungracious indeed for the Third World to 
discount the importance of this fact, which contributed so signally to the 
stream of revolutionary thought which coursed through the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries into the liberation movements of our age. The 
links between Thoreau and Gandhi, between the American Constitution 
and the Indian and the host of others patterned on it are too real to pass 
without due recognition. 
It is a pity this debt has tended to be obscured by the fact that such 
a country, for generations the apostle of liberty, independence and the 
rights of man, has in some of its relationships with the Third World 
shielded dictatorial regimes against the claims of the oppressed.2s 
But have the Declaration and the Constitution ofthe United States 
been relevant to the constitutional and legal needs of contemporary 
Asian nation-states? If so, in what manner and degree is this relevance 
manifested? Where it is not considered a suitable set of general guide-
lines or a model for the constitutionalism of a particular Asian country, 
what precisely about American constitutionalism, in theory or practice, 
is found irrelevant or repugnant in which Asian country covered herein? 
What alternative systems have been preferred by Asian constitutional 
states? These and similar questions were put to the Asian symposium 
participants, not only as they prepared to write their papers, but also in 
public and private discussions with American legal scholars, judges, 
and lawyers, and with each other. 
It is of course impossible to make many salient generalizations 
about such a diversity of nations, and those that are hazarded here are 
made with reference to some but not all Asian nations considered. First, 
let us look at some of the modes of American constitutional influence in 
Asia. One form of influence is found in the fact that some constitution 
makers consulted as seminal, relevant documents the Declaration, the 
U.S. Constitution, and other American documents when they were in 
the process of drafting or debating the details and principles of their 
own nations' constitutions. This mode of recognition as a forerunner in 
documentary constitutionalism is found in the cases of Indonesia, 
India, Bangladesh, the Republic of China, the Philippines, and Japan.29 
The latter two used American models out of the political necessities 
attendant upon American occupation and tutelage, but with general 
acceptance of most constitutional principles suggested in both cases. 
28. Weeramantry, op. cit. (n. 2 above), pp. 67-68. 
29. See the chapters on these countries herein, passim. 
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Moderate nationalist resentments remain in some circles, but adoption 
of American constitutional and legal ideas was a step that smoothed the 
way to independence at the time. 
A second context for American influence has been the consultation 
of American experts on constitutionalism and law during the process of 
drawing up, applying, interpreting, or amending a national constitu-
tion. Concretely, the views of individual American judges and legal 
scholars have been solicited during visits by Asian constitutionalists to 
America; American legal literature (including judicial precedents) has 
been studied, and one or more Americans have been directly involved in 
some Asian constitution-making. As noted in the chapters below on 
Bangladesh and Malaysia and elsewhere, British rather than American 
influence was of course significant. In the case of Japan, historically a 
civil law country, Americans wrote most of the Constitution of Japan 
(1947), Japanese judges often study (even if they do not often cite) 
precedent of the United States Supreme Court in constitutional cases, 
and many influential Japanese legal scholars continue to be well 
informed about American laws and judicial decisions touching on 
constitutional issues. This or analogous patterns of consultation are 
found in a number of other Asian systems. A fascinating example of 
indirect American influence on the Constitution of India ( 1950) is in 
Article 21 of that constitution, which adopts the wording in Article 31 
of the Constitution of Japan in providing: "No person shall be deprived 
of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established 
by law" (the phrasing adopted is in italics).JO Other instances of 
consultation will be found in the chapters concerning India and the 
Philippines. As Justice Fernando makes clear, even in those systems of 
constitutional law which were not directly affected by the United States 
there will be found recognition of principles, such as the concepts of 
judicial review and the supremacy of the constitution, deriving their 
historical influence in fair part from American constitutionalism.31 
What are some of the other specific issues and constitutional 
characteristics in terms of which American influence has been notable 
in Asia?J2 All of the Asian jurists stressed the rights, equality, and 
30. See chapter 4. See Article 21 at p. 15 in Jagdish Lal, The Constitution of India. 
as Amended by Forty-second Amendment [1976] (Delhi, India: Delhi Law House, 1977). 
Article 31 of the Constitution of Japan: "No person shall be deprived of life or liberty, nor 
shall any other criminal penalty be imposed. except according to procedure established by 
law" (H. Itoh and L. W. Beer, The Constitutional Case Law of Japan [Seattle, University 
of Washington Press, 1978], p. 260.) 
31. See, for example, chapter 8. 
32. Some of the views herein attributed to the Asian participants are a distillation of 
many discussions with or in the presence of the present writer during the month-long 
Bicentennial program in the spring of 1976. They do not necessarily represent the views of 
this writer. Those of the authors contributing to this symposium who were present are 
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religious values enunciated in the Declaration of Independence: "We 
hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that 
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that 
among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." This 
Declaration is considered by the participants to be one of the few most 
important human documents enunciating these values. Although there 
are profound differences of religious concept among the Asian nations 
represented, all protect freedom of religion; the Islamic states (Malay-
sia, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan) and the Christian Philippines 
emphasize monotheism, as do prevalent American religious concepts. 
In discussing appropriate constitutional relationships between religion 
and the State, the visiting Asians agreed that the American constitu-
tional doctrine of strict separation is unreasonable, extremely rigid, and 
in effect possibly inimical to religion and the community.JJ They felt 
that the central concern should be, not the nonestablishment of a 
particular religion or religions, but rather the equal and friendly 
treatment of all religions by the State, without discrimination against 
any religion. In fact, they found rather strange, even puzzling, the 
secularist and implicitly antireligious legal bias of some current Ameri-
can constitutional law, in light of the commitment to religious values in 
the Declaration of Independence and the apparent intent of the Consti-
tution. Can, they ask, a "wall of separation" between Church and State 
and full exercise of religious freedom coexist? In another context, 
Professor Ukai, an influential Christian from non-Christian Japan, 
speculated that perhaps the long-term success of democratic constitu-
tionalism in Japan requires a Christian religious foundation. Whatever 
the merit of that view, it suggests the broader question: What are the 
necessary characteristics of a legal, social, philosophical, or religious 
basis for democracy? In the diversity of Asia, how relate democratic 
rule-of-law values to Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, and 
animism? 
A second issue on which a number of the contributors agree is the 
centrality of equality. Equality was stressed more than freedom, not 
because the Asian jurists do not value freedom, but because many 
Asian nations suffer from serious poverty, maldistribution of goods, 
and a deep gap between a small, privileged elite and most other citizens. 
In part, the economic problem is seen as a direct result of colonial 
systems that restructured traditional economic life to produce com-
Chief Justice Seno Adji, Professor Ukai, Tun Suffian, and Justice Fernando; in addition, 
a paper by Dr. Tripathi (unable to attend owing to a last-minute complication) was read 
at " number of public panel presentations. 
33. This view is also expressed in this volume; see, for example, chapter 5 and 
chapter 7. 
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modities in kind and quantity desired by colonialist traders and func-
tionaries. For example, Sri Lanka was forced to cut back on rice 
production and to grow tea for export, while Burma became a major 
rice exporter under British rule.34 The tendency today is to put less 
emphasis on individual private property rights than on economic 
justice, and more stress on policies leading toward economic prosperity 
for the generality of citizens. The Asian jurists were particularly sharp 
in their criticisms of America's allegedly excessive emphasis on private 
property to the detriment of economic equality. The contention was that 
the U.S. Constitution, as it has developed through legislative, admin-
istrative, and judicial interpretation, has come to serve special economic 
interests much more assiduously than it has pursued the contrary ideals 
of equality, life, and the pursuit of happiness in the Declaration of 
Independence. Interpretations of the Constitution which in effect pro-
tect economic "liberty," for example, at the expense of economic 
viability and education for all citizens are seen as a possible betrayal of 
the spirit of the Declaration by the United States. At the same time, the 
"state action theory" of some American Jaw, and also government entry 
into the private sector to regulate the use of resources and to correct 
discrimination in housing and employment, and into the political arena 
to equalize political campaign financing, were seen as doctrines in 
keeping with the true spirit of the Declaration of Independence and the 
best in the U.S. Constitution. 
Third, the necessary linkage seen by many Americans between 
economic liberty in a free enterprise system and civil liberties is not 
easily accepted by many of the Asian jurists. Political liberties and civil 
rights are separable from economic liberty and property rights and are 
to be more vigilantly protected; but this socialist leaning does not imply 
"pro-communism." 
Fourth, a common view expressed is that freedom of speech and 
freedom of the press should be protected, but only insofar as they do 
not excessively disrupt the development and functioning of the political 
or the economic order. Given the fragility and youth of some political 
arrangements and economic systems in Asia, as well as patently existing 
internal or external sources of possible threat to some regimes, such 
views are not necessarily self-serving prevarications. As our Bicenten-
nial guests from Asia found through personal exchanges in the United 
States, relatively few American constitutional lawyers and political 
observers are likely to refrain from harsh attributions of authoritari-
anism and political evil whenever they perceive restraints of liberty, 
whether it be economic liberty, free speech, freedom of assembly, or 
34. Buchanan, op. cit. (n. 14 above}, pp. 24 and 78-86; and Weeramantry, op. cit. (n. 
2 above), pp. 38-68. 
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freedom of the press. Torture or prolonged incarceration without trial 
for peaceable acts of dissent from political policy are of course incom-
patible with any system of genuine constitutionalism; but interpreta-
tions at variance with common American views of rights in areas of 
other issues were not rare. America does not face political and eco-
nomic problems analogous to those of most Asian nations which affect 
the status of freedom and law. Moreover, like scholars in some Euro-
pean democracies, most of the Asian jurists took issue with the abso-
lutist tone of some legal interpretations of the First Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution, as being both unpersuasive and unrealistic. On the 
other hand, Professor Ukai felt that a near absolutist posture was 
needed in Japan in order to encourage citizens to exercise rights and 
liberties granted only some thirty years ago, in light of Japan's prior 
modern history of governmental and social restrictions.35 The relative 
stability of Japan's economic and sociopolitical order adds to the 
plausibility of Professor Ukai's position; but other Asian jurists crit-
ically contrasted the "social responsibility theory" of freedom with 
American "absolutist theory." 
Fifth, the status of individual rights and liberties under "martial 
law·· regimes and "emergency" declarations was discussed on a number 
of occasions and is touched on here and there in this volume. The 
suspension of legal or constitutional rights or both has occurred under 
many constitutional traditions, legal provisions, and political situations 
in Asia since World War II; but reliable generalizations about the 
empirical status of rights in such circumstances-the degree and con-
sistency of restraints, popular support or resentment of the same, the 
significance of their effects on the system, and the intent of ruling elites 
in restricting certain types of activity normally thought lawful in a 
country-are not easily arrived at. For example, Lord President Tun 
Suffian noted in public session that although the King of Malaysia has 
utilized his constitutional power to declare an "emergency" on the 
advice of the Prime Minister three times in recent decades, an emer-
gency has not in fact implied a suspension of civil liberties. He added 
that this may seem unusual, particularly in a nation where civil liberties 
are generally less of a preoccupation than are socioeconomic and 
cultural rights. (He might have added that the critical importance of a 
semblance of communal harmony among the majority Malays, and the 
Chinese and Indians of Malaysia, suggests the rationality of quiet 
restraint on speech likely to foment violence, judging from past trage-
dies.) Tun Suffian also pointed out that Malaysian law concerning 
emergencies derives from British legal practice in India prior to Inde-
35. Relevant to this point is Richard H. Mitchell, Thought Control in Prewar Japan 
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1976). 
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pendence, which copied British legal thinking on an earlier Palestinian 
situation, which in turn goes back finally to English policy during the 
Irish "troubles" of the early twentieth century. Justice Chowdhury in 
his paper maintains that the suspension of rights and of Superior Court 
jurisdiction to protect them by the emergency proclamation of late 1974 
did not abrogate rights, but left them in a temporary state of "animated 
suspension." Justice Fernando, while emphasizing the great importance 
of the issuance of writs of habeas corpus in the Philippines system of 
judicial review, said that recent denials of such writs to political 
prisoners under the presidential emergency powers of the present 
"Martial Law Constitution" of the Philippines rely on American legal 
precedent and constitutional doctrine of both the Civil War period and 
the colonialist era in the Philippines. Professor Ma of National Taiwan 
University points out that the principles of habeas corpus have been 
incorporated into Chinese law and constitution under American influ-
ence, but that the interpretation of the relevant provisions requires 
intelligent adaptation of foreign legal techniques, both European and 
Anglo-American, to the Chinese legal context.J6 
The severity of the threats to a system and the rigidity of govern-
mental restraints on individual rights can be balanced only by regard 
both for theory and for detailed studies of the ecology of rights and 
freedom in each nation. Groping for a fair assessment of some Asian 
systems, Michael Brecher has maintained that a clear democratic thrust 
exists in the regimes and elites of most ·'middle zone" Asian states, 
which sets them off from the less open Asian communist systems: 
But in none of these states is authoritarianism total; this is one vital 
distinction between communist governments and those of the "middle 
zone." Another difference is the commitment in principle to "democ-
racy," though this has lessened in recent years; but even among those 
who seek alternative paths to a stable political system, there is acceptance 
of the idea of change in the political elite, protection for individual and 
minority rights, the notion of choice by the governed as to who shall 
be the governors, and other components of "democracy." Because of 
these commitments and the possibility of change in the political system, 
these authoritarian regimes are potentially closer to the substance of 
democracy than to the rigid closed political system of communism.J' 
In the contributions to this symposium, one of the American 
constitutional institutions most frequently cited as important and rele-
vant is the judicial review of laws and other acts of government in light 
of constitutional requirements. Judicial review directly inspired by 
American precedent was written into the 1947 Constitution of Japan 
36. See chapter 3. 
37. Michael Brecher, The New States of Asia: A Political Analysis (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 48; see also the symposium cited in n. 3 above. 
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(Chapter VI, Articles 76 to 82) during the Occupation; but, as in other 
Asian nations such as Indonesia, the coexistence of judicial indepen-
dence and judicial review powers with aspects of civil law tradition 
limits in theory, law, or practice or all three the judicial assertion of 
review powers.Js Continental German, Swiss, French (e.g., in Japan, 
China, Korea) and Dutch (in Indonesia and Sri Lanka) legal thinking 
and interpretive approaches have been notable formative factors in 
modern Asian law. Dr. Tripathi's chapter explicates the American 
influence on incorporation of judicial review into the Constitution of 
India and indicates the negative effects on legislative development and 
on rights protection itself of subsequent citizen reliance on judicial 
review for the solution of an excessive range and number of problems.39 
The Federal Court of Malaysia has and makes moderate use of the 
power of judicial review, a constitutional feature adapted from the 
Constitution of India.4o 
An American type of federalism has not been characteristic of 
constitutionalism in Asian countries; but the U.S. pattern has been 
consulted in the process of devising systems of limited local autonomy 
in India and Japan.41 Indonesia's "United States of Indonesia" (January 
to August, 1950) experimented briefly with federalism but found it 
impossible in a system composed of hundreds of ethnic groups and 
over 13,000 islands.42 Professor Ma of China notes the importance of 
American influence on the federalist strain of early republican consti-
tutional thinking, and the movement in the 1920s for "United Autono-
mous Provinces."43 The Federation of Malaysia, building unity out of 
long-existing autonomous sultanates, operates under a distinctive sys-
tem contrasting clearly with the American federal modes. For example, 
federal subjects for judicial review include education and police mat-
ters, and Malaysia's king (the Yang Dipertuan Agung) is elected for a 
five-year term from among the hereditary sultans of the federal states 
by a Conference of Rulers; he is a constitutional monarch, not a 
president.44 All other nations in Asia are unitary in constitutional 
structure. 
38. See chapter 5. Concerning the differences between law and judicial practice in 
civil law and common law countries, see John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969). An accurate American assessment of the 
status of judicially protected rights, for example, in a civil law country must take into 
account the contrasts in judicial function and powers flowing from the two major 
Western legal traditions. 
39. See chapter 4. 
40. Oral comments of Tun Suffian. See also his An Introduction to the Constitution 
of Malaysia, 2nd ed. (Kuala Lumpur: Ibrahim Bin Johari, Government Printer, 1976), 
pp. 105-110. 
41. See chapters 4 and 6. 42. See chapter 5. 43. See chapter 3. 
44. See chapter 7, and Tun Suffian, An Introduction (chap. 3). 
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The executive systems of governmental Asia owe little to the 
American presidency, except in the cases of the Philippines and Indo-
nesia; but with respect to his powers, the President of the Republic of 
China resembles the American President.45 The Indonesian President's 
position was originally modeled in part on the American system, Chief 
Justice Seno Adji points out, but the office is not balanced against 
legislative and judicial organs in the American manner.46 In 1975, 
constitutional amendments under Martial Law Regulations by Parlia-
ment made the President of Bangladesh more powerful than the 
American President, and reduced the considerable powers vested in the 
Prime Minister by the 1972 Constitution.47 Most democratically elected 
Asian executives are parliamentary prime ministers in a cabinet system 
deriving its forms, at least in part, from the British Parliament. In 
addition, a rich tradition of distinctive monarchical systems continues 
to live in the constitutions, written and unwritten, of a number of Asian 
nations. The unique kingship system of Malaysia has been mentioned. 
In Japan, the Emperor Hirohito is the latest of an ancient line of 
hereditary monarchs; he is now a symbol of national unity in the 
Constitution of Japan, is explicitly denied any governmental powers, 
and is technically not a head of state. Except during the period from 
1868 until 1945, and then only formally, the Emperor has very rarely 
held any significant political power in the past thousand years.4s Other 
kingship systems are found in Thailand, Laos, Nepal, and the Him-
alayan principalities. In Thailand, for example, perhaps the most stable 
and popular element in constitutionalism, despite changes in govern-
ment and in constitutional document, is the hereditary kingship system. 
Patterns of written constitutional change vary strikingly in Asia, 
but American influence on amendment processes has rarely been 
significant. Constitutions have been amended often in India and Malay-
sia, but never in Japan. Indonesia too has been reluctant to employ its 
amendment process.49 The Constitution of India, already the longest 
constitution in the world, can be amended by a majority vote with "a 
majority of not less than two-thirds of the members" of each house 
.. present and voting."so Forty-two amendments have been passed, with 
complications analyzed in this volume by Dr. Tripathi.5 1 The amend-
ment process under the Constitution of Malaysia is modeled on that of 
India, but establishes different requirements for different categories of 
amendment; in all, there had been seventeen amendments in seventeen 
45. See chapter 3. 46. See chapter 5. 47. See chapter 2. 
48. David A. Titus, Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1974). 
49. See chapter 5. 50. Article 368, in Constitution of India, p. 173. 
51. See chapter 4. 
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years by the beginning of 1976.52 On the other hand, the fear that any 
amendment will imply wholesale anti-democratic revision of the Con-
situation has rendered politically impossible any utilization of the 
amendment provisions of Japan's Constitution.53 Replacement of one 
constitution with another as a means of change has occurred in the 
Philippines ( 1972), Indonesia ( 1966, a returning to the 1945 Consti-
tution), Burma (1974),54 and the People's Republic of China (1975 and 
1978). 
In summary, the American influence in Asian constitutionalism is 
manifest in the utilization of American sources, from the Declaration of 
Independence and the Constitution of the United States to the Gettys-
burg Address to more recent judicial decisions, and in the direct or 
indirect adaptation of American institutions such as legally protected 
liberty and judicial review. Federalism and the American system of 
separation of powers have not been exported to Asia. In the area of 
individual rights and liberties, the Asian contributors have found fault 
with American notions of absolute freedom of expression, property 
rights, and separation of religion and the State, but much inspiration in 
the emphasis on the equality of persons, the right to self-government, 
human dignity, and the pursuit of economic justice found in America's 
constitutional documents and experience. All express commitment to 
the principle of the supremacy of the law of the constitution in their 
respective countries. 
As the United States picks her way through the next century of 
constitutional development, the constitutional strains and wisdom aris-
ing from the current era of experimentation in Asia's politico-legal 
cultures will deserve the attention of American judges and constitu-
tional lawyers. One measure of the constitutional maturity of the 
United States in the twenty-first century may well be the degree of 
American openness to the reception of legal and constitutional influ-
ences flowing from Asia and other non-Western regions. 
52. Oral comments of Tun Suffian, and his Introduction, pp. 337-343. 
53. Article 96, Constitution of Japan, in ltoh and Beer, op. cit. (n. 30 above), p. 268. 
54. The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, adopted 
January 3, 1974. 
II 
Bangladesh 
Editorial Note 
Prior to August 1947, when India was still part of the British Empire, 
one of its large and populous states was known as Bengal. Its capital 
and its center of transportation, communication, commerce, industry, 
and education was the city of Calcutta. The first university in India of 
the English type was established in Calcutta in 1857. Bengal had a 
substantial Muslim population whose ancestors had been converted to 
that faith in the twelfth century as an afLermath of the Turks' capture of 
Delhi in 1191. In August 194 7 these Mus lim majority districts of Bengal 
became the eastern wing of Pakistan-separated by more than a 
thousand miles from the western segment of Pakistan. By 1971-some 
twenty-four years later-East Pakistan had demanded its autonomy 
and, with the aid of the Indian Army, achieved its independence after 
the Pakistan Army surrendered on December 16, 1971. This new nation 
was called Bangladesh. 
Bangladesh is the most densely populated nation in the world 
except for the very small nation of Singapore. Its population in 1978 
was estimated at 87 million-an average of about 1,500 persons for 
each of its 55,000 square miles (a little larger than England). Its capital 
is Dacca, a city with a population of over one million. Bangladesh is 
bordered on the west, north, and east by India; to the south lies the Bay 
of Bengal; it shares a short border with Burma to the southeast. No 
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point in Bangladesh is more than a hundred miles from the border of 
India. Most of the country is a flat, alluvial plain-never more than five 
hundred feet above sea leveL It is a nation of rivers flowing south into 
the Bay of Bengal and adding more silt to the extensive delta. 
Bangladesh has a tropical monsoon climate with heavy rainfalL 
About 94 percent of the population lives in villages; 80 percent depends 
on agriculture for subsistence. It is difficult land on which to build 
substantial structures: foundations are soft and floods are frequent. 
Calcutta, which once provided extensive services to this area, now lies 
across the border in India. 
The citizens of East Pakistan (as the area was called from 1947 to 
1971) were never satisfied with their treatment by the national govern-
ment in the west. Although the population of East Pakistan exceeded 
that of the western segment, Pakistan's national government never 
placed a high priority on the development of its eastern province. The 
people of West Pakistan dominated the armed forces, the civil services, 
industry, and commerce. The two parts of Pakistan spoke entirely 
different languages. Although the eastern province earned most of the 
nation's foreign exchange through jute sales, it was the west that 
decided how to spend it. In 1978 Bangladesh continued to have an 
agricultural economy that relied principally on rice, tea, jute, and 
sugarcane. Its annual per capita income was approximately $70 (U.S.). 
Only 20 percent of the population was literate. 
Bangladesh shares with the rest of the Indian subcontinent a 
common governmental heritage. In the eighteenth century the British 
East India Company became the principal commercial organization in 
India and, after victory in two military engagements, had emerged as 
the undisputed ruler of Bengal by 1764. A century later the Company 
had been replaced by the British government, and Bengal was governed 
in the name of the Crown. A penal code, a code of criminal procedure, a 
civil code, an administrative code, and a civil service system were pre-
pared by the British for India. The system and its procedures were 
carefully designed to facilitate British control of the subcontinent and 
also to give the natives an opportunity to learn self-government. At 
times these two objectives seemed inconsistent. The Government of 
India Act of 1935 set the pattern for the original constitutions of 
independent India, Pakistan, and even Bangladesh. 
The immediate events in Pakistan which led to the independence of 
Bangladesh may be recounted briefly. Military officers and retired civil 
servants had been running Pakistan for most of its brief history. In 1970 
Pakistan scheduled its first general election. The results of the voting in 
that election showed massive support in East Pakistan for the Awami 
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League and its leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Surprisingly, the 
Awami League also won a majority of the seats in the National 
Assembly without winning a single seat in West Pakistan. Thus the 
logical head of government would be Mujibur Rahman except for the 
fact that he had campaigned on a platform of autonomy for East 
Pakistan and was therefore unacceptable to the leaders of West Pakistan. 
The new National Assembly never met. No compromise could be 
reached; there were strikes and riots in East Pakistan. On March 25, 
1971, the Pakistan Army attacked. There was devastation. Mujibur 
Rahman was arrested and flown to West Pakistan. An estimated ten 
million refugees fled to India, and ultimately the Indian Army entered 
East Pakistan and forced the surrender of the Pakistan Army on 
December 16, 1971. The following month Mujibur Rahman was re-
leased from prison and became Prime Minister of the newly created 
nation of Bangladesh; Abu Sayeed Chowdhury became President (see 
footnotes 5 and 10). By the end of 1972 a Constitution had been 
prepared by a Constituent Assembly consisting of those elected from 
East Pakistan in the 1970 elections. In March 1973 elections were held 
under the new Constitution, and Mujibur Rahman's Awami League 
party won 305 of 313 seats. 
President Abu Sayeed Chowdhury resigned in December 1973 and 
was succeeded by Professor Mohammadullah. By the end of 1974 the 
deteriorating political situation caused the President, at the request of 
Prime Minister Mujibur Rahman, to proclaim emergency rule and 
suspend the fundamental rights contained in the Constitution of 1972. 
The Constitution was also amended to provide for a system of presiden-
tial supremacy. On August 15, 1975, Mujibur Rahman was assassinated 
and Khondakar Mushtaque Ahmed was named President (see footnote 
II). In November 1975 he resigned in favor of a former Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court, Abusat Mohammad Sayem. A little more than 
eighteen months later, on April 21, 1977, President Sayem resigned for 
health reasons and nominated Major General Ziaur Rahman, who 
continued to hold the posts of Chief of Army Staff and Chief Martial 
Law Administrator, to succeed him as President. The new President 
immediately ordered the amendment of the Constitution to eliminate a 
reference to Bangladesh as a secular state and inserted in its place an 
expression of absolute faith in Allah. Other changes made the Constitu-
tion amendable by a simple majority vote of the membership of 
Parliament and provided a procedure by which Supreme and High 
Court judges could be removed by the President. 
In a referendum held in May 1977, 85 percent of the electorate 
reportedly went to the polls, and almost 99 percent voted in support of 
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General Ziaur Rahman as President of Bangladesh. Nevertheless, the 
situation remains unstable. In early October 1977 an abortive coup 
occurred and was promptly suppressed, but five hundred persons were 
said to have been tried as a result, and ninety-two received the death 
penalty. 
May 16, 1978 HENRY F. GOODNOW 
The Bangladesh Constitution 
in American Perspective 
Mr. Justice Abu Sayeed Chowdhury 
Past President of Bangladesh 
The American Experience 
American celebration of the bicentenary of its independence is in effect 
renewal of its determination to pursue a way of life as visualized in the 
declaration of its independence and in its Constitution. It reminds the 
world of its pledge for democracy founded on the basic principle of 
consideration for others. America derived benefit of the experiences 
acquired since the discovery of the New World from men and women 
from all over the world and built it up by dedicated and collective 
efforts for the welfare of the people of America and the peace and 
happiness of the peoples of the world. 
The way of life cherished in its Constitution is mainly based on its 
well-founded and well-recognized principle of the "government of laws 
and not of men." Implicit in this American concept is that nothing can 
happen without due process of law, and the United States has provided 
its judiciary with all facilities to do justice in all circumstances, and the 
mechanism is laid on a foundation, solid and stable. 
Americans wanted liberty. When that was denied, they were left 
with no other course than to demand complete and full independence, 
which they achieved by their determination and steadfast adherence to 
and firm faith in the cause they were upholding. Liberty, it is well 
established, consists in the power of a person to perform an act which 
would not infringe on the right of another. The principle of common 
good as conceived in a civilized society implies limitation of the power 
of an individual in that he is free to act in any manner-so long as he 
does not stifle the natural rights of another person. None of his actions 
claimed to be in pursuance of his fundamental rights can encroach upon 
those of others. 
There is an eternal human yearning for an individual to be free to 
act, think, and move about with his head erect and conscience clear so 
(24) 
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long as he does not violate other supervening principles established for 
the common good of the people. Limitation on such powers can be 
discerned in the police power, taxation power, eminent domain, and 
such other powers limiting the fundamental rights in the interest of the 
State as a whole. 
Salient features of the United States Constitution such as the 
doctrine of ultra vires, separation of powers, the enumeration of 
inalienable human rights, and well-planned checks and balances have 
influenced many written constitutions since the adoption of the Consti-
tution in Philadelphia in 1787. Since that year these principles designed 
to uphold human liberty have been adopted in varying degrees in 
written constitutions adopted in many parts of the world, including 
Bangladesh. 
It is true that for some time America became indifferent to other 
nations of the world. After a period of isolationism America was 
brought by force of circumstances to play its destined role in the 
development of the modern world; and the Second World War led 
America to be a founding member of the United Nations and enshrine 
the principles upholding human dignity and honor in its Charter. These 
formulations placed man above everything else, and the world body 
was entrusted with the solemn and historic duty of upholding the 
cherished ideals of civilization and the dignity of man. 
The nations that believed in a representative form of government, 
whether presidential or parliamentary, gained much from the American 
experiences and the fruits of the struggle to make the world "safe for 
democracy.'· In fact, President Woodrow Wilson when declaring war 
on Germany in 1917 emphasized the philosophy of life which guided the 
thoughts and deeds of the great American people. In his ringing voice 
he told the Congress that America would enter the war "for the rights 
and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such 
a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations 
and make the world at last free. To such a task we can dedicate our lives 
and fortune." It was in fact a reiteration of cherished goals of mankind 
as contemplated in the U.S. Constitution and its various amendments. 
The Path to Bangladesh Independence 
Bangladesh is a new country with an ancient civilization and culture. As 
its mighty rivers flow down one can hear, in their murmurs, the music 
that was heard thousands of years ago. The enchanting beauty of its 
vast green fields spreading to the distant horizon and its azure blue sky 
still reveal the beauty witnessed since the dawn of civilization. The 
people inhabiting the land are well known for emotion, a strong sense 
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of values, hospitality, friendliness, a capacity to face challenges, endure 
sufferings, bear losses calmly, meet the demands of the occasion, and 
retain firm faith in God. 
The territory now known as Bangladesh was a part of British 
India, and on the achievement of independence in 1947, it became a 
province of Pakistan and was called East Pakistan. People of this area 
took a remarkable part in the quest for independence during British 
days and acquired considerable political consciousness.' They became 
fully aware of their legitimate rights and privileges.2 
The first British step according some recognition to the struggle for 
independence was the Government of India Act (1919), which declared 
that its aim was to establish "a responsible government as an integral 
part of the British Empire." This naturally failed to satisfy the growing 
aspirations of the sub-continent. The Act was to be reviewed after a 
period of ten years, but the time was shortened and a commission 
headed by Sir John Simon was appointed to report about constitu-
tional reforms. There was no one from the sub-continent itsel( on the 
commission, and it was claimed that such a task could not be accom-
plished without someone having intimate and close association with the 
thoughts and prevailing ideas in the sub-continent; so the commission 
suffered from lack of cooperation. It submitted its report on May 27, 
1930. Thanks to the good efforts of Lord Irwin, three successive round-
table conferences could be held to find an acceptable solution; but 
unfortunately they failed to work out an agreed framework for the 
constitution. 
The British Parliament, however, rightly felt that it was high time 
to act and, if necessary, to act unilaterally. And so it did, by enacting a 
valuable document called the Government of India Act (1935). Elabor-
ate and detailed in its provisions, the Act provided the foundation on 
which all constitutional exercises were made in the sub-continent. This 
Act introduced a federal form of government to which princely states 
were also to accede. 
Although the part relating to the federation could not be put into 
operation at all, the provincial governments as provided in the Act 
came into existence and worked satisfactorily. The federal form pro-
vided therein worked as a model to the framers of constitutions in both 
India and Pakistan after the achievement of independence in 1947. 
I. Leonard Gordon, Bengal: The Nationalist Movement, 1876-1940 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1974). 
2. Concerning the modern constitutional development of India, see R. G. Aggar-
wala, Constitutional History of India and National Movement (Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 
1964); Sankar Ghose, The Western Impact on Indian Politics (1885-1919) (Bombay: 
Allied Publishers, 1967); Granville Austen, The Indian Constitution (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1966), and chapters 4 and 6 of this work. 
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When the Second World War was raging, renewed efforts were 
made to arrive at a constitutional settlement satisfactory to the sub-
continent. With that end in view, a mission led by Sir Stafford Cripps, 
an eminent British jurist and statesman, went to India in 1942, but 
again no accepted formula could be found. It was felt that Sir Stafford 
was very genuine in his efforts, and naturally high hopes were raised, 
but as the political parties failed to reach agreement, these hopes were 
dashed to the ground. 
Soon after cessation of hostilities, the question of framing a 
suitable constitution for the sub-continent was again taken up. Lord 
Pethick-Lawrence, the then Secretary of State for India, led another 
mission for the purpose. It presented a scheme of its own in May 1946. 
It recommended that an elected Constituent Assembly should be 
entrusted with the work of framing a constitution for the sub-continent. 
It also brought into existence an interim government at the centre. But 
a constitution could not be framed without settling the demand for 
partition between India and Pakistan, which had grown into a gigantic 
mass movement. 3 
The British government by then became anxious to transfer power 
to the sub-continent, for it knew when to leave, and the British 
Parliament enacted the Indian Independence Act. in 1947. As the 
political parties by then had agreed to partition the sub-continent, 
Britain handed over its responsibilities to two independent dominions, 
India and Pakistan, amidst universal friendliness for Britain, without 
bitterness, without rancour. The American attitude at the time of the 
severance of its connection with Britain was perhaps not the same. 
The two wings of Pakistan were separated by more than twelve 
hundred miles. They had, however, many things in common. As was 
already noted, the people of East Pakistan, now known as Bangladesh, 
took full part in the struggle for independence from Britain. Such a 
politically conscious people now clamoured for equality of rights and 
opportunities as visualized in the United States Constitution, and the 
struggle which started soon after achievement of Pakistan in 1947 
culminated in the emergence of Bangladesh as a sovereign and indepen-
dent republic on December 16, 1971, after twenty-four years of working 
together.4 
3. Khalid B. Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase, 1857-1948 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1960); G. W. Choudhury, Constitutional Development in Pakistan 
(London: Longman, 1969, 2nd ed.); and Sir Ivor Jennings, Constitutional Problems in 
Pakistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957). 
4. Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1972); Wayne Wilcox, The Emergence of Bangladesh (Washington, 
D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1973); G. W. Choudhury, 1he Last Davs of United 
Pakistan (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974). · 
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Independent Bangladesh then adopted a parliamentary Constitu-
tion on the fourth day of November, 1972;5 the first election under this 
Constitution was held in the beginning of 1973.6 
The 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh 
and the Emergency 
This Constitution when first adopted in 1972 provided for a parlia-
mentary form of government, although the Prime Minister and not the 
Cabinet was made all powerful, deviating from the theory of collective 
responsibility. In fact, by virtue of Article 55 (2) of the Constitution, all 
executive authority was to be exercised by the Prime Minister. 
Suddenly, at the end of 1974, an Emergency was declared;7 funda-
mental rights were suspended, and the Superior Courts, which were to 
enforce them, were divested of the authority to do so against any 
executive action infringing them. Suspension, however, does not mean 
abrogation; it means that these rights remain in a state of animated 
suspension. The moment the suspension order is removed, they would 
be revived. Even before the proclamation of the Emergency, the Prime 
Minister in reality possessed all the powers, and as such its need was 
widely doubted. 
The Prime Minister possessed unlimited powers even otherwise by 
reason of a number of Presidential Orders or Ordinances which were 
later protected by the Parliament by a saving clause of the Constitution. 
A list of these Orders and Ordinances was given in a schedule of the 
Constitution as passed by the Parliament prohibiting by a constitu-
tional provision any attack on them; many of their provisions were 
violative of the fundamental rights.s 
5. The Consrirurion of rhe People's Republic of Bangladesh, passed by the 
Constituent Assembly of Bangladesh on Nov. 4, 1972, and authenticated by the Speaker 
on Dec. 14, 1972 (Dacca: Constituent Assembly of Bangladesh, 1972). See Rounaq 
Jahan, "Bangladesh in 1972: Nation Building in a New State," Asian Survey, Feb. 1973, 
pp. 199-210; M. M. Sankhdher, "Bangladesh Constitution: A Content Analysis," Journal 
of African and Asian Srudies, 4, no. I (March-April 1973): 23-34; and Abu! Fazl Huq, 
"Constitution-Making in Bangladesh," Pacific Affairs, 46, no. I (Spring 1973): 59-76. 
The latter author notes, at p. 60: "Justice Abu Sayeed Chowdhury, a former High Court 
Judge and Vice-Chancellor of Dacca University (one of the few intellectuals who had 
actively participated in the liberation movement and yet was not aligned with any 
political party), became the new president of the Republic. If integrity and impartiality 
are considered essential qualities of the head of the state, there could have been no better 
choice for the presidency." 
6. Concerning the March elections and other 1973 developments, see Rounaq 
Jahan, "Bangladesh in 1973: Management of Factional Politics," Asian Survey, Feb. 
1974, pp. 125-135. 
7. On events of 1974 and the emergency decree of December 28, see Talukder 
Maniruzzaman, "Bangladesh in 1974: Economic Crisis and Political Polarization," Asian 
Survey, Feb. 1975, pp. 117-128, and "Bangladesh," Keesing's Conremporary Archives, 
Jan. 20-26, 1975, pp. 26924-26925. 
8. Keesing's, p. 26925. 
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The Constitution also made it a unitary form of government and it 
continues to be so. 
The United States Constitution 
and the Bangladesh Constitution 
Geographically, Bangladesh is a homogeneous territory inhabited by a 
people speaking the same language, inheriting the same traditions, 
culture, thoughts, and ideas. The question of a federal form of govern-
ment therefore did not arise, and the framers of the Constitution were 
therefore relieved of the many problems which confronted the Conven-
tion at Philadelphia. 
We may now have a closer look at the Bangladesh Constitution 
and the American impact thereon. The U.S. Constitution declares in its 
Preamble: 
We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect 
union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the com-
mon defense, promote the general welfare, secure the blessings of liberty 
to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitu-
tion for the United States of America. 
The Bangladesh Constitution, also in its Preamble, pledges that its 
aim is to realize a society free from exploitation and that fundamental 
human rights and freedom and equality and justice will be secured for 
all citizens. Resemblance between the two is apparent. 
The Bangladesh Constitution is an all-embracing document pro-
viding for a mechanism of administration practically in all constitu-
tional spheres. 9 It consists of 153 Articles in 11 Parts. Part I deals with 
the republic, declares Bengali the State language, provides for citizen-
ship, and other matters. Part II is devoted to fundamental principles of 
State for the guidance of the government and the Parliament, but these 
are not enforceable by courts. Part III is the most important, relating to 
fundamental rights recognized by the Parliament and enforceable by 
Superior Courts when there is no suspension order on account of any 
proclamation of emergency. Part IV is divided into five chapters and 
deals with the executive branch of the government. Part V provides for 
Parliament, and for legislative and financial procedures and ordinance-
making powers. Part VI provides for the judiciary, Part VII deals with 
elections, Part VIII provides for the Comptroller and Auditor General, 
and Part IX deals with the armed services of Bangladesh. The pro-
cedure for amendment of the Constitution is to be found in Part X. 
Miscellaneous matters have been laid down in Part XI. This outline 
should give an idea of the structure of the Constitution itself. 
9. See note 5 above. 
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As was already noted, the Bangladesh Constitution has enumer-
ated fundamental rights in a chapter. A study of these rights would at 
once make it clear that in their formulation Magna Carta ( 1215), the 
Petition of Rights ( 1628), the Bill of Rights ( 1689), and the Constitution 
of the United States of America, together wjth its amendments, were 
kept in mind. It is in this part of the Constitution that the full benefit of 
the written Constitution of the United States was taken as a model, and 
in fact, in dealing with these provisions the courts in Bangladesh freely 
refer to the judicial pronouncements of the Superior Courts of Britain, 
America, and the Commonwealth countries. Bangladesh is a sovereign 
and independent republic, and these decisions are certainly not binding 
on Bangladesh courts, but the views expressed by them are taken into 
consideration as and when similar questions arise, just as those courts 
also refer to judicial pronouncements of Superior Courts of other 
countries. 
The chapter on fundamental rights begins by adopting the doctrine 
of ultra vires, for it expressly declares that all existing law inconsistent 
with those rights as enumerated therein shall be void to the extent of 
inconsistency; it incorporates a prohibition to the effect that the State 
shall not make any laws inconsistent with those rights, and if so made 
they would also be void. It is clear that an order made by the State, if 
challenged, has to be referable to some law of the land, and ifthere is no 
law supporting the executive order, or even if there is one and that law 
is inconsistent with fundamental law, the law must be declared void, 
and the executive order set aside. 
Perhaps the most important of all rights enumerated therein is 
Article 27 of the Bangladesh Constitution, which reads: "All citizens are 
equal before law and entitled to equal protection of law." Broadly 
speaking, this Article confers the right to equality as visualized in the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
The principle of equality before the law contemplates that the 
courts must treat all citizens as subject to the ordinary law of the land 
and they must enjoy equal protection of law. It will therefore be seen 
that the obligation imposed on the State is to secure to a person 
equality before the law and also to give equal protection thereof. It is 
true that in the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution the 
expression "equality before the law" does not occur; but it must be 
remembered that the expression "equal protection of the laws" occurs 
therein; and in this context one has to bear in mind that the expression 
"due process of law" is so elastic in its ideas that in its application it 
does include "equality before the law" as well. 
This Article of the Bangladesh Constitution prohibits discrimina-
tion in any shape or manner. One cannot arbitrarily pick and choose 
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any person or class of persons under the law. In other words, the law 
should be equal and equally administered, and the like should be 
treated alike. Without going into detailed examination of this principle, 
one would say that it is one of the most important of all the rights 
conferred on a citizen, for it is an injunction against discrimination in 
applying the law. Moreover, Article 28 prohibits discrimination on 
grounds of race, colour, sex, or place of birth. 
Similarly, Article 29 provides for the equality of opportunity in 
public appointment. Article 32 guarantees that no person shall be 
deprived of life and personal liberties except in accordance with law. 
Article 33 provides that a person who is arrested shall not be detained 
unless informed of the grounds of arrest and shall have the right to be 
defended by a lawyer of his choice. A person so detained has to be 
brought before a court of law within twenty-four hours. 
Articles 39, 40, and 41 provide for freedom of thought and 
conscience, freedom of profession and occupation, and freedom of 
religion. Articles 42 and 43 provide for the rights to property and 
protection of home and correspondence. A study of the Amendments to 
the U.S. Constitution would show that these cherished principles were 
incorporated therein. 
In a parliamentary form of government provision is made for a 
head of state who represents the State as distinguished from the 
government; as such, after election the President belongs to the country 
as a whole and not to a party and is looked upon as a symbol of 
national unity and national dignity. Bangladesh also provided for a 
President to be elected by the Parliament; by virtue of Article 48 (2), as 
head of the state "he shall take precedence over all other persons in the 
State." It was also provided that all executive actions of the government 
were to be expressed as taken in the name of the President. He was by 
another Article made Supreme Commander of the armed forces, and 
the officers of the government were to hold office during his pleasure. 
He is also to appoint constitutional functionaries like the Prime Min-
ister, Ministers, Judges of the Superior Courts, Attorney General, and 
Auditor General. He was invested with legislative functions as well 
when the Parliament was not in session. 
But, by one single Article, namely, Article 48 (3), all these func-
tions were rendered ceremonial inasmuch as the advice of the Prime 
Minister was made constitutionally binding on him in the discharge of 
all his functions except the appointment of the Prime Minister. This 
was a mandatory constitutional provision as distinguished from a 
convention in a parliamentary form of government such as is found in 
Britain. 
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The Constitutional Changes of 1975 
But this discussion about the functions of the President in the Consti-
tution that was originally adopted in 1972 is merely academic now. 
Without again ascertaining the opinion of the country, which earlier 
gave its verdict for a parliamentary form of government, drastic and 
sweeping changes were brought about by the Parliament in the begin-
ning of 1975, Jo empowering the President to discharge all his functions 
at his own discretion or in his individual judgment, and the Prime 
Minister and all other Ministers were made to function subject to the 
direction of the President. 
A number.of amendments to the Constitution had to be effected 
now by Martial Law Regulations in order to make it workable. Briefly 
stated, by sweeping amendments made by the Parliament, the President 
was vested with much more power than the President of the United 
States, without any of the well-thought-out checks and balances obtain-
ing in the U.S. Constitution. As was already stated, the Cabinet was 
retained; so also was the office of the Prime Minister, but he had none 
of the powers or functions of a Prime Minister in a parliamentary form 
of government. Ironically enough, this time it was the Prime Minister's 
office which was made a ceremonial one. 
Then on August 15, 1975, the Constitution as it existed on that date, 
as was indicated above, was kept in force but with necessary amend-
ments made by Martial Law Regulations. 11 It continues in force today, 
subject to Martial Law Regulations, which may bring about amend-
ments as and when thought necessary. 
The present Constitution provides for a unicameral legislature as 
distinguished from a bicameral one. The Parliament consists of three 
hundred members; for a period of ten years there shall be fifteen women 
members of the Parliament, to be elected by the three hundred members 
already elected. 
Illustrative of its legislative functions are provisions that no tax can 
be levied without parliamentary sanctions, and the budget is to be 
10. Mr. Justice Chowdhury, a confidant of Mujibur Rahman, had resigned from 
the presidency in December 1973 to devote himself to service in the foreign affairs of 
Bangladesh. The constitutional changes were adopted by the Parliament (Jatiya Sangsad) 
on January 25, 1975. See "Bangladesh," Keesing's Contemporary Archives, March 3-9, 
1975, p. 26997, and Aug. 25-31, 1975, pp. 27296-27297. 
II. On August 15, 1975, President Mujibur Rahman, together with his family, was 
killed in a coup d'etat by a group of military officers. He was succeeded as President by 
Khandaker Moshtaque Ahmed. On August 20, 1975, President Moshtaque Ahmed 
assumed the power to issue martial law regulations which could not be questioned in any 
court. See "Bangladesh." Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Oct. 13-19, 1975, pp. 27381-
27383; and Talukder Maniruzzaman, "Bangladesh in 1975: The Fall of the Mujib Regime 
and Its Aftermath," Asian Survey, Feb. 1976, pp. 119-129. 
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passed by the Parliament. As the Parliament stands dissolved now, the 
budget can be authenticated and certified by the President. 
The Constitution as it now stands provides for a Supreme Court 
and a High Court. It is also provided, as in Article III of the U.S. 
Constitution, that Chief Justices of the Supreme Court and the High 
Court and other judges shall be independent in the exercise of their 
judicial functions. The Supreme Court originally had an Appellate 
Division and a High Court Division; but recently the Constitution has 
been amended, and a High Court has been established with a Chief 
Justice with distinct status and functions. 
The Supreme Court is empowered to hear appeals from the High 
Court. The High Court is entrusted with original powers of issuing 
orders directing a functionary to refrain from doing anything which he 
is not permitted in law to do, or declaring an act illegal if it is in 
contravention of a statute. These are, in fact, powers of issuing writs 
analogous to the American writs of mandamus, prohibition, quo 
warranto, certiorari, or habeas corpus. 
Although the power of enforcing fundamental rights has been in 
suspension by proclamation of emergency since 1974, the High Court is 
empowered to issue directions as contemplated in Article 102 of the 
Constitution if the order against which a c~mplaint is brought is in 
violation of any statutory provision. Appeals from such orders are 
made to the Supreme Court. 
A brief reference can now be made to the question of separation of 
powers. The principle postulates that the same person or body of 
persons should not be entrusted with unrestricted powers. The idea is 
that the three different organs of the State, the executive, the legisla-
ture, and the judiciary, should function independently of each other. 
Here we may refer to the words of James Madison, who said: "The 
accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive and judiciary in the 
same hands, whether of one, a few or many and whether hereditary, 
self-appointed or elected, may justly be pronounced the very definition 
of tyranny." 
The United States Constitution, therefore, in Article I gave legis-
lative power to the Congress, executive power to the President, and 
judicial power to the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as the 
Congress may from time to time establish. Although the U.S. Constitu-
tion greatly succeeded, without entering into an elaborate discussion it 
may be said that it has also been found that the watertight compart-
ments were neither possible nor desirable. 
A study of the Bangladesh Constitution would show that the 
Parliament, while acting as the Constituent Assembly, adopted the 
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principle of separation of powers but did not make effective provision 
for its implementation. 
Bangladesh is a new country and as such it has to go through 
constitutional experiments with a view to securing peace and happiness 
for the people, who are looking forward to enjoyment of the fruits of 
independence. It has been aptly said that a constitution is best which 
works best. A nation vibrating with enthusiasm and continuously 
looking for prosperity and a higher standard of living has to adopt a 
mechanism suitable to the changing circumstances and needs of society. 
This is particularly true of a country like Bangladesh, which is still in 
the process of constitutional experimentation, in order to secure for its 
people peace, happiness, and prosperity.'2 
12. "Bangladesh," Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Jan. 16, 1976, pp. 27521-
27522; Oct. 15, 1976, pp. 27989-27992; March 4, 1977, p. 28223; and July 29, 1977, p. 
28480. See also Maniruzzaman, "Bangladesh in 1975," and by the same author, 
"Bangladesh in 1976: Struggle for Survival as an Independent State," Asian Survey, Feb. 
1977, pp. 191-200; M. Rashiduzzaman, "Bangladesh in 1977: Dilemmas of the Military 
Rulers," Asian Survey, Feb. 1978, pp. 126-134. 
III 
Republic of China 
Editorial Note 
Geography: The Republic of China (ROC), located in East Asia, 
exercises control over the island of Taiwan (Formosa), the Penghu 
(Pescadores) islands, the Quemoy and Matsu islands. It also controls 
Pratas and some of the Nan-sha (Spratly) Islands, such as Tai-p'ing 
(ltu Aba) Island, in the South China Sea. Although the ROC continues 
to claim legal sovereignty over other parts of China under the Com-
munist rule, it has since 1958 renounced the use of force to achieve 
that goal. 
Taiwan Island lies 80 to 125 miles off the southeastern coast ofthe 
China mainland. It is about 245 miles long and from 60 to 90 miles 
wide. A north-south mountain range forms the backbone of the island, 
with the highest peak, Yii Shan, rising to 13,110 feet above sea level. 
The eastern slope of this range is exceedingly steep and craggy, but the 
western half of the island is generally flat, fertile, and well cultivated. 
Population and education: The ROC has a population of 17 
million, including about 120,000 on the Penghu islands and 75,000 on 
other islands (excluding the military). Population density is about 1,200 
per square mile, which is almost five times higher than that of mainland 
China and is the second highest in the world, only after Bangladesh. In 
1977, the population growth rate was about 2 percent. 
Over 27 percent of the population (about 4.4 million) are in school. 
Since 1968 a nine-year free education system has been in effect. There 
(35) 
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are about 300,000 undergraduate (including junior college) and gradu-
ate students. The literacy rate in the ROC is over 95 percent. 
History: China is one of the oldest of the world's civilizations. The 
earliest Chinese dynasty began in about 2205 B.C., and under successive 
dynasties Chinese culture prospered and advanced to a point where 
achievements in literature, philosophy, art, and craftsmanship were 
among the highest attained by man. But China was weak in science, and 
there was no industrial revolution similar to what happened in the 
West. As a result, China was falling behind the West in technology, 
especially with respect to weapons, in the nineteenth century. 
The foreign Ch'ing (Manchu) rulers adopted an isolation policy to 
prevent foreign penetration into China. However, after its defeat in the 
Opium War (1839-1842) by Great Britain, China was forced to open to 
the Western powers. Continued encroachment on China by Western 
nations and Japan led to other unequal treaties which included foreign-
ers' extraterritoriality, foreign control of tariff and customs administra-
tion, and other matters which the Chinese considered humiliating. 
Some unequal treaties continued into the 1940s. 
After decades of painful experiences and frustration, the Chinese 
people began to take a keen interest in the revolutionary movement led 
by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, which finally overthrew the Ch'ing Dynasty ( 1644-
1911) and established the Republic of China in 1912. The new republic 
was soon beset with warlordism, foreign intervention, and domestic 
social disorder. 
In the 1920s a new leader arose, Chiang Kai-shek, a follower of Dr. 
Sun Yat-sen. Chiang reorganized the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) 
and established a party army. In 1929, Chiang almost unified China. At 
that time, the Communist movement began to spread in southeast 
China, and Chiang moved to eliminate the Communists. He succeeded 
in destroying most of their party organization and virtually paralyzed 
their ranks throughout China. The remnants of Communist forces of 
several thousand fled to Shenshi Province in the northwest in 1936. In 
1937, Japan invaded China, and a provisional truce was made between 
the ROC government under Chiang and the Communists led by Mao 
Tse-tung. 
During the Sino-Japanese War, when the Chiang government was 
preoccupied with resisting the Japanese aggression, the Communists 
took the opportunity to expand their military forces from roughly 
thirty thousand in 1937 to a million in 1945. After the defeat of Japan, 
civil war broke out and finally culminated in the Communist defeat of 
the ROC forces in 1949. On October I, 1949, the Communists estab-
lished the People's Republic of China on the mainland. Chiang Kai-
shek moved his government and the remnant of his forces and his 
supporters to Taiwan in late 1949. 
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Economy: During the past three decades, Taiwan has changed 
dramatically from an agricultural to an industrial economy. The gross 
national product (GNP) in 1977 was about $19 billion and per capita 
income was about $1,000 (U.S.). The economic growth rate since 1970 
has been about 8 percent annually. Foreign trade, both ways, in 1977 
was about $18 billion, with a favorable balance (surplus) of $850 
million. Trade between the United States and the ROC in 1977 was 
about $6 billion. 
The economic system is a mixture of socialism and free enterprise. 
The government controls electricity, petroleum, railways, highways, 
steel, shipyards, salt, tobacco, wine, postal service, and a few other 
major enterprises. All others are open to private enterprises. 
The economic policy is also directed toward a more equitable 
distribution of income among the population. In 1976, the 20 percent of 
families with the highest income received 37.3 percent of the total 
personal income, while the 20 percent of families with the lowest 
income received 8.9 percent of the total personal income. The ratio 
between the highest income group and that of the lowest was 4.2. Such 
discrepancy in income distribution between the two groups is one of the 
lowest in the world. 
Constitutional development and government structure: Modern 
constitutionalism was unknown in traditional 'China. The emperor 
possessed all legislative, executive, and judicial powers. However, his 
rule was not absolute, and there were some limitations on his authority 
in practice, usage, and the teachings of ancient sages. Beyond that, the 
censorial institution formed another check on the Chinese emperor. 
The censors had the duty to watch and criticize any member of the 
entire official system, including the emperor. Therefore, China did have 
in its tradition something similar to modern constitutional limitation on 
the government. 
Modern Western constitutional concepts were introduced to China 
in the late nineteenth century. After decades of effort, the Constitution 
of the ROC was adopted on December 25, 1946, by the constitutional 
National Assembly. This Constitution is still in effect in Taiwan. 
A popularly elected National Assembly is the supreme organ. The 
Assembly elects the President and Vice-President, who serve six-year 
terms. The main legislative body is the Li-fa-yuan (Legislative Yuan), 
composed of popularly elected members. The cabinet-the Executive 
Yuan, appointed by the President with the consent of the Li-fa-yuan-
is responsible to the latter. Under the central government, there are 
the Taiwan Provincial Government, Taipei Special Municipality, and 
Fukien Provincial Government (in charge of Quemoy and Matsu 
islands). A provincial assembly, city councils, and mayors are all 
popularly elected. 
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Legal system: Under the traditional Chinese legal system, the 
written law was predominantly penal, and the traditional society was 
not legally oriented. There were no independent judiciary, no profes-
sional lawyers, no formal legal education in the modern sense. One of 
the results of Western intervention in China has been the modernization 
of its legal system on the Western model. A legal reform movement 
started in the late Ch'ing Dynasty at the turn of the century. However, it 
was not until the Kuomintang assumed nation-wide power in the 
1930s that a complete set of modern laws was enacted and promulgated 
by the ROC government and has become known as the Six Codes 
(Organic and Administrative Law, Commerical Law, Civil Code, Crim-
inal Code, Code of Civil Procedure, and Code of Criminal Procedure). 
These codes are essentially modeled upon continental Europe's civil law 
systems, but they also retain some of the traditional Chinese legal rules 
or principles. 
The ROC government under the Kuomintang also began to 
establish modern court systems throughout China. Under the 1946 
Constitution, the highest judicial organ is the Judicial Yuan, composed 
of the Council of Grand Justices-primarily responsible for interpre-
tation of the Constitution-the Supreme Court, the Administrative 
Court, and the Commission on the Discipline of Public Functionaries. 
Below that there is a high court (court of appeal) in each province or 
special municipality and a district court at the county or city level. 
Modern law schools are established to train lawyers and judges. The 
constitution also guarantees the independence of the judiciary. Since 
late 1949, the Six Codes and the judicial system have operated only in 
Taiwan and other islands under ROC control. 
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China's first attempt to emulate Western political and legal institutions 
dates back to the last years of the last dynasty, the Manchu reign, in the 
1800s. However, serious efforts to make a permanent constitution 
began only after the founding of the Republic of China in 1912. As a 
result, a number of drafts were introduced leading to the May 5th Draft 
Constitution of 1936, which in turn formed the basis of the present 
Constitution of 194 7. 
Both the May 5th Draft Constitution and the present Constitution 
are founded on the unique political theory ofthe Three Principles ofthe 
People and the doctrine of separation of five powers as taught by Dr. 
Sun Yat-sen, founder of the Chinese Republic. However, Western 
influence has always been present. 
The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to try to show what 
influence the United States Constitution and constitutional law had on 
the Republic of China during the formation of her constitution; second, 
to try to see in a modest way what prospects there are for developing the 
constitutional law of the Republic of China in light of American 
experience. It is convenient to begin with what is historically relevant. 
II 
When Japan first defeated China in 1894 and then Russia in 1905, the 
Manchu rulers of the Ch'ing dynasty were convinced by loyal political 
reformers that a constitutional government was the only way to be 
strong again. A concrete step was taken in 1908 when the Emperor 
Kuang-shti declared the 23-article General Plan of the Constitution 
aiming at transforming the body politic into a constitutional monarchy 
(39) 
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patterned after the Meiji Restoration in Japan. However, it was a time 
when the revolutionaries led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen had determined to 
bring down the dynasty as a prerequisite to the successful reconstruc-
tion of China. As a last attempt to survive, the Manchu imperial house 
further promulgated in 1911 the Nineteen Constitutional Principles to 
take effect immediately as a temporary constitution. These Principles 
were obviously meant to copy the British cabinet system, with the 
Emperor as a mere figurehead. But it was too late to turn the tide. The 
next year saw the fall of the last dynasty in China's long monarchical 
history, and the first Chinese republic came into being. 1 
It is interesting to note that supporters of the Chinese revolution in 
their attempts to establish a republic often referred to the experiences of 
the United States of America in her constitution-making. In late 1911, 
when the governors of Kiang-su and Chekiang provinces called upon all 
other provinces which had declared independence to send delegates to a 
meeting in Shanghai to form a provisional government, they had this to 
say in a joint proposal: 
A Republican form of government is now recognized by national opin-
ion. However, success will not be easily had unless there is a model 
to be followed. The system of the United States of America should be 
the future pattern of our country. At the beginning of the founding of 
the United States, the country was rife with crises of internal disruptions 
although declaring herself a union. That she managed to achieve final 
victory after eight years of bitter struggle was primarily because the 
thirteen colonies formed a Congress which ably conducted business and 
enforced order unitedly. The first and the second Congress of the Ameri-
can colonies meant to assist the legislatures of the respective colonies . 
. . . It was not until the third Congress that a national Congress was 
established for permanent order and lasting peace. This is also a neces-
sary course of history. It is appropriate for us urgently to emulate the 
method of the first Congress of the American colonies and set up a pro-
visional congressional organization in Shanghai to discuss proper mea-
sures for internal and external affairs in order to preserve the unifica-
tion of our land and to regain peace.2 
Delegates from ten and later seventeen provinces did meet in 
Shanghai and elsewhere, and the result was the 24-article General Plan 
for Organization of the Provisional Government. Though quickly 
drawn up and short-lived, these articles are nevertheless fruits of the 
first attempt at constitution-making of the first Chinese Republic. 
These articles bore some striking similarities to the original United 
I. For a general history of the formation of the Chinese Constitution ( 1908-1934), 
see W. Y. Tsao, The Constitutional Structure of Modern China (Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 1947), chap. I, pp. 1-22. 
2. See Hsieh Cheng-min, ed., The History of Legislation of the Republic of 
China (in Chinese) (Shanghai: Cheng-chung Book Company, 1948), pp. 45-46. 
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States Constitution. Among other things, they made the provisional 
President the real chief executive, and there was no mention of the 
people's basic rights and duties. 
It was most unfortunate that the Chinese Republic had to face in 
her infancy successive crises of internal disruptions, to repeat the words 
of the above-quoted joint proposal used to describe the United States 
of America in her initial stage. The fact was, shortly after the installa-
tion of the provisional government, there arose warlordism, which kept 
the country divided and irresolute. It started with Yuan Shih-kai, the 
most influential figure during China's transition from a monarchy to a 
republic. When Sun Yat-sen, the revolutionary leader, was made the 
provisional President, no one feared he would abuse that powerful 
position. But the members of the Senate did have grave concern over 
the ambitious incoming President, Yuan Shih-kai-so much so that the 
Senate strongly proposed a Provisional Constitution of fifty-six arti-
cles,l which replaced the General Plan for Organization of the Provi-
sional Government and changed the American type of presidential 
system to the cabinet system based on the French model. However, the 
official explanation was best given by one of the senators as follows: 
When the provinces were first united, the situation was very much 
likened to the Union of the thirteen colonies of America. Because 
the circumstances made it natural for us to have a federal state, the 
American presidential system was adopted. Since, after the establish-
ment of the provisional government, the unification of the south and the 
north was felt so necessary, it is appropriate for us to have a unitary 
state such as the centralized government of France. So we should adopt 
the French cabinet system. 4 
When an elected Congress worked out a draft for a permanent 
constitution in 1913, it adhered to the cabinet system, which requires all 
the President's acts to be countersigned by a member of the govern-
mer.<. This greatly angered Yuan Shih-kai, who had by then become 
dissatisfied with his already dictatorial presidential power. 
What is significant here is the fact that, primarily in fear of a single 
person, the early constitution-makers of China forsook the American 
presidential system, which, as later developments attested, never was 
considered by the subsequent Chinese constitution-makers with the 
same force. 
After disbanding the Congress by force, Yuan Shih-kai sought to 
put himself on the throne. In this he failed. But great damage was done 
to the cause of republicanism in China, because, although the Congress 
3. In this Provisional Constitution, the rights and duties of the people were for the 
first time itemized, but the rights of the people are subject to legislative restrictions. See 
Hsieh Cheng-min, History of Legislation, p. 362. 
4. These words were Ku Chung-Hsiu's; see Hsieh Chung-min, p. 49. 
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was soon reassembled and the constitution-making efforts were made 
to continue in the following ten years, warlords began to vie with one 
another for control of the central government in Peking. Since they 
were not genuinely willing to see China embrace constitutionalism, 
which would threaten their own positions, the constitutional drafts 
drawn up in 1919, 1923, and 1924, respectively, were either abortive or 
never enforced. These drafts all adopted the French cabinet system, but 
each time in a more elaborate form. 
However, two things that came up during this agonizing period of 
constitution-making had obvious American influence. First a bicameral 
Congress comprised of a Senate and a House of Representatives based 
on the American model was adopted by the constitutional draft of 1913 
and followed by the subsequent drafts mentioned above.s Second, when 
the governors of Kiang-su and Chekiang sent out a joint proposal 
calling for a meeting of the provincial representatives to discuss the 
formation of some kind of national government, they explicitly indi-
cated that "the system of the United States of America should be the 
future pattern of our country." This pronouncement had no small 
impact on the later movement for "united autonomous provinces" that 
began to gain groun9 during 1920-21. Frustrated by political and 
military strife, many provinces advocated a kind of federalism by the 
making of provincial constitutions, on the one hand, and a constitu-
tion of united provinces, on the other. At one time, it was openly 
proclaimed that all provinces should first enact their own constitutions 
and then, following the American example, seek to create a constitu-
tion for the Republic of China. 6 But the movement did not go very far, 
because it soon met with strong opposition from many sources. 
At the time when the warlords battled against each other in the 
north, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the Republic, rallied the 
revolutionary forces of his Nationalist Party in South China to oppose 
them. He was not to see China unified before he died in 1925. The 
unification of China was left for his devoted disciple, Generalissimo 
Chiang Kai-shek, to complete when in 1926 he successfully carried 
through the northern expedition which wiped out the major warlords. 
The capital was moved to Nanking, and a new epoch began in China's 
efforts to make a permanent constitution, this time on the basis of the 
theory of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People and the 
doctrine of separation of five powers. 7 
5. Ibid., pp. 364-365. 
6. Ibid., p. 176. 
7. This was also the time when basic Chinese laws were codified, following in 
general the European continental system. For an introduction to prevailing Chinese laws 
and legal system in English, see Herbert H. P. Ma, "General Features of the Law and 
Legal System of the Republic of C,hina," in Trade and lnveslment in Taiwan: The Legal 
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III 
Often translated as the Principle of Nationalism, the Principle of 
Democracy, and the Principle of People's Livelihood, these three 
principles provide the theoretical bases for the cause of revolution and 
national construction. Since so much has been written about them, it is 
sufficient for our purpose to say that they aim at national unity and 
independence, a government of popular sovereignty and the general 
welfare of the people. s The separation of five powers as a direct 
guideline for constitution-making is meant to implement the three 
principles. While this theory and doctrine are unique in many senses, 
they are not cut off from the main currents of political thought 
underlying any democratic form of government. Indeed, it has been 
asserted that Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People were in 
the main of American origin. The immediate inspiration of the three 
principles was said to be Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, particularly his 
"government of the people, by the people and for the people."9 How-
ever, since Dr. Sun Yat-sen in elaborating his three principles obviously 
resorted to many sources, Eastern as well as Western, European as well 
as American, the above assertion is only true to the extent that 
Lincoln's words probably gave a powerful impetus to Dr. Sun's forming 
the idea of three principles of the people. 
On the other hand, the separation of five powers as a foundation of 
China's constitutional structure is not a departure from, but an im-
provement on, Montesquieu's doctrine of separation of powers. The 
ingenuity of separating the powers of examination and impeachment, 
traditionally highly developed in China, from the executive and legisla-
tive powers and according them independent status marks the unique-
ness of the doctrine. In this way, a government of qualified persons 
chosen by means of competitive civil service examinations may be 
ensured. On the other hand, the power of impeachment may no longer 
be used to achieve partisan purposes in parliament, but may be 
exercised independently to help bring about a clean and efficient 
government. Dr. Sun Yat-sen believed, however, that a five-power 
and Economic Environment in the Republic of China, edited by Richard Cosway, 
Herbert H. P. Ma, and Warren Shattuck (Taipei: Mei-ya Publishing Company, 1973), 
chap. I, pp. 1-50; Herbert H. P. Ma, "The Legal System of the Republic of China," 
Lawasia, 5 (December 1974): 96-127; Herbert Han-Pao Ma, "Legal System of the 
Republic of China," in Rabies Zeitschrift fiir auslandisches und internationales Privat-
recht, 37. Jahrgang 1973, Heft I Paul Siebeck, Tubingen, pp. 101-110. 
8. For an authoritative interpretation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's teachings, see Ts'ui 
Shu-chin, New Commentaries on the Three Principles of the People (in Chinese), 4th ed. 
(Taipei, 1959). 
9. See Arthur N. Holcombe, The Chinese Revolution: A Phase in the Regenera-
tion of Power (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1930), pp. 134-135. 
44 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
government plan would not be able to substantiate popular sovereignty 
as advocated by him unless the demarcation of political powers and 
administrative (government) powers were realized. In short, Dr. Sun 
Yat-sen would push the idea of direct democracy to the extent pos~ble 
by installing a popularly elected National Assembly armed with the 
political powers of election, recall, initiative, and referendum, so that 
the five-power government would function according to the will of the 
people.1o On the basis of these doctrines, the Organic Law of the 
National Government was formulated in 1928 to create the first five-
power national government under the leadership of the Nationalist 
Party (Kuomintang). 
In the subsequent years constitution-making efforts continued 
steadily. In 1931 a Provisional Constitution was adopted, consisting of 
eighty-nine articles to be divided into eight chapters. This document 
recognized the supremacy of the Kuomintang during the period of 
political tutelage in that "the National Congress of the Kuomintang 
delegates shall exercise the powers on behalf of the National As-
sembly." But this period of party rule was supposed to be of short 
duration. Hence, after 1932, drafts of the permanent constitution began 
to be proposed and released to the public for comment and criticism. It 
was only after six revisions that the draft became final on May 5 in 
1936. Hence the popular name, "May 5th Draft Constitution. "11 
Unfortunately, the constitution-making task was interrupted, first 
by the Sino-Japanese war, which broke out the next year and lasted for 
eight years, then by the political crises started by the Chinese Com-
munists who, taking advantage of the war, had been made so strong as 
to threaten the existing government and its determination to introduce 
a permanent constitution. To keep the country united the government 
agreed to a Political Consultation Conference to settle the differences of 
all major political parties with regard to constitution-making. Although 
certain agreements were reached, the Communists and leftist parties 
still refused to participate. The National Assembly finally met to pass a 
revised version of the May 5th Draft Constitution as guided by the 
agreements, on December 25, 1946. 
Since the present Constitution differs from the May 5th Draft 
Constitution in both form and substance, it is pertinent to point out the 
highlights of that draft before dealing with the present Constitution in 
more detail. The May 5th Draft Constitution is by and large in 
conformity with the guidelines bequeathed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. As far 
10. For a general explanation in English of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's five-power theory of 
government, see Hsieh K wan-sheng, A Brief Survey of the Chinese Constitution (Taipei, 
1954), pp. 1-17. 
II. An account of this laborious procedure is found in W. Y. Tsao, Constitutional 
Structure of Modern China (n. I above), pp. 17-19. 
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as government structure is concerned, it entrusted the four political 
powers with a popularly elected National Assembly, which elects and 
recalls, among other officials, the President and Vice-President of the 
Republic. The President of the Republic, on the other hand, possesses 
actual power, and the office resembles to a large extent that of the 
President of the United States of America. He appoints all the top 
officials of the executive department of the central government, who are 
individually responsible to him. Though his acts must be countersigned 
by the president of the Executive Yuan, the fact that the President of 
the Republic chairs the meetings of the Executive Yuan Council gives 
him every opportunity to exert his influence. 12 
IV 
The Constitution in its present form consists of 175 articles divided into 
14 chapters.IJ It was meant to cover all the major points of Dr. Sun Yat-
sen's constitutional theories and the principles agreed upon at the 
Political Consultation Conference participated in by leaders of the then 
existing political parties. For this reason, some deviations from the 
May 5th Draft Constitution were unavoidable. Consequently, there has 
been much argument as to whether as a result the present constitution is 
not less conformative to Dr. Sun Yat-sen's teachings than the May 5th 
Draft Constitution. However, the following introduction to the present 
Constitution of the Republic of China will be done only in terms of 
whatever relationship its provisions may have with the United States 
Constitution and constitutional law. 
First of all, the Chinese Constitution, like the U.S. Constitution, has 
a preamble setting forth the theoretical bases and the major aims of the 
fundamental law of the land. And nothing in the Chinese Constitution 
shows more affiliation with the United States of America than its 
Article I, which declares that "The Republic of China, founded on the 
Three Principles of the People, shall be a democratic republic of the 
people, to be governed by the people and for the people." While the 
origin of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People may have 
derived from Lincoln's famous words, there has been criticism against 
the advisability of equating the two and qualifying national polity with 
those obvious "foreign slogans."I4 
12. For a detailed analysis of the May 5th Draft Constitution, see W. Y. Tsao, 
Constitutional Structure. 
13. It should be noted that to meet the unexpected needs of the period of war with 
the Communists a few Provisional Clauses were added to the Constitution by the 
National Assembly from 1945-1966. An official English translation of the Chinese 
Constitution and the Provisional Clauses may be found in the appendix of the China 
Year Book. For a general introduction to the present Constitution in English, see Hsieh 
Kwan-sheng, op. cit. 
14. Se~ ~sieh Ying-chow, The Constitution of the Republic of China (in Chinese), 
6th ed: (Taipei, 1954), pp. 26-27. 
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Under the chapter on Rights and Duties of the People there are 
articles corresponding to the Bill of Rights in the United States 
Constitution. For example, the people are guaranteed (l) freedom of 
speech, lecturing, writing, and publication (Article II, first amend-
ment), (2) freedom of religious faith (Article 13, first amendment), (3) 
freedom of assembly and of association (Article 14, first amendment), 
(4) freedom of person (Article 8, fourth amendment), (5) right to 
present petitions, to file complaints, and to institute legal proceedings 
(Article 16, first amendment). Article 22 ofthe Chinese Constitution is 
strikingly similar to the Ninth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
That Article provides that "all other freedoms and rights of the people 
that are not detrimental to social order or public welfare shall be 
guaranteed under the Constitution." 
However, while the Chinese Constitution, like its American coun-
terpart, guarantees individual freedoms and rights without qualifica-
tion, restriction of them is allowable under conditions set forth in 
Article 23, namely: (I) to prevent infringement upon the freedoms of 
other persons, (2) to avert an imminent crisis, (3) to maintain social 
order, (4) to advance public welfare. 
The governmental structure as found in the present Constitution is 
based in general on Dr. Sun Yat-sen's demarcation of political and 
administrative powers and the separation of five administrative powers. 
There are a National Assembly, a President, and five Yuan: the 
Executive Yuan, the Legislative Yuan, the Judicial Yuan, the Examina-
tion Yuan, and the Control Yuan. Compared with the National As-
sembly as defined in the May 5th Draft Constitution, the present 
National Assembly is so limited in its powers that in practice it only 
elects the President and Vice-President of the Republic. For this reason, 
it has been derogatively likened to the American presidential electoral 
college.' 5 
Of particular relevance to our purpose is the frequent question 
whether the central government structure adopted by the Chinese 
Constitution is modeled on the American presidential system or on the 
British cabinet system. This question can best be answered in light of 
the triangular relationship between the President, the Executive Yuan, 
and the Legislative Yuan. Article 57 reads: 
!.The Executive Yuan has the duty to present to the Legislative 
Yuan a statement of its administrative policies and a report on its 
15. The present Constitution provides for initiative and referendum only for 
constitutional amendments, not for ordinary legislation, and limits election and recall to 
the offices of President and Vice-President of the Republic (Article 27). However, in 1966 
the National Assembly, on the basis of the Provisional Clauses to the Constitution, 
enacted a set of rules in accordance with which the National Assembly may initiate 
principles and practice referendum for central government legislation. These powers and 
the power to recall are seldom practiced. 
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administration. While the Legislative Yuan is in session, Members of the 
Legislative Yuan shall have the right to question the President and the 
Ministers and Chairmen of Commissions of the Executive Yuan. 
2. If the Legislative Yuan does not concur in any important policy 
of the Executive Yuan, it may, by resolution, request the Execu-
tive Yuan to alter such a policy. With respect to such resolu-
tion, the Executive Yuan may, with the approval of the President 
of the Republic, request the Legislative Yuan for reconsideration. If, 
after reconsideration, two-thirds of the Members of the Legislative Yuan 
present at the meeting uphold the original resolution, the President of the 
Executive Yuan shall either abide by the same or resign from office. 
3. If the Executive Yuan deems a resolution on a statutory, budge-
tary, or treaty bill passed by the Legislative Yuan difficult of execu-
tion, it may, with the approval of the President of the Republic and 
within ten days after its transmission to the Executive Yuan, request 
the Legislative Yuan to reconsider the said resolution. If, after recon-
sideration, two-thirds of the Members of the Legislative Yuan present 
at the meeting uphold the original resolution, the President of the Execu-
tive Yuan shall either abide by the same or resign from office. 
If the above provision gives one the initial impression that the 
system contained therein appears to be both cabinet and presidential, a 
closer look indicates that it is neither the one nor the other. While the 
President of the Executive Yuan (the Prime Minister) is made respon-
sible to the Legislative Yuan, Article 57 expressly prohibits members of 
the Legislative Yuan from holding government posts concurrently, and 
the President of the Executive Yuan is not given the power to dissolve 
the legislature. On the other hand, while the President of the Republic, 
subject to the consent of the legislature, does nominate and appoint the 
President of the Executive Yuan,l6 his power of appointment ceases 
there and does not reach down to the Vice-President of the Executive 
Yuan and the various heads of the ministries and commissions.17 And 
unlike the American system, where the President is the ultimate deci-
sion maker, the Executive Yuan meeting, which the President of the 
Yuan himself chairs, makes the decisions on all important matters of 
the State. 18 Article 57 does adopt the veto power, the prerogative of the 
American President, but it is exercised by the President of the Execu-
tive Yuan. The President of the Republic only reserves the power of 
approval. So analyzed, the Chinese government system is of a unique 
type taking after both the British cabinet system and the American 
presidential system. 
One may next ask whether the American judicial review system, 
which has been adopted by many countries, obtains in the Chinese Con-
stitution. If by judicial review is meant the power vested in the judiciary 
to interpret the Constitution and to repudiate the applicability of laws 
16. Constitution, Article 55. 17. Article 56. 18. Article 58. 
48 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
inconsistent with the Constitution, it has its counterpart in the Chinese 
Constitution. 
According to the provisions of Articles 78, 79, 171, and 173 of the 
Constitution, the Council of Grand Justices, a component part of the 
Judicial Yuan, is vested with the exclusive power of judicial review and 
the power of interpreting the Constitution and unifying the interpreta-
tions of laws and ordinances.t9 Among other things, the Council alone 
is to determine whether a law or an ordinance is in conflict with the 
Constitution. However, interpretation can be given only upon re-
quest by governmental organs or the people and not of the Council's 
own initiative.2o 
On the other hand, the ordinary courts, unlike their American 
counterparts, have no power of judicial review as to whether a law is in 
conflict with the Constitution. Only if a judgment is deemed to be in 
conflict with the Constitution does the litigant concerned have the right 
to state this in the reasons for his appeal to a higher court while the 
proceedings for the case are still in progress.21 It is not made clear 
whether a higher court must necessarily accept this as a fact, nor what 
the higher court can do if it affirms the allegation in the appeal. 
Finally, a few words about the Control Yuan may be in order. 
Although based on the traditional Chinese censorial system, the Con-
trol Yuan as found in the present Constitution is to a certain extent in its 
organization modeled on the United States Senate. 22 For example, mem-
bers of the Control Yuan are basically elected by provincial and munici-
pal councils, the number being five from each province and two from 
each municipality. They are prohibited from occupying any other public 
office during the time for which they are elected.23 One of the majorfunc-
tions of the Control Yuan is to exercise the power of consent in the ap-
pointment of the President, Vice-President, and Grand Justices of the 
Judicial Yuan, and the President, Vice-President, and Members of the 
Examination Yuan.24 In fact, it was on the basis of its similarity to the 
upper house of a Western parliament or congress, such as the United 
States Senate, that the Control Yuan, the National Assembly, and the 
19. Article 78 provides: "The Judicial Yuan shall interpret the Constitution and 
shall have the power to unify the interpretation of laws and orders." Article 79 provides: 
"The Judicial Yuan shall have a certain number of Grand Justices to take charge of 
matters specified in Article 78 of this Constitution." Article 171 provides: "Laws that are 
in conflict with the Constitution shall be null and void." Article 173 provides: "The 
Constitution shall be interpreted by the Judicial Yuan." 
20. Law governing the Council of the Grand Justices, Articles 2, 3, and 4. 
21. Interpretation of Council of Grand Justices, Shih Tzu No. 9, 1952. 
22. For an introduction to the Chinese Control Yuan, see Herbert Han-Pao Ma, 
"The Chinese Control Yuan: An Independent Supervisory Organ of the State," Wash-
ington University Law Quarterly, no. 4 (December 1963), pp. 401-426. 
23. Constitution, Articles 93 and 103. 
24. Articles 79 and 84. 
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Legislative Yuan jointly were regarded by the Council of Grand Justices 
as being equivalent to a "parliament" of a Western democracy.25 
v 
In the above paragraphs, instances of American influence exerted and 
felt during the extended period of Chinese constitution-making were 
given. These instances, large or small, mostly refer to the formation of 
the Constitution as a document-whether it be the language used, 
institutions adopted, or theories preferred. 
Once the Constitution is framed, the next task is to work out a 
technique of interpretation and application of the Constitution in order 
that a law of the Constitution may be developed. This is based on the 
assumption that a constitution, like any code, could not provide a 
solution for all controversies that might arise, no matter how carefully 
it was drawn up. In other words, a written constitution is not the whole 
of constitutional law, and many questions can only be answered by 
means of judicial decision or interpretation aided by doctrinal exposi-
tion. In this way the constitution is put on a working basis, and a law of 
the constitution may be developed. It is with this understanding that 
attempts will be made in the following to see whether and how the 
American experiences may be resorted to in the development of the 
constitutional law of the Republic of China. 
First, a mention of some historical facts is pertinent in this 
connection. Two years after the promulgation of the Constitution of 
1947, the Chinese Communists overran the country and the Nationalist 
government retreated from the mainland to the island province of 
Taiwan. It brought with it the Constitution, the laws, and the legal 
system intact, and they have since been in force within the present 
territories of the Republic of China. In other words, there is a continua-
tion in the Constitution proper since it was framed in 1947, but the 
interpretation and application of the Constitution are limited to the 
experiences after the Nationalist government moved to Taiwan in 
1949.26 
25. Interpretation of Council of Grand Justices, Shih Tzu No. 76, 1957. 
26. Because the Chinese Communists across the Taiwan Strait have continued to 
threaten to take the island province of Taiwan by force, the Republic of China has been 
continually kept under martial law. However, the economic growth and the prevailing 
peace and stability enjoyed by the society as a whole have made it unnecessary to apply 
such measures as are authorized by martial law, except in a few special cases. In other 
words, to conform to the actual situation of the country, a set of rules has been enacted to 
limit the jurisdiction of military courts to certain specific categories of serious crimes 
leaving most other cases to ordinary courts. It is now a well-known fact that th~ 
government has not stopped making efforts to relax existing restrictions. Under these 
circumstances, ~eveloping the law of the Constitution, even in the area of guaranteed 
freedoms and nghts of the people, is not absolutely impossible, as this paper will show 
later. 
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It should first be remembered that the Chinese Constitution, while 
based on Dr. Sun Yat-sen's unique political theories, has incorporated 
provisions taken from both continental European and Anglo-American 
constitutional systems together with their respective legal techniques. It 
should also be emphasized that there is great diversity in training of the 
people who participated in the framing of the Chinese Constitution and 
people who have interpreted and applied it. These people were trained 
in Germany, in France, in England, in America, in Japan, or in China 
by teachers with a like diversity of training. When they come to 
interpret and apply the Constitution, they are likely to do so from 
different standpoints and with different techniques. This will inevitably 
lead to an unsystematic interpretation and application of the Constitu-
tion, which is detrimental to the development of constitutional law in 
the Republic of China. Therefore, there has been felt an imperative 
need for a unified interpretation and application of the Constitution, 
which can be brought about by intelligent use of the doctrinal and 
judicial development of European and Anglo-American constitutions 
which have contributed to the framing of the Chinese Constitution. By 
intelligent use is meant an adaptation of these foreign experiences, 
theoretical and technical, to the basic ideas and techniques of Dr. Sun 
Yat-sen and the general constitutional and legal framework developed 
on the basis of them. 27 
On this assumption, any provision in the Chinese Constitution 
which is of American origin should therefore be interpreted and applied 
in light of an adaptation of the American doctrinal and technical 
development concerned to the basic Chinese teachings and consti-
tutional and legal framework. This is often easier said than done. But as 
a general guideline to be borne in mind in the development of Chinese 
constitutional law, the approach is sound and workable. An example 
would serve to show the direction. However, the adoption of a more 
basic approach in the U.S. Constitution should perhaps first be con-
sidered. 
As is well known, the United States Constitution is both a legal 
and a political document. But in America the Constitution is more a 
legal than a political document. It is enforced and applied in the courts 
as the "supreme law of the land," binding legally not only all private 
27. For this basic assumption the present writer is indebted to Dean Roscoe Pound, 
who served as Advisor to the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of China in Nanking 
between 1946 and 1948. During these two years he commented often on the Chinese law and 
legal system and suggested how to better apply them. His comments have been published 
in different places, for example, Some Problems of the Administration of Justice in China 
(Nanking: National Chengchi University, 1948); The Law in China as Seen by Roscoe 
Pound, edited by Tsao Wen-yen (Taipei: China Culture Publishing Foundation, 1953). In 
particular, his opinions on how to develop a true constitutional law on the basis of the 
then newly framed Chinese Constitution are full of insight and foresight. The subsequent 
discussion in this paper is mainly enlightened by them. 
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persons but all officials and government agencies. Like the U.S. Consti-
tution, the Chinese Constitution is also both a legal and a political 
document in the sense that it is not only a frame of government, a 
declaration of national policies, but also a body of the supreme law of 
the land. Article 8, which guarantees personal freedom by the privilege 
of habeas corpus, and Article 24, under which wrongful exercise of 
authority may create a liability enforceable in the courts, attest to this. 
What is significant in making this comparison is that there is the 
need of a body of principles derived from the Chinese Constitution by a 
legal technique to deal with controversies arising under it. For instance, 
disputes over the jurisdictional lines between the several Yuan are likely 
to rise as the operation of the Constitution increases. How is legislation 
in contravention of the Constitution to be made void by Article 171? 
How are administrative ordinances in conflict with the Constitution 
invalidated by Article 172? And how may guaranteed rights and 
freedoms of individuals be infringed? These and other matters are 
questions of law and should be solved by judges and jurists with legal 
methods rather than by politicians over conference tables. In other 
words, so far as constitutional law can be made a body of interde-
pendent principles and rules, it is important to make it such. And in this 
respect American experience as a whole is invaluable. 
VI 
From here it is convenient to go back to the above assumption that the 
interpretation and application of any provision in the Chinese Consti-
tution which is based on the American model should be done in light of 
an adaptation of the relevant American doctrinal and technical devel-
opment to the basic Chinese constitutional and legal environment. 
Article 8 of the Chinese Constitution is a good example. In definite 
terms it provides: 
Personal freedom shall be guaranteed to the people. Except in case 
of flagrante delicto as provided by law, no person shall be arrested or 
detained otherwise than by a judicial or a police organ in accordance 
with the procedure prescribed by law. No person shall be tried or pun-
ished otherwise than by a law court in accordance with the procedure 
prescribed by law. Any arrest, detention, trial, or punishment which is 
not in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law may be resisted. 
When a person is arrested or detained on suspicion of having com-
mitted a crime, the organ making the arrest or detention shall in writing 
inform the said person, and his designated relative or friend of the 
grounds for his arrest or detention, and shall, within 24 hours, t~rn him 
over to a coml?~tent court for trial. The said person or any other 
person may petition the competent court that a writ be served within 
24 hours on the organ making the arrest for the surrender of the said 
person for trial. 
The court shall not reject the petition mentioned in the preceding 
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paragraph, nor shall it order the organ concerned to make an investiga-
tion and report first. The organ concerned shall not refuse to execute, 
or delay in executing, the writ of the court for the surrender of the said 
person for trial. 
When a person is unlawfully arrested or detained by any organ, he 
or any other person may petition the court for an investigation. The 
court shall not reject such a petition, and shall, within 24 hours, investi-
gate the action of the organ concerned and deal with the matter in ac-
cordance with law. 
That this Article adopted the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus 
as found in Article I, Section 9, of the U.S. Constitution is beyond 
doubt. In fact there had been in force before the introduction of the 
present Constitution a law entitled the Habeas Corpus Act, which now 
serves to strengthen the provision in the Constitution.2s 
What calls for discussion is this expression in the above Article: 
"No person shall be tried or punished otherwise than by a law court in 
accordance with the procedure prescribed by law." It was argued that, 
from the standpoint of the Anglo-American legal system in which the 
writ of habeas corpus originated and long operated, this sounds very 
good. But to the Chinese, who are more accustomed to the French 
regime of police handling of petty police offences informally, interpre-
tation and application of this portion of Article 8 to the letter will lead 
to awkward results. A preferable way is to change "a law court" to "a 
judicial authority" and to prescribe by legislation the procedure in case 
of minor infractions of police regulations, thus bringing the customary 
practice within the Constitution. The dissatisfaction and inconvenience 
in the American system of traffic courts for petty cases in large cities 
have also been advanced as reasons for rephrasing this portion of 
Article 8 of the Chinese Constitution.29 However, the actual develop-
ment in the past two decades seems to uphold the system as defined in 
the Chinese Constitution, which is in conformity with its Anglo-Ameri-
can archetype. As a matter of fact, years ago the constitutionality of the 
Law for the Punishment of Police Offences, which has been in force 
since 1943, was formally challenged, and the case eventually ended up 
in the Council of Grand Justices awaiting an interpretation. This is a 
strong indication that the court rather than the police station is thought 
to be the place where better protection for personal freedom is afforded. 
28. Enacted in 1935 and enforced since 1946, this Act has ten articles specifying the 
procedural details of the privilege of habeas corpus. 
29. These arguments were advanced by a person no other than Roscoe Pound 
himself. (See The Law in China as Seen by Roscoe Pound, p. 2.) To promote a rule of law 
in the Western sense, he would have advised more use of the court in China. That he 
should have argued otherwise than this in this example might be reputed partly to his 
concern that unsuccessful molding of established customs by legislation would render the 
legislation concerned ineffectual. This is also consistent with the basic tenet of his 
sociological jurisprudence. 
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It is also interesting to note that, contrary to the American experience 
alleged above, traffic divisions have been established in the district 
courts in major cities of this country to govern the rapidly increasing 
traffic cases, which were formerly exclusively handled by the police. In 
a country to which constitutionalism and a rule of law in the Western 
sense are historically unknown and traditionally strange, these tenden-
cies in the development of her constitutional law are healthy and 
encouraging. 
VII 
Another example of American influence on the development of the 
interpretation and application of the Chinese Constitution may be 
given. Article 24 of the Chinese Constitution provides: 
Any public functionary who, in violation of law, infringes upon the 
freedom or right of any person shall, in addition to being subject to 
disciplinary measures in accordance with law, be held responsible under 
criminal and civil laws. The injured person may, in accordance with law, 
claim compensation from the State for damage sustained. 
This Article, like Article 8, secures the protection of the freedoms 
and rights of the people and may be directly enforced by the courts. 
Borrowing from both the European continental system and the Anglo-
American system, it has to do, first, with the civil and criminal liability 
of public functionaries for injuries caused by their acts to individuals in 
the operations of government, and second, with the liability of the 
government to answer for damages sustained by the injured individuals. 
More specifically, the purpose of this Article is mainly to provide 
compensation for the injured person. As far as this aspect of the Article 
is concerned, the injured person may either hold the public functionary 
causing the wrong to be answerable or call upon the government itself 
for compensation. 
The idea of holding the government responsible for the acts of its 
officers is, in American law, based on the common law principle of 
respondeat superior, that is, let the principal or master be answerable 
for the acts of his agent or servant.JO This principle, as a matter of fact, 
is not completely unknown to Chinese law. Article 187 of the Chinese 
Civil Code explicitly provides: "The employer is jointly liable to make 
compensation for any damage which the employee wrongfully causes to 
the rights of another person in the performance of his duty." 
In the case of exacting compensation from the wrong-doing public 
functionary, the injured person may resort to civil law proceedings, as 
the first part of Article 24 implies. When the government itself is the 
30. See 2 American Jurisprudence 270, Broom's Legal Maxims 843. 
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target, the purpose of Article 24 can be achieved only with the help of 
special legislation, as is obvious from the latter portion of its provisions. 
This was also modeled on the experiences of both European continental 
law and American law.JI 
As for the Chinese legislation relevant to Article 24 of the Consti-
tution, it is the Law Governing Compensation for Wrongful Convic-
tions of 1959. As the title indicates, this Law only governs criminal 
cases in which the innocent has been convicted. The significant thing 
about this legislation is that it adopted the principle of liability without 
fault, again following the example of many countries, including the 
United States of America. Specifically, it includes injuries to individuals 
in the course of government, which are not due to the wrong-doing of 
public functionaries or which are not the result of violation of law by 
public functionaries. This is based on the conviction that the necessary 
ground for compensation should be whether there has been a wrong or 
an injury sustained, not whether there is violation of law on the part of 
public functionaries.J2 Only in this way are the freedoms and rights of 
the people sustained. 
What is of particular interest here is that the remedies provided by 
Article 24 of the Constitution are available only in cases in which the 
public functionary concerned has infringed the freedom or right of an 
individual in violation of law. In other words, Article 24, based on the 
traditional principle of no fault-no liability, is narrower in scope in 
providing for compensation for the injured. As a result, the question 
was raised as to the constitutionality of the Law Governing Wrongful 
Convictions. However, it is heartening to see that most law teachers and 
doctrinal writers of importance have in recent years come to support 
the Law.JJ Outstanding among the opinions expressed is the argument 
that the Law not only conforms to the general trend of modern 
legislation but also serves to realize the ultimate purpose of Chapter 
Two of the Chinese Constitution, namely: the protection of the free-
doms and rights of the people.J4 One may even go so far as to say that 
this piece of legislation also serves to implement the fundamental 
Principle of People's Livelihood, which in essence is to help bring about 
a service state for the general good of the people. 
31. For instance, special legislation or provisions obtained in Switzerland, Germany, 
Austria, the states of New York, California, Wisconsin, and North Dakota. 
32. See Ho Tso-chih, A Treatise on the Chinese Law Governing Wrongful Convictions 
(in Chinese) (Taipei, 1959), p. 102. 
33. Notably, Lin Chi-tung, Commentaries of the Constitution of the Republic of 
China (in Chinese) (Taipei, 1960), p. 164; Ho Tso-chih, op. cit., pp. 102-103, 159-161. 
34. See Ho Tso-chih, p. 103. 
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VIII 
In conclusion, it seems clear that the usefulness of comparative consti-
tutional law was not exhausted in the framing of the Constitution. It 
does and will enter into the interpretation and application of many 
constitutional provisions. However, it should be remembered that the 
major Jaws of the Republic of China were codified on the basis of 
continental European models, especially German and Swiss codes. 
Hence, as far as basic concepts, principles, and techniques are con-
cerned, modern Chinese law and the modern Chinese legal system are 
similar to other legal systems influenced by the reception of Roman 
law. 
As this paper has modestly shown, in the formation of the Chinese 
Constitution American influence was apparently present though in 
different degrees. For this reason, in the development of Chinese consti-
tutional Jaw, American influence will have to continue so that borrow-
ings of American origin may be properly adapted to a codification on 
continental European lines. What is more important, the Chinese 
Constitution is founded on Dr. Sun Yat-sen's unique political doc-
trines. Any adaptation of Western institutions, European or Anglo-
American, will have to fit into the basic constitutional framework as 
defined by those doctrines. This calls for a well-developed juristic 
technique, which Chinese legal scholars and judges must work out for 
themselves. Inasmuch as such a technique must be developed mainly by 
judicial decision and interpretation, American experience will prove to 
be invaluable. 
IV 
India 
Editorial Note 
India has a population of approximately 600 million, of whom about 85 
percent live in the country's half-million villages. Most are poor: per 
capita gross national product in 1974 was $98. While most of the Indian 
people are Hindus, II percent are Muslims and another 5 percent are 
Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, and followers of tribal religions. 
The population is also extremely diverse in language and culture: the 
Constitution of India confers the status of official languages on four-
teen of the country's languages. 
Agriculture is the base of India's economy. Self-sufficiency in 
agricultural production has been attained in some years in the late 
1960s and 1970s, but the uncertainties of the monsoons and the sharp 
rise in the price of artificial fertilizers have left agricultural production 
unpredictable each year. Since Independence, a number of industries 
have also been developed. India now makes some of its own steel, 
vehicles, farm machines, and other heavy goods and exports industrial 
products to other countries in Asia and to Africa. It must still import 
some industrial goods, however, and is dependent on other countries 
for petroleum and artificial fertilizers. 
India attained independence from Great Britain in August 1947. 
After two and a half years as a dominion in the British Empire, India 
became a republic with the coming into force of the Constitution in 
January 1950. The government created by this Constitution is patterned 
(56) 
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largely after the British parliamentary system. Parliament is composed 
of two houses. Of these, the upper house (Rajya Sabha, or House of the 
States), like the British House of Lords, has little legislative power. The 
lower house (Lok Sabha, or House of the People) is the principal 
legislative body. The executive powers rest with the Prime Minister, 
who is a member of the Lok Sabha. The President of India, though 
titular head of state, has very limited powers. 
India is a federation. Each of the twenty-three states has its own 
government, each on a parliamentary model similar to that of the 
Central government. However, the Constitution envisions a strong 
central government. It is possible for the President of India to dissolve a 
state government and rule the state directly from New Delhi, and this 
step has been taken on a number of occasions. 
From Independence until 1977 the dominant party in national 
politics was the Congress Party, which led the movement for indepen-
dence from Britain. All national governments until 1977 were Congress 
governments, under three different prime ministers. There were a 
number of opposition parties throughout this time, however, and some 
of them were strong enough to control intermittently several of the state 
governments. In 1969 the Congress Party split, but in the national 
elections in 1971 Indira Gandhi, who had been Prime Minister since 
1967, and her segment of the Congress Party won a heavy majority in 
Parliament. 
In 1974 there were massive political agitations in several states 
against Mrs. Gandhi's Congress Party. In early 1975 a High Court 
judge found Mrs. Gandhi guilty of corrupt practices in the 1971 election 
campaign for her Lok Sabha seat. This increased the agitation and 
brought demands that Mrs. Gandhi resign. Instead, citing the civil 
disturbances caused by the agitations against her, the President of India 
at Mrs. Gandhi's request declared a State of Emergency, in accordance 
with Article 352 of the Constitution. Civil liberties were sharply cur-
tailed, and the press was put under heavy censorship. Most opposition 
political leaders were quickly arrested and held for months without 
being charged. It was such a detention that was challenged in the 
Shivkant Shukla case, mentioned by Dr. Tripathi. 
The overwhelming parliamentary majority attained by Mrs. Gan-
dhi's Congress Party in the 1971 elections made it possible for the 
government to amend the Constitution without much difficulty: the 
Forty-second Amendment was passed at this time. In early 1976 the 
Parliament, whose term would have expired that year, extended its own 
term for one year, as it was entitled to do under Article 83 (2) of the 
Constitution. The elections were finally called in early 1977; most of the 
opposition politicians were released from jail to campaign, and the 
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newspapers, which had been subjected to strict censorship throughout 
the Emergency, were permitted some freedom in covering the elections. 
Mrs. Gandhi's party was badly beaten in the March 1977 elections and 
the Emergency was immediately ended by the President. The new 
government has promised to amend the Constitution again to nullify 
most of the amendments passed by the Congress Parliament during the 
Emergency. 
At the time of the Bicentennial symposium (1976: see the Preface) 
the Emergency was firmly established; Parliament had just extended its 
own term, and it looked as though the Emergency would last indefi-
nitely. At the last minute Dr. Tripathi was not permitted to leave India 
to attend the Committee on Asian Law sessions in North America. Dr. 
Tripathi's contribution to this volume was written after the change in 
government in the spring of 1977. 
May 22, 1978 ROBERT HAYDEN 
MARC GALANTER 
Introduction 
Perspectives on the 
American Constitutional Influence 
on the Constitution of India 
P. K. Tripathi 
Professor of Law, University of Delhi 
Irrespective of whether recourse to the doctrine of judicial review was 
intended or "invited" by the framers of the United States Constitution or 
was plainly a usurpation of power by Chief Justice Marshall and his 
Court, the doctrine has come to be recogp.ized as an outstanding 
American contribution to world culture. Based on the seminal English 
principle of rule of law-or being, in fact, a maturer paradigm of it-the 
doctrine has realized the utmost potentialities of that great principle. In 
England, the principle of rule of law ensured that executive action would 
comply with established standards of legality and propriety, but it 
stopped short of enforcing those standards against parliamentary legis-
lation. The credit for overcoming that inhibition and subjecting the 
legislature also to judicial scrutiny for compliance with those standards 
goes to the United States. 
The claim to share with the United States allegiance to the doctrine 
of judicial review is a cachet of cultural attainment which many nations 
should be eager to own. Several countries have, in fact, incorporated 
the doctrine in their written constitutions. But in this respect, constitu-
tional text is not enough, and actual conduct is of the essence. 
Even in the United States, the doctrine and its application have not 
been free from practical and even theoretical difficulties. Crises like the 
Civil War and the confrontation between President Roosevelt and his 
Supreme Court have been attributed, at least in part, to the unimagina-
tive application of the doctrine. The anti-majoritarian principle inher-
ent in the exercise of the doctrine has been recognized ever since its very 
inception. 1 More recently, towards the beginning of the century, James 
Bradley Thayer warned that exercise of the power of judicial review "is 
I. Jefferson's opposition to it is well known. 
(59) 
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always attended with a serious evil," namely, that of depriving people of 
"the political experience and the moral education and stimulus that 
comes from fighting the question out in the ordinary way, and correct-
ing their own errors" and with the tendency "to dwarf the political 
capacity of the people and to deaden its sense of moral responsibility."2 
These should have been serious deterrents to any newly liberated 
underdeveloped Asian nation inclined to adopt the doctrine of judicial 
review. Yet, India has not only incorporated the doctrine in her Consti-
tution, but has also lived with it all these years since January 26, 1950, 
when the operation of the Constitution commenced. During this period 
thousands of controversies have been presented before and disposed of 
by the Supreme Court at the Centre and the High Courts in the states, 
and hundreds of laws whose expression has been defined to include, 
besides Acts of the Parliament or of the state legislatures, "any Ordi-
nance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage 
having in the territory the force of law"J have been declared unconsti-
tutional and void. 
It is not as if such a large-scale application of the doctrine 
presented no problems in India. By and large, it engendered a sense of 
security and a respect for the law and for the law courts throughout the 
country, so vital to a good beginning for a young democracy. But, in the 
first place, it all began to be unwieldy. Although the numerical strength 
of judges in the High Courts was doubled or, in some cases, even 
trebled, often at the cost of quality on the bench and depletion of talent 
at the bar, arrears continued to mount. High Courts issued writs in 
several matters in which the courts in the United States or in England 
(when validity of parliamentary legislation is not involved) would 
probably not be persuaded to grant relief. Thus, for instance, students 
who did not complete the required attendance in schools or colleges 
could often get ex parte stay orders enabling them to take an examina-
tion, subject, of course, to the final outcome of the litigation in which 
they sought relief on the basis of such allegations as that they had no 
notice of the rules, or they were not warned about the condition of their 
attendance, or, occasionally, that the rules of attendance were not made 
by the proper authority or in accordance with the proper procedure and 
so forth. Investigation of tax matters was stayed, and the relevant 
papers were sealed, and sometimes the ordinary procedure for manda-
mus or injunction was permitted to be utilized for enforcing simple 
contracts against the state, completely bypassing the regular procedure 
through a civil suit. 
2. J. B. Thayer, John Marshall (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1902), pp. 57-84. 
3. Constitution of India, Article 13 (3) (a). Ed. note: see Jagdish Lal, ed., The 
Constitution of India (as amended by Forty-Second Amendment) (Delhi: Delhi Law 
House, 1977), p. 7. 
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There were more serious problems, too. Chief among them was 
perhaps the running battle of wits between the Supreme Court and the 
legislatures on the matter of compensation for property acquired for 
public purposes. This was characterized by a series of constitutional 
amendments seeking to attenuate and limit the scope of judicial review 
for the enforcement of the fundamental right to property, and an 
equally sustained succession of resourceful judicial opinions frustrating 
each amendment and reasserting the original norm under which the 
State must pay not less than the market value of the property acquired. 4 
This culminated in the year 1967 in an opinion of the Supreme Court 
which sought to limit the power of constitutional amendment itself in 
the same way as ordinary legislation when it attempted to abridge a 
fundamental right.S This opinion was overruled in 1973, but is under-
stood to have been replaced by another which enlarges the power of 
judicial review by adopting what may be called the doctrine of "basic 
structure and framework."6 This doctrine enables the Court to strike 
down any amendment which, in its judgment, abrogates or damages 
any provision or principle of the Constitution-not necessarily a funda-
4. The Patna High Court, in 1951, struck down the "Bihar Land Reforms Act, 
1950" on the ground that it violated the "equal protection" guarantee in Article 14, 
inasmuch as it provided for a higher rate of compensation to the smaller landowners (up 
to twenty times the annual rental) and a lower (discriminatory) rate to the bigger 
landowners (three times the annual rental); A.I.R. 1851 Pat. 91. This Jed to the 
Constitution, First Amendment Act of 1951, which placed certain Acts in the so-called 
"Ninth Schedule" of the Constitution and immunized them from judicial review on the 
basis of Articles 14 (equality), 19 (right to acquire, hold, and dispose of property), and 31 
(compensation). Then, in 1954, in State of West Benga/v. Bela Banerjee (A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 
170), the Supreme Court pronounced that "compensation" guaranteed in Article 31 (2) of 
the Constitution must mean "just equivalent" and could not be less than the market value 
of the property (here a housing site in Calcutta) at about the date of acquisition. This was 
met by the Fourth Amendment, in 1955. The amendment resulted in an express statement 
being appended to the right in Article 31 (2) to the effect that "no such law shall be called 
in question in any court on the ground that the compensation provided by the law is not 
adequate." This worked for some time; but, in 1970, in R. C. Cooper v. Union of India 
(A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 564) the Supreme Court held that the "market price" rule will continue 
to apply in adjudging the constitutionality of "the "compensation" offered or paid for 
property acquired by the State. This led to the Twenty-fifth Amendment in 1971, which 
substituted for the word "compensation" the word "amount." This was done in the hope 
that the difficulties created by the use of the expression "compensation" would thereby 
disappear. However, in the meantime, a new question cropped up, namely, whether 
Parliament has the power to amend the fundamental rights in the Constitution. For a full 
and critical discussion, see P. K. Tripathi, Some Insights Into Fundamental Rights 
(Bombay: University of Bombay, N. M. Tripathi, 1972), chapters 5 and 6. 
5. I. C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1643. For a critique, see 
P. K. Tripathi, Some Insights. 
6. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461. The present 
writer has analyzed the opinions in the case and taken the view that there is no majority 
support in the case for the doctrine that "the basic structure and framework" of the 
Constitution is immune from the power of constitutional amendment laid down in Article 
368. See P. K. Tripathi, "Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala: Who Wins?" 1 
Supreme Court Cases, Journal 3 (1974). 
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mental right-which the Court may regard as part of the "basic 
structure or framework of the Constitution." 
This exchange, which one may or may not like to describe as a 
confrontation between the Parliament and the judiciary, continues to 
this day. The latest shot has been recently fired by Parliament in 
enacting the Forty-second Amendment to the Constitution which, inter 
alia, reasserts with retrospective effect the power of Parliament to 
amend each and every provision of the Constitution, and declares that 
no such amendment "shall be called in question before any court."7 
Is it any wonder that the operation of the doctrine was attended 
with difficulties in India? Indeed, it would reflect upon the credibility of 
the enterprise if no problems arose. What is truly significant is that 
India has lived with the doctrine for more than a quarter century; and, 
although recently there has been some effort to contain its operation 
within certain limits whose reasonability itself is being avidly debated in 
the country,8 it can be confidently asserted that the doctrine has been 
assimilated as a part of India's cultural fabric. 
Judicial Review: British Statutes 
and the U.S. Constitution 
The doctrine of judicial review came to be received in India through two 
distinct channels. Ironically enough, it came to India, in the first 
instance, through a British statute, namely, the Government of India 
Act, 1935, which was, in a sense, the precursor of the Constitution of 
India. Much earlier, the British Parliament had reconciled to the 
doctrine to a limited extent by enacting federal constitutions for the 
Dominions of Canada9 and Australia.JO Once a detailed scheme of 
distribution of powers between the central and regional governments on 
the United States pattern was adopted for each Dominion, judicial 
umpiring became almost a logical necessity. For these Dominions the 
British Parliament occupied the position simulative of a constituent 
assembly, keeping itself beyond the reach of judicial review, but permit-
ting the doctrine to operate upon what the English jurists euphemisti-
cally called subordinate legislation by the federal as well as the regional 
governments functioning under the written constitutions. 
These constitutions provided the models for the Government of 
India Act, 1935. The Act provided for three legislative lists. Two of 
7. The Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, s. 55. 
8. The Forty-second Amendment debars the High Courts from questioning the 
validity of a "Central law," i.e., a law passed by the Parliament or any regulation, rule, by-
law, etc., passed by the Union Government. But the Supreme Court remains available for 
the purpose. 
9. The British North America Act, 1867. 
10. The Commonwealth of Australia Act, 1900. 
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these were based on the Canadian pattern and enumerated the matters 
on which the federal government and the regional governments, respec-
tively, had the exclusive power to legislate. But, like the Australian 
Constitution, the Government of India Act of 1935 also provided a 
concurrent list comprising matters over which both governments could 
legislate; and, as in Australia, in case of "repugnancy" between their 
laws on the same subject, the federal law was to prevail. The Constitu-
tion of India substantially adopted this scheme of distribution of 
powers between the Union and the states, although there were important 
modifications aiming at a strong centre. 
Thus, even before the Constitution, India was familiar with the 
operation of the American doctrine in the limited field of judicial 
umpiring between the central and the regional governments with a view 
to confining each within the constraints of a written constitution. 
Important decisions were given by the High Courts, the Federal Court, 
and the Privy Council on the validity of legislation by the federal and 
the provincial governments under the Government of India Act of 1935. 
Many of them are still regarded as authority and are followed in settling 
disputes under the Constitution. 
This is not to say that the framers of the Constitution did not 
directly consult or benefit from the United States Constitution in the 
matter of distribution of powers between the central and the regional 
governments. The Constituent Assembly, which began its deliberations 
on December 9, 1946, in New Delhi, was not quite unrestrained, 
initially, in its choice on vital issues like the powers of central govern-
ment under the new Constitution. The Cabinet Mission Plan of May 16, 
1946, which set the process of constitution-making in motion, had 
envisaged that the Union of India "should deal with the following 
subjects: 'Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Communications; and should 
have the powers necessary to raise the finances required for the above 
subjects,' and that 'all subjects other than the Union subjects and all 
residuary powers should vest in the Provinces."'" True, these were only 
··recommendations" from the Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy of 
India; the British Prime Minister, Mr. Attlee, had expressly stated on 
March 15, "just before the despatch of the Cabinet Mission to India," 
that the British government's intention was "of using their utmost 
endeavour to help her [India] attain her freedom as speedily and fully as 
possible" and that "what form of government is to replace the present 
regime is for India to decide."12 Yet, in view of the fact that no 
agreement had been possible between the Congress Party and the 
II. B. Shiva Rao, The Framing of India's Constitution, Select Documents (New 
Delhi: The Indian Institute of Public Administration), vol. I, p. 209. 
12. Ibid. 
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Muslim League, the two popular organizations without the imprimatur 
of whose assent the Constitution could have no social acceptance, these 
recommendations constituted real constraints on the Assembly. The 
effort of the Congress Party in the Assembly, therefore, was to bloat 
and expand the powers under the four rubrics of Foreign Affairs, 
Defense, Communications, and Finance, to cover as many subheads or 
"items" as possible. In that effort, Sir B. N. Rau, the Constitutional 
Adviser to the Constituent Assembly, and Sir Alladi Krishnaswamy 
Ayyar, one of the ablest and most respected lawyer members of the 
various committees set up by the Assembly, frequently relied on the 
Constitution of the United States. 
In one of the notes prepared for the use of the members of the 
Assembly, Rau referred to Article I, Section 8, of the United States 
Constitution to emphasize that "external matters, whether described as 
foreign or external affairs or not" included in its embrace commerce 
with foreign nations, naturalization, regulation of foreign exchange, 
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, offenses against the 
law of nations, declaring war, and making "all laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing pow-
ers."13 In his second note, Rau referred to the ambiguity in the Cabinet 
Mission Plan's statement as to the Union power "to raise" the finances 
required for the allotted subjects, pointing out that "whether these 
powers should be powers of direct taxation in the right of the Union or 
merely powers to levy contributions from the Provinces is a question of 
great importance on which the statement is silent." 14 He advocated 
direct taxation and referred, in support of his recommendations, to the 
experience of the "loose confederacy" under the Articles of Confedera-
tion. He quoted an appropriate passage from Farrand's The Framing of 
the Constitution, to explain the difficulties experienced by the con-
federacy in obtaining from each state the share of its contribution, and 
concluded: 
It was to rectify these and other defects that the Philadelphia Con-
vention was called. Under the Constitution framed by that Convention-
which is substantially the present Constitution of the United States of 
America-Congress has been given power "to levy and collect taxes, 
duties, imposts and excises to pay the debts and provide for the common 
defense and general welfare of the United States; to borrow money on the 
credit of the United States; to coin money, regulate the value thereof and 
of foreign coin." Thus the right of direct taxation was substituted for the 
right of levying contributions.I5 
13. Shiva Rao, op. cit., vol. II, p. 691. 14. Ibid., p. 701. 15. Ibid., p. 703. 
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Ayyar, in his note submitted to the "Union Powers Committee" of 
the Assembly,'6 referred at length to the "necessary and proper" clause 
in Article I, Section 8, of the United States Constitution and quoted the 
words of Chief Justice John Marshall from McCulloch v. Maryland,l1 
and the legal tender cases's in support of the doctrine of incidental 
powers. He then pointed out: 
In the judgments of the Supreme Court, apart from the expression "im-
plied powers," there is also authority for inferring inherent and resulting 
powers. The expression "inherent powers" has been used with respect to 
a matter of national interest such as no particular State is competent to 
deal with. There have been doubts expressed as to this aspect of the 
Union power but a resulting power is one implied from a group of 
enumerated powers instead of from a single express power. Instances of 
this are found on p. 221 of Wills' Constitutional Law. On the question 
of inherent, implied and resulting powers, see Willoughby, Vol. I, 993-94: 
"Legal Tender cases, eminent domain, expelling aliens, acquisition and 
cessation of territory."l9 
In conclusion, he recommended that "the most prudent course will 
be to draft a clause on the lines of recent American decisions."20 This 
recommendation was considered, along with several others, by a joint 
meeting of the Union Powers and Union Constitution committees of 
the Assembly in its meeting on July 2, 1947, and "it was agreed 
... to consider the necessity of having a provision on the lines of Article 
I, Section 8, Clause (18) of the U.S.A. Constitution."21 
Actually, however, neither the "necessary and proper" clause nor 
any variant of it ever found a place in the Constitution, because the 
entire situation changed in early June 1947, when the Congress Party 
agreed to the partition of the country into the two Dominions of India 
and Pakistan and the British Government announced its decision to 
effect the partition. The Constituent Assembly at New Delhi was now 
absolutely free to allot to the Centre or to the states any powers it 
Iiked.22 Accordingly, the Committee on Union Powers, with the con-
16. Ibid., p. 714. 17. 4 Wheaton, 316. 
18. Latham v. United States and Deming v. United States, 12 Wallace, 529. 
19. Shiva Rao, op. cit. (n. II above), vol. II, p. 717. 
20. Ibid., p. 718. 21. Ibid., p. 772. 
22. Accordingly, Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru, Chairman of the Union Powers 
Committee, forwarding the report of his committee to the President of the Constituent 
Assembly, wrote: "Now that the partition is a settled fact, we are unanimously of the view 
that it would be injurious to the interests of the country to provide for a weak central 
authority which would be incapable of ensuring peace, or coordinating vital matters of 
common concern and of speaking effectively for the whole country in the international 
sphere .... We have accordingly come to the conclusion-a conclusion which was also 
reached by the Union Constitution Committee-that the soundest framework for our 
Constitution is a Federation, with a strong Centre" (ibid., p. 777). 
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currence of the Union Constitution Committee, presented a modified 
report to the Constituent Assembly based on the premise that "the 
soundest framework of our Constitution was a Federation with a strong 
Centre." The federal ideal was still practically indispensable for luring 
the princely states, which, now liberated from the leash of "British 
paramountcy," were, in theory at least, free not to join any Dominion 
or to join either of them.23 
The Concept of a Strong Centre 
By October 1947 Rau had prepared a constitution draft to serve as the 
basic working document for the Drafting Committee set up by the 
Assembly under the chairmanship of Dr. B. R. Ambedkar.24 This draft 
was mainly based on the reports of the various committees appointed 
by the Assembly at one of its earliest meetings and the decisions taken 
by the Assembly itself on those reports.25 It was a thoroughgoing 
document comprising two hundred and forty clauses and twelve sched-
ules. It was thoughtfully prepared, with marginal references indicating 
corresponding provisions in the other constitutions of the world. 
Except for the clauses concerning civil liberties or "fundamental rights;· 
with which we shall deal separately, very few of these marginal notes 
refer to provisions of the United States Constitution. The obvious 
reason for this was that the need to take the Muslim League along had 
disappeared, and there was great freedom of choice in the matter of 
distribution of authority between the Centre and the states. The idea of 
a strong Centre was answered fairly well by the scheme of distribution 
available in the Government of India Act of 1935, which could be 
further improved by making suitable alterations. Therefore, the task was 
thereafter viewed by all concerned as one of adapting the existing 
framework to the new aspirations rather than one of writing on a clean 
slate. 
23. In the Constituent Assembly, this report was ··not discussed in full, and the 
Assembly considered only the first 37 items of the Federal List. Further consideration of 
the report was held over and, in fact, was never taken up again" (ibid., p. 776). 
24. The Drafting Committee was appointed by the Constituent Assembly on 
August 29, 1947, under the Chairmanship of Dr. B. R. Ambedkar (a graduate of 
Columbia University, from where he obtained his doctoral degree, and the most 
important leader of the backward communities, including the "untouchables"). Before the 
appointment of this Committee, the Assembly had already received and considered the 
reports of its various committees earlier appointed, among which was the Advisory 
Committee on Fundamental Rights and Minorities, appointed on January 24, 1947, on a 
motion by Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant. 
25. This draft is also called the first draft of the Constitution. But the "Draft 
Constitution" was a different document, prepared by the Drafting Committee under 
Ambedkar's chairmanship and submitted by Ambedkar to the President of the Consti-
tuent Assembly in February 1948. The Assembly began consideration of the Draft 
Constitution on November 4, 1948. The Constitution was finally passed in its present 
form on November 26, 1949. 
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Even so, at least one important, though thus far little used, 
provision of the Constitution of India in the sphere of distribution of 
powers between the Union and the states has been the product of direct 
contemporary United States inspiration. It is the provision in Article 
249 of the Constitution which enables the Parliament of the Union to 
legislate on any matter which is placed in the exclusive state list; only 
the Rajya Sabha (upper house of Parliament) must have earlier passed 
a resolution supported by "not less than two-thirds of the members 
present and voting" declaring that "it is necessary or expedient in the 
national interest" that Parliament should make laws with respect to that 
matter. Incidentally, it is on the basis of one of those provisions that it 
may be said that the Constitution of India is not federal in character. 26 
The inspiration came during Rau's visit to the United States 
between October 26 and December 2, 1947, immediately after complet-
ing his draft Constitution for the Assembly. In his report to the 
President of the Constituent Assembly, Rau noted that as a result of the 
discussions during the visit abroad he had already proposed two 
important amendments to the draft, one of which was 
designed to secure that when the national interest requires that a certain 
matter, ordinarily falling in the exclusively provincial sphere, should be 
dealt with on a national basis, the Centre should have power to legislate 
on it on that basis.27 
Those with whom he had discussions in Washington included "the 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, ex-Chief Justice Hughes and 
Justices Frankfurter, Burton, and Murphy."28 At another place, Rau 
observes: 
On November 20 and 21, I saw Dr. Jessup [Professor of International 
Law], Professor Mirkine [Constitutional Consultant to the United Na-
tions], Dr. Hamburger [Secretary General, United Nations Year Book 
on Human Rights], and Professor Dowling [Professor of Constitutional 
Law, Columbia University]. I had detailed discussions with each of them. 
Both Dr. Jessup and Prof. Dowling regard as very important the amend-
ment giving power to the Centre to legislate on a subject which is 
normally provincial if it has come to be of national importance.29 
26. The present writer considers the Constitution of India to be a "non-federal" 
Constitution. SeeP. K. Tripathi, "Federalism: Reality and the Myth," Journal of the Bar 
Council of India, 3, no. 3 {August 1974): 251-277. Thus far no other writer has agreed. 
27. Shiva Rao, op. cit. {n. II above), vol. Ill, p. 218. 
28. Ibid., p. 217. 
29. Ibid., pp. 221-222. Rau was so greatly impressed with the need for vesting this 
power in the Centre envisaged in the draft he had prepared that on November II, 1947, 
while he was still busy in consultations with American politicians, judges, and academi-
cians in Washington, he despatched an air letter to New Delhi recommending a few 
amendments to accommodate this and other ideas. Explaining the object of the amend-
ment on this point, he wrote: "The essence of the matter is that where legislation is called 
for on a national basis, the Central legislature should have power to enact it without 
68 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
Apart from the distribution of legislative powers, there were a 
couple of other important matters on which Rau found the discussions 
with eminent Americans very instructive. Emulating the Irish Constitu-
tion, Rau's draft had provided for "Directive Principles of State 
Policy."3o These were not to be judicially enforceable. In his air letter 
from Washington on November ll, 1947,31 Rau suggested that the 
Constitution should expressly provide that no law made in discharge of 
the Directive Principles of State Policy should be considered void 
merely on the ground that it contravenes a fundamental right. Ex-
plaining his purpose he said: 
As a result of the discussions in Washington and Ottawa, I propose the 
following amendments: The object of these [two] amendments is to make 
it clear that in a conflict between the rights conferred by Chapter 2, 
which are, for the most part, rights of the individual, and the principles 
of policy set forth in Chapter 3, which are intended for the welfare of 
the State as a whole, the general welfare should prevail over the indi-
vidual right. Otherwise, it would be meaningless to say, as Clause 10 
does say, that these principles of policy are fundamental and that it is 
the duty of the State to give effect to them in its laws. In the Constitu-
tion of the United States of America, there are no express Directive 
Principles of State Policy, but the courts have developed what is equiva-
lent thereof, namely, the doctrine of "Police Powers" which has been 
defined as the power "to prescribe regulations to promote the health, 
peace, morals, and the good order of the people, and to legislate so as 
to increase the industry of the State, develop its resources, and add to 
its wealth and prosperity." In the exercise of this power, the State 
may make laws for the general welfare which would otherwise be incon-
sistent with the American Bill of Rights. The courts in India might have 
been able to develop a similar doctrine but for the language of Clause 9 
of the draft Constitution. Hence the amendments proposed. 32 
From no less persons than Justice Frankfurter and Judge Learned 
Hand a willing Rau received his baptism of skepticism for the doctrine 
amending the Constitution. Such legislation may be needed not only in such spheres as 
education, cooperative farming, or public health, but also in a matter which is coming to 
be regarded as one of the national and, indeed, almost international importance, namely, 
safeguarding the civil rights of all citizens: e.g., removing the social disabilities of 
Harijans. . The report of the President's Committee just published in the U.S.A. 
recommends that the National Government of the United States must take the lead in 
safeguarding the civil rights of all Americans and that Congress must enact the necessary 
legislation" (ibid., p. 227). 
30. These were recommended by the Advisory Committee, in its report to the 
Constituent Assembly, and were already approved by the Assembly along with the rest of 
its recommendations. Rau's draft, as was already noted, was based on this groundwork 
already accomplished. 
31. See n. 29 above. 
32. Shiva Rao, op. cit. (n. II above), vol. III, p. 226. What are referred to as 
Chapters 2 and 3 are, in the Constitution, Parts III and IV, respectively; Clause 10 in the 
letter corresponds to Article 37 of the Constitution, and Clause 9 corresponds to 
Article 13. 
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of judicial review. In his report to the President of the Assembly, he 
said: 
Indeed, Justice Frankfurter considered that the power of judicia! review 
implied in the due process clause, of which there is a qualified versio_n 
in Clause 16 of our draft Constitution, was not only undemocratiC 
(because it gave a few judges a power of vetoing legislation enacted by 
the representatives of the nation) but also threw an unfair burden on 
the judiciary; and Justice Learned Hand considered that it will be better 
to have all fundamental rights as moral precepts than as legal fetters 
in the Constitution.33 
Rau's meeting with President Harry Truman was also very inter-
esting. The President commended to him the United States provision 
for an indissoluble Senate one-third of whose members retire every two 
years. Rau was able to reply, "We had, in fact, copied this provision in 
the Indian Constitution." Further on, Rau's report says: 
I then mentioned that we had specially noted the step taken by him in 
December 1946, in appointing a committee on civil rights-particularly 
the civil rights of the underprivileged classes. The committee's report 
had just been published and has proved how valuable was a periodic 
investigation of this kind and accordingly we had inserted in the Indian 
Constitution an express provision empowering the President to appoint, 
from time to time, a commission to investigate the position of the back-
ward classes. I added that we had gone further and had actually antici-
pated one of the recommendations of the President's Committee. The 
committee had recommended that there should be a special section in 
the Department of Justice, both at the Centre and in the States, to 
protect the civil rights guaranteed by the Constitution. We have provided 
in the Indian Constitution for the appointment of Special Officers for 
minorities, both at the Centre and in the provinces forasimilarpurpose.J4 
The provision in Rau's draft regarding the appointment of a 
commission to investigate the position of the backward classes finds 
expression in Article 340 of the Constitution of India. This article 
authorizes the President of India to appoint a commission "to investi-
gate the conditions of socially and educationally backward classes 
within the territory of India and the difficulties under which they labour 
and to make recommendations as to the steps that should be taken by 
the Union or any State to remove such difficulties and to improve their 
condition." The provision in his draft regarding the appointment of 
"Special Officers for minorities both at the Centre and in the provinces" 
for the protection of civil rights guaranteed in the Constitution was also 
33. Ibid., p. 218. Clause 16 of his draft, referred to in the passage quoted, was to this 
effect: "No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty without due process of 
law, nor shall any person be denied equality before the law within the territories of the 
Federation." 
34. Ibid., p. 221. 
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slightly modified in the course of subsequent debates at the various 
stages. Finally, the Constitution provided for the appointment of such 
Special Officer only by the Centre and not by the states. The Special 
Officer under the Constitution is only meant for the Scheduled Castes, 
the Scheduled Tribes, the backward classes, and the Anglo-Indian 
community, and not for all "minorities." It is his duty "to investigate all 
matters relating to the safeguards provided for" those groups "under 
this Constitution and report to the President upon the working of those 
safeguards at such intervals as the President may direct." The President 
must place all such reports before each house of Parliament. 
The ·•strong Centre" concept had become a part of the unquestion-
able credo of the Drafting Committee headed by Ambedkar. But even 
for this, support if not inspiration was found from no other than the 
United States Constitution. In his historic speech in the Constituent 
Assembly on November 4, 1948, while moving the Draft Cbnstitution 
for the consideration of the Assembly, Ambedkar alluded to the 
criticism that the Centre envisaged by the draft was "too strong," and 
observed: 
However much you may deny powers to the Centre, it is difficult to 
prevent the Centre from becoming too strong. Conditions in the modern 
world are such that centralization of powers is inevitable. One has only 
to consider the growth of the Federal Government in the U.S.A. which, 
notwithstanding the very limited powers given to it by the Constitution, 
has outgrown its former self and has over-shadowed and eclipsed the 
State Governments. The same conditions are sure to operate on the 
Government of India and nothing that one can do will help to prevent it 
from becoming strong.35 
In fact, if the attention given to the United States Constitution in 
this important speech is any measure of its influence on the Draft, and 
ultimately on the Constitution of India, that influence has been truly 
immense. A major portion of this speech-occupying eighteen pages in 
Shiva Rao's monumental work36-deals with detailed and comparative 
references to the provisions in the Draft and the corresponding provi-
sion under the United States Constitution. After stating the prelimi-
naries, Ambedkar comes straight to the question of the form of govern-
ment envisaged by the Draft. He explains that although the head of the 
Union is called the President, the presidential form of government in 
the United States has not been adopted. He then states elaborately the 
differences that exist between the two forms in regard to the nature of 
the executive and its relations with the legislature. He explains briefly 
why the American form of government was not adopted and the British 
form was preferred. From this he moves on to the next theme-the 
35. Ibid., vol. IV, p. 433. 36. Ibid., pp. 419-436. 
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choice of the federal form of constitution-with its concomitant of 
double polity adopted in the Draft, and says: 
This dual polity under the proposed Constitution will consist of the 
Union at the Centre and the States at the periphery, each endowed with 
sovereign powers to be exercised in the field assigned to them respec-
tively in the Constitution. This dual polity resembles the. Ameri-
can Constitution. The American polity is also a dual polity, one 
of it is known as the Federal Government and the other States 
which correspond respectively to the Union Government and the State 
Governments of the Draft Constitution. Under the American Constitu-
tion the Federal Government is not a mere league of the States nor are 
the States administrative units or agencies of the Federal Government. 
In the same way, the Indian Constitution proposed in the Draft Consti-
tution is not a league of States nor are the States administrative units 
or agencies of the Union Government. Here, however, the similarities 
between the Indian and the American Constitutions come to an end. 
The differences that distinguish them are more fundamental and glaring 
than the similarities between the twoY 
Ambedkar then explained some of the important features in the 
proposed Indian Constitution-the strong Centre-oriented features-
which made it different from the United States. These included features 
like the absence of double citizenship and of separate state constitu-
tions in India. 
"So far I have drawn attention to the differences between the 
American Federation and the proposed Indian Federation," he said, 
after making these comparisons. "But there are some other special 
features of the proposed Indian Federation which mark it off not only 
from the American Federation but from all other federations." In this 
connection, he mentioned the provision for the declaration of emer-
gency which enables the Union to exercise unrestrained legislative and 
executive authority overriding the authority of the states. "Such a 
power of converting itself into a unitary State no federation possesses. 
This is one point of difference between the Federation proposed in the 
Draft Constitution and all other federations we know of."JS He then 
went on to explain some other distinguishing features of the Draft 
Constitution which freed it from "rigidity" and "legalism"-the "two 
weaknesses from which federation is alleged to suffer. "39 
Thus it will be seen that even in seeking to avoid the presidential 
form of government and strict federalism, the two very important 
features of the United States Constitution, the framers of the Constitu-
tion of India have been very largely influenced and guided by the 
constitutional experience of the United States. Naturally, however, the 
influence and guidance are most pronounced and direct in yet another 
37. lbid., p. 422. 38. lbid., p. 424. 39. lbid., p. 424. 
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area, namely, that of civil liberties, or "fundamental rights," as the 
Indian document calls them. 
Fundamental Rights: Direct and Massive Borrowing 
Although, in his speech moving the Draft Constitution in the Assembly, 
Ambedkar emphasized the departure from the United States Constitu-
tion in regard to federalism, he had just the opposite to say in regard to 
civil liberties. This "most criticized part of the Draft Constitution" was 
assailed during the period from February to October 1948-when it was 
circulated widely throughout the country to elicit criticism and opinion 
from the general public-mostly on the ground that the rights were 
"riddled with so many exceptions that the exceptions have eaten up the 
rights altogether." The critics generally referred to the Bill of Rights in 
the United States Constitution and complained that while "the funda-
mental rights in the American Bill of Rights are real because they are 
not subject to limitations or exceptions," those in the Draft proposed by 
Ambedkar are "a kind of deception." To dispel this misconception, he 
said, 
. . it is wrong to say that fundamental rights in America are absolute. 
The difference between the position under the American Constitution 
and the Draft Constitution is one of form and not of substance. That 
the fundamental rights in America are not absolute rights is beyond 
dispute. In support of every exception to the fundamental rights set out 
in the Draft Constitution, one can refer to at least one judgment of the 
United States Supreme Court. It would be sufficient to quote one such 
judgment of the Supreme Court in justification of the limitations on the 
rights of free speech contained in Article 13 of the Draft Constitution. 
In Gitlow v. New York, in which the issue was the constitutionality 
of the New York "criminal anarchy" law which purported to punish 
utterances calculated to bring about violent change, the Supreme Court 
said: It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom of 
speech and of the press, which is secured by the Constitution, does not 
confer an absolute right to speak or publish, without responsibility, 
whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled license 
that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the 
punishment of those who abuse this freedom. 
It is, therefore, wrong to say that the fundamental rights in America are 
absolute while those in the Draft Constitution are not.40 
The right to freedom of speech, mentioned by Ambedkar to 
illustrate his point, was stated in Article 13 of the Draft in these terms:41 
(I) Subject to the other provisions of this Article, all citizens shall 
have the right (a) to freedom of speech and expression .... 
(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (I) of this article shall affect 
40. Ibid., p. 431. 
41. The corresponding article in the Constitution is Article 19. 
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the operat-ion of any existing law, or prevent the State from making 
any law, relating to libel, slander, defamation, sedition or any other 
matter which offends against decency or morality or undermines the 
authority or foundation of the State.42 
In the final version of the Constitution, there was some reorgani-
zation of the subjects on which laws restricting free speech were to be 
constitutionally permissive. They read, "libel, slander, defamation, 
contempt of court or any other matter which offends against decency or 
morality or which undermines the security of, or tends to overthrow, 
the State." The significant change was that "sedition" had been deleted, 
and undermining the "authority" of the State was also dropped. 
"Undermining the security of the State" or "tendency to overthrow the 
State" were the new tests substituted. Dennis v. United States43 had not 
then been decided; but, Ambedkar's phrase "tendency to overthrow the 
State" came perhaps fairly close to anticipating the majority view of the 
United States Supreme Court in that case. The available United States 
precedents on this aspect of free speech, of course, included Gitlow v. 
New York,44 and the text of Ambedkar's draft is reminiscent of the 
following sentence from the judgment of Mr. Justice Sandford in that 
case: "And, for yet more imperative reasons, a State may punish 
utterances endangering the foundations qf organized governments and 
threatening its overthrow by unlawful means" (emphasis supplied).45 
There can be no doubt that Ambedkar had in his mind decisions like 
Bridges v. Ca/ifornia,46 Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court of Cali-
fornia,47 the Pennekamp Case,48 and Craig v. Henry49 when he included 
"contempt of court" as one of the matters concerning which laws 
restrictive of free speech were to be permitted. On libel, slander, and 
defamation, he must have had cases like Near v. Minnesotaso before 
him. The Kingsley Pictures Case51 had, of course, not been decided by 
then, but the Minnesota Session Law involved in Near v. Minnesota did 
prohibit and punish "obscene, lewd and lascivious" publications. Thus, 
as far as the free speech provision in his draft was concerned, Ambed-
kar was probably justified in making the claim that, in support of every 
exception to the right, one can refer to at least one judgment of the 
United States Supreme Court. Ambedkar further observed: 
42. This article, as will be seen later, was the subject of a very heated and 
enlightened debate in the Assembly resulting in several changes in the text, the most 
important of which was the introduction of the justiciable element represented by the 
word "reasonable" qualifying all permissive legislative restrictions. 
43. 341 u.s. 494 (1951). 44. 268 u.s. 652 (1925). 
45. Ibid. 46. 314 U.S. 252 (1941). 
47. Ibid. 48. Pennekemp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946). 
49. 331 u.s. 367 (1947). 50. 283 u.s. 697 (1931). 
51. Kingsley International Pictures Corporation v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959). 
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What the Draft Constitution has done is that instead of formulating 
fundamental rights in absolute terms and depending upon our Supreme 
Court to come to the rescue of Parliament by inventing the doctrine of 
police power, it permits the State directly to impose limitations upon 
the fundamental rights. There is really no difference in the result. What 
one does directly the other does indirectly. In both cases, the fundamental 
rights are not absolute.s2 
What Ambedkar did not seem to have realized, however, was that 
by enumerating the interests for the protection of which restrictive 
legislation is permissible he imported a rigidity from which the judi-
cially developed doctrine of police powers did not suffer. Furthermore, 
his draft did not indicate how far a law will be permitted to go in 
restraining free speech in protecting the countervailing public interest, 
say, in security of the State. These shortcomings, coupled with the 
rather rigid or literalistic view of the text adopted by the courts, made 
an early amendment of this clause unavoidable. The amendment,sJ 
however, did not discard the enumeration of the protected public 
interests, and the rigidity has, therefore, persisted to this day. But that is 
a differ~nt matter. 54 
Ambedkar was by no means the only person to lean heavily on the 
United States Constitution for drafting the fundamental rights. In the 
earlier stages, before the appointment of the Drafting Committee under 
Ambedkar's chairmanship, others, and particularly Ayyar and Munshi, 
played very important roles. 
The commitment of the Indian leadership to justiciable funda-
mental rights went as far back, at least, as the year 1924 when the 
National Convention presided over by Sir Tej Behadur Sapru prepared 
the Commonwealth of India Bill. 55 This Bill was actually introduced in 
the British House of Commons by Mr. George Lansbury, a leading 
member of the Labour Party, and had its first reading in the House in 
December 1925, but could not be pursued owing to the defeat of the 
Labour Government. It contained a "declaration of rights." The rights 
were enumerated under seven heads, and included the right freely to 
profess and practice religion, the right to free expression, and the right 
to equality. It was not expressly stated that these were to be justiciable. 
But the Supreme Court was to be the final interpreter of the Constitu-
tion, and it was unlikely that the United States precedents would not be 
52. Shiva Rao, op. cit. (n. II above), vol. IV, p. 432. 
53. The First Amendment, 1951. 
54. On the circumstances compelling this amendment, and on its limitations, see P. 
K. Tripathi, Spotlights on Constitutional Interpretation (Bombay: N. M. Tripathi Pvt. 
Ltd., 1972), chap. 13 (titled "India's Experiment in Freedom of Speech, etc."), p. 255. 
55. Shiva Rao, op. cit. (n. II above), vol. I, pp. 43-50 (Document No. II). 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA 75 
emulated. The next milestone in constitution-making was the report of 
the Motilal Nehru Committee set up by the All Parties Conference held 
in February 1928.56 The report, known as the Nehru report, had wide 
acceptance and support in the country and was hailed as a proof of the 
ability of Indians to sink their differences and to rule themselves under 
their own constitution. The Nehru Report provided for a separate 
section dedicated to "fundamental rights." Here again, there was no 
express mention of judicial review of legislation for the enforcement of 
the rights; but it is obvious that most of them were intended to be 
justiciable. 
The Government of India Act of 1935 provided for non-discrimi-
nation57 and for compensation for property compulsorily acquired for 
public purpose.ss The non-discrimination provision was practically 
nullified by an exception saving discriminatory action sanctioned by the 
Governor in a province or by the Governor-General at the Centre. 
Naturally, therefore, it never presented any occasion for judicial review 
of discriminatory legislation or even executive action. The right to 
compensation was understood not to extend to situations where legisla-
tion modified and diminished the rights of landowners for the benefit of 
their tenants.59 In other words, the right was merely to be availabk 
when there was a direct transfer of ownership of property from the 
proprietor to the government, and not in a variety of other situations 
understood in the United States to involve the "taking" of property 
without direct acquisition. 
The Cabinet Mission Plan announced by the Viceroy of India on 
May 16, 1946, which set into motion the processes leading to the setting 
up of the Constituent Assembly, had in a special paragraph "recom-
mended" the setting up of an "Advisory Committee on the rights of 
citizens, minorities and tribal and excluded areas," to report to the 
Union Constituent Assembly "upon the list of Fundamental Rights" 
and upon certain other matters concerning the protection of minorities 
and administration of tribal areas. Accordingly, the Advisory Commit-
tee was set up on January 24, 1947. At its first meeting, held on 
February 27, 1947, the Committee, presided over by Sardar Patel, 
elected five sub-committees, including one on "Fundamental Rights" 
and another on "Minorities." The provisions concerning fundamental 
rights in the Draft Constitution presented to the Assembly in February 
1948, were mainly the product of the fundamental rights sub-commit-
tee approved by the Advisory Committee. It was this sub-committee on 
fundamental rights which borrowed heavily from the experience of the 
United States. 
56. Ibid., p. 58 (Document No. 16). 57. Section 298. 58. Section 299. 
59. See Thakur Jagannath Baksh Singh v. United Provinces, A.I.R. 1943 F.C. 29. 
76 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
Constitutional guarantee of justiciable fundamental rights had by 
that time become a matter of national aspiration, to which the partition 
of India made really no difference. It was not only a question of 
protecting the rights of minorities; there were several other vital inter-
ests and values to be secured, for example, the right to travel, reside, 
and settle in any part of the country, or the right-even of the majority 
community-to practice religion or to be treated with fairness and 
without arbitrary discrimination. The setting up of separate sub-com-
mittees for fundamental rights and minorities will itself bear testimony 
that the fundamental rights were viewed in a broader perspective than 
mere guarantees for the interests of the minorities. 
Hardly any foreign experience other than that of the United States 
was available in the realm of fundamental rights. The Australian 
Constitution had a single fundamental right which could not be taken 
away or abridged by legislation, namely, the right to free exercise of 
religion.6o That right was itself drafted on the model of its counterpart 
in the United States Constitution, and the Australian case law on the 
subject added hardly anything fresh or important. The Canadian 
Constitution had no such rights. The Irish Constitution, which was 
relied upon for the incorporation of some non-justiciable duties of the 
State-the Directive Principles of State Policy-had also little guidance 
to offer in regard to justiciable fundamental rights inasmuch as the 
rights guaranteed therein were all subject to law. The remaining consti-
tutions in the world either had no guaranteed rights, or had rights which 
were not justiciable, or had hardly any length of tradition or experience 
to encourage emulation. No wonder, therefore, that in the sub-com-
mittee on fundamental rights three leading members, Munshi, Ambed-
kar, and Ayyar, each a lawyer of high standing, leaned very heavily on 
the United States Constitution for preparing the draft of the funda-
mental rights. 
The preliminary question whether to plump for fundamental rights 
enforceable by the judiciary, or to opt for rights which might be subject 
to the overriding power of the legislature, was disposed of without 
much difficulty. The minutes of the very first meeting of the sub-
committee record that, after a short discussion, "it was agreed that 
before the bill of rights was drawn up, the sub-committee should have a 
clear idea about the points to be concentrated upon." The chairman 
then invited the members to express their opinions, and Ayyar was the 
first to speak. The minute reads: 
Alluding to the Charter of fundamental rights and guarantees embodied 
in the Irish and American Constitutions, Sir Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar 
60. Section 116 of the Commonwealth of Australia Act, 1900. 
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pointed out that citizens' rights to be embodied in a Constitution should 
consist of guarantees enforceable in courts of law, and it was no use 
laying down precepts which remained unenforceable or ineffective. The 
Supreme Court of the United States, whenever its power is invoked 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, prevents a State 
from depriving any person of life, liberty or property otherwise than by 
due process of law. Sir Alladi advised the sub-committee to take the 
United States as model for the protection of the basic rights of the 
citizens.61 
Munshi, agreeing with Ayyar, said that the justiciable rights must 
be worked out first, and later some non-justiciable rights may also be 
considered. He emphasized, in regard to the justiciable rights, that the 
constitution must provide for writs to be issued by the courts.62 
Ambedkar agreed with Munshi. He also "informed the sub-com-
mittee that he had prepared a long list of fundamental rights which he 
proposed to lay before the sub-committee."63 
Ambedkar's promised memorandum was submitted to the sub-
committee on March 24, 1947. The influence of the United States 
Constitution was writ large on the face of this memorandum. The 
preamble to the memorandum began with the words "We the people" 
and referred to the Indian Union as the "United States of India."64 
Article II, Section I, of the "memorandum and draft" said, "The 
Constitution of the United States of India shall recognize the following 
fundamental rights of citizenship,"65 and then follows a list of rights 
which include, inter alia, the following: 
I. All persons born or naturalized within its territories are citizens 
of the United States of India and of the State wherein they reside. Any 
privilege or disability arising out of rank, birth, person, family, religion 
or religious usage and custom is abolished. 
2. No State shall make or enforce any law or custom which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty and property without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of 
law. 
10. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
12. No law shall be made abridging the freedom of speech, of the press, 
of association and of assembly except for consideration of public order 
and morality. 
13. No Bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed. 
14. The State shall guarantee to every Indian citizen liberty of con-
61. Shiva Rao, op. cit. (n. II above), vol. II, p. 115. 62. Ibid. 
63. Ibid. 64. Ibid., p. 84. 65. Ibid., pp. 85-86. 
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science and the free exercise of his religion, including the right to profess, 
to preach and to convert within limits compatible with public order and 
morality. 
16. No person shall incur any penalties of any kind whatsoever by 
reason of his caste, creed or religion nor shall any person be permitted 
to refuse to fulfill any obligation of citizenship on the ground of caste, 
creed or religion. 66 
Nor did Ambedkar confine his borrowing to the text of the United 
States Constitution. He was aware of the difficulty felt in the United 
States in enforcing the Civil Rights Act of 1875 on the ground that 
Congress could not legislate in the field of civil rights, and so long as a 
state abstained from taking positive action supporting segregation the 
courts could not intervene to prevent social discrimination by private 
action. He, therefore, provided in his draft for specific fundamental 
rights dealing with the problem: 
4. Whoever denies to any person, except for reasons by law applica-
ble to persons of all classes and regardless of their social status, the full 
enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, privi-
leges or inns, educational institutions, roads, paths, streets, tanks, wells 
and other watering places, public conveyances on land, air or water, 
theatres or other places of public amusement, resort or convenience 
where they are dedicated to or maintained or licensed for the use of the 
public, shall be guilty of an offense. 
5. All citizens shall have equal access to all institutions, conveni-
ences and amenities maintained by or for the public. 
6. No citizen shall be disqualified to hold any public office or 
exercise any trade or calling by reason of his or her religion, caste, 
creed, sex or social status.67 
Being himself a member and leader of the discriminated classes he 
wanted to take no chances in regard to this matter. In Section II of the 
same Article, under "remedies against invasion of fundamental rights," 
he sought to provide a second string to the bow by providing: 
That the authority of the Legislature and the Executive ofthe Union 
as well as of every State throughout India shall be subject to the follow-
ing limitations: 
It shall not be competent for any Legislature or Executive in India 
to pass a law or issue an order, rule or regulation so as to violate the 
following rights of the subjects of the State: 
(I) To make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give 
evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and 
personal property; 
(2) to be eligible for entry into the civil and military employ and 
to all educational institutions except for such conditions and limitations 
as may be necessary to provide for the due and adequate representation 
of all classes of the subjects of the State; 
66. Ibid., p. 86 et seq. 67. Ibid. 
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(3) to be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommo-
dations, advantages, facilities, educational institutions, privileges of inns, 
rivers, streams, wells, tanks, roads, paths, streets, public conveyances 
on land, air and water, theatres and other places of public resort or 
amusement except for such conditions and limitations applicable alike to 
all subjects of every race, class, caste, colour or creed.68 
In the "explanatory notes'' appended to the memorandum he 
acknowledges that the "provisions of Clause 2 are borrowed from the 
Civil Rights Protection Acts, I 866, and of March I, I 875, passed by the 
Congress of the United States of America to protect the Negroes 
against unequal treatment. "69 
In the section relating to remedies, Ambedkar's draft suggests, on 
the United States pattern, that the "United States of India shall provide 
(I) that the judicial powers of India shall be vested in a Supreme 
Court,'' and that the "right to apply for a writ shall not be abridged or 
suspended unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety 
may require it."7° He also borrowed from the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, 
and Fifteenth Amendments to provide that the "Union Legislature shall 
make laws to give effect to such provisions as require legislation for that 
purpose and to prescribe punishments for those acts which are declared 
to be offenses."71 
Among the other members who submitted separate drafts for the 
consideration of the sub-committee was Munshi, whose draft was 
finally accepted by the sub-committee, on March 24, 1947, as the basis 
for discussion "in conjunction with other drafts."72 Munshi, on the 
whole, took the substance of the provisions in the United States 
Constitution and, unlike Ambedkar, avoided the literal text. Yet, even 
in Munshi's draft, the text of the United States Constitution could be 
easily recognized. Here is a sampling: 
Article III, Section ( 10): 
No person shall be denied equal protection of the laws within the 
territories of the Union. 
Article V, Section (4): 
No person shall be deprived of his life, liberty or property without 
due process of law. 
Article VII, Section (3): 
Every form of slavery or traffic in human beings or compulsory 
labour other than public service equally incumbent upon all or as part of 
the punishment pronounced by a court of law is abolished and if such 
form of traffic or labour is enforced it shall be punishable by the law of 
the Union. 
68. Ibid., pp. 88-89. 69. Ibid., p. 98. 
70. Ibid., p. 88. Article II, Section II, Clause I, sub-clauses (I) and (4). 
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Article X, Section (3): 
No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house, 
without the consent of the owner and in time of war except in a manner 
prescribed by law. 
Article X, Section (4): 
Expropriation for public reasons shall only be permitted upon con-
ditions determined by law and in return for just and adequate considera-
tion determined according to principles previously laid down by it. 
Article XII, Section (2): 
No person shall be tried for the same offense more than once and he 
shall not be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self; nor shall the burden of proving his innocence be thrown on him. 
Article XII, Section (3): 
No person shall be subjected to prolonged detention preceding trial, 
to excessive bail, or unreasonable refusal thereof or to inhuman and 
cruel punishment or be denied adequate safeguards and procedure. 
Article XII, Section (6): 
Full faith and credit shall be given throughout the territories of the 
Union to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of the Union 
and every unit thereof, and the manner in which such acts, records and 
proceedings shall be proved and the effect thereof determined shall be 
prescribed by the law. of the U nion.73 
Besides these provisions, which bore obvious textual resemblances 
to the corresponding provisions in the United States Constitution, there 
were many others in the drafts presented to the sub-committee by 
Munshi, Ambedkar, and others which corresponded to the substance of 
one provision or another in the United States Bill of Rights. In fact, 
almost every important fundamental right which was included in these 
drafts and which finally became a part of the Constitution of India has 
its counterpart in the United States Bill of Rights. In most cases the text 
is deliberately altered because the true import of the guarantee as it now 
obtains in the United States after about one hundred and sixty years of 
judicial application will be-or so it was thought-more truly captured 
by an altered text. The case of the guarantee of free speech is one in 
point. As Ambedkar explained in the Constituent Assembly, an abso-
lute statement of guarantee of free speech in the Constitution of India 
would have created more uncertainty than a statement qualified by 
those exceptions which have been judicially recognized in the United 
States over the long years. 
In some cases, the text was also altered because Indian experience, 
aspirations, and policies were just different. The provision for freedom 
of religion illustrates this genre. India, with her memories of Sati and 
her awareness of a host of anachronistic social customs sheltered 
behind religion could not afford to leave all .. practice" of religion 
73. Ibid., pp. 75-79. 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA 81 
immune from legislative reform. Nor could she afford to forget the 
history of communal riots engineered by the obscurantist and antisocial 
elements by indulging, in the name of religion, in practices offending 
the sentiments of other communities. The Indian Constitution, there-
fore, guaranteed the freedom "to profess, practice and propagate reli-
gion," but, unlike in the United States, expressly subjected it to laws of 
health, morality, and public order; and expressly provided that the 
regulatory and restrictive power of the law will reach all "economic, 
financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated 
with religious practice," and the law may bring about "social welfare 
and reform" or throw open "Hindu religious institutions of a public 
character to all classes and sections of Hindus."74 
In yet another category of cases, the texts are different because the 
social format of the problem as it obtained in the United States in the 
late eighteenth century was different from that in India in the middle of 
the present century, although the essential nature of the problem as well 
as the basic human issues involved are nearly the same. The Thirteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution provided against slavery 
and involuntary servitude and empowered Congress to enforce the 
injunction by legislation. In India the problem took the form of 
"untouchability," and the Indian Constitution appropriately provides 
that "untouchability is abolished, and its practice in any form is 
forbidden. The enforcement of any disability arising out of 'untoucha-
bility' shall be an offense punishable in accordance with law."75 Another 
article deals with the problem of involuntary labour: 'Traffic in human 
beings and begar and other similar forms of forced labour are pro-
hibited and any contravention of this provision shall be an offense 
punishable in accordance with law."76 Indeed, Munshi's draft, as we 
have already seen, spoke of abolishing "every form of slavery," and 
Professor K. T. Shah's draft also said, "Slavery of any kind is forbid-
den. No rights which would amount to property of any kind in human 
beings, or enslavement of one individual by another, or by groups or 
corporations, shall be recognized."77 Consequently, in Clause 15 (l) of 
the report of the subcommittee on fundamental rights, "slavery" was 
one of the four social evils prohibited. However, when this Clause came 
up for discussion in the Advisory Committee, Mr. Rajagopalachari 
promptly protested: 
May I suggest that we need not adopt the laws of America as enacted 
at the time of slavery. What is intended is that forced labour and any 
74. Co~stitution of India, Article 25. 75. Ibid., Article 17. 76. Article 23. 
77. Sh1va Rao, op. cit. (n. II above), vol. II, p. 53 (fundamental right, 39). 
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form of involuntary servitude except as a punishment for crime whereof 
party shall have been duly convicted are prohibited, etc. 78 
And with this the "slavery" provision was dropped without ado. 
It is neither necessary nor practicable to trace the development of 
every provision, or even several provisions, in Munshi's or Ambedkar's 
draft through the various stages of discussion in the sub-committee, in 
the Advisory Committee, and then in the Constituent Assembly itself 
through the last stage when it does or does not find a place in the 
Constitution. However, a review of the progress of the due process 
clause through the various stages of this journey will be not only 
illustrative but also, it is hoped, interesting and even rewarding. 
Due Process: Resisted and Abandoned 
In Munshi's draft, which was picked up by the sub-committee on 
fundamental rights as the principal or working draft, two provisions 
were significant from the point of the "due process" guarantee. These 
were to be found in sub-sections (l) and (4) of Article V, the Article 
itself being titled "Rights to Freedom."79 
The "Rights to Freedom" enumerated in sub-clause (I) included 
the rights of free expression, free association, free assembly, and such 
other rights. In their progress from Munshi's draft to the Draft Consti-
tution on which the Constituent Assembly commenced debate on 
November 4, 1948, these rights to freedom underwent great changes in 
style and content. But their essence remained the same. In the Draft 
Constitution, these rights found a place in Article 13. The rights were 
stated in bare terms in sub-clauses (a) to (g) of clause (l) of the Article, 
and in clauses (2) to (6) of the same Article provisos were incorporated 
permitting the State to impose restrictions on each of the rights for the 
protection of specified social objects like security of the State, public 
order, or safeguarding the interests of aboriginal tribes or of the general 
public. The Article did not say that these restrictions must be "reason-
able" or "proper~' or "due"; and this omission, as we shall see, was 
severely objected to during the debate in the Assembly. But for the 
present we return to the deliberations on Munshi's draft in the sub-
committee on fundamental rights. 
The other provision referred to above was in sub-clause (4) of 
Article V of Munshi's draft to the effect: "No person shall be deprived 
of his life, liberty or property without due process of law." It was this-
the due process clause-which was subjected to very keen discussion 
and tough resistance at practically every stage of its journey to the 
Draft Constitution, before the Constituent Assembly. 
It may perhaps be surmised at this stage that Munshi, in all 
78. Ibid., p. 255. 79. Ibid., p. 75. 
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probability, took his "due process" clause from the Fifth and not from 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This is 
already indicated by the fact that he did not regard "liberty" in the 
clause to comprehend the right of free speech, association, and the like, 
which he separately mentioned in sub-section (I) of his Article V. The 
surmise is further strengthened by the separate provision elsewhere in 
his draft (in his Article X) for "just and adequate consideration" for 
private property expropriated for ··public reasons." The epithet "just" 
seems to be obviously borrowed from the Fifth Amendment, because 
there is no provision at all for compensation in the Fourteenth; and 
even in Section 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935, whose 
influence is equally manifest in Munshi's Article X, mention is made 
only of "compensation" for the property acquired, and not of "just and 
adequate consideration." 
Be that as it may, in the sub-committee itself Munshi's "due 
process" guarantee for "life, liberty and property" was subjected to the 
criticism that it will defeat the ineluctable tenancy reforms contem-
plated in several states. It had to be put to a vote in the sub-committee, 
but survived by five votes to two. so Yet another effort was made, at the 
sub-committee stage only, to dislodge or qualify heavily the "due 
process" guarantee in Munshi's draft. In a note circulated by him "on 
the effect of some of the proposed clauses," Rau pointed out that the 
"due process" clause has spawned a great deal of litigation in the United 
States; it had led to a great deal of uncertainty regarding the standards 
of constitutional behaviour and would, if adopted in India, pose a 
threat to the validity of social welfare legislation concerning tenancy 
reform, price control, regulation of wages, and the working conditions 
of labour. His note then referred to the decision of the United States 
Supreme Court in Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford,SI in 
which the Court declared unconstitutional a congressional law scaling 
down mortgage debts with a view to protecting the interests of the 
farmers, and went on to say: 
It should be noted that the Fifth Amendment of the U.S.A. Constitu-
tion contains the "due process" clause and also another clause which 
provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without 
just compensation. Our draft contains both these clauses (see Clauses II 
and 27). It must be admitted that the clauses are a safeguard against 
predatory legislation; but they may also stand in the way of beneficent 
social legislation. s2 
Rau recommended to the sub-committee that a new clause should 
be added to its report mitigating the effect of the "due process" and the 
80. Ibid., p. 122. 81. 295 U.S. 555 (1935). 
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"just compensation" clauses by empowering the State "to limit by law 
the rights guaranteed" by these clauses "wherever the exigencies of the 
common good may require." But the sub-committee rejected this 
suggestion also by a majority vote.sJ 
In the Advisory Committee, however, B. N. Rau's skepticism was 
shared by three very important men, each of whom had rich administra-
tive experience. They were Mr. Goving Ballabh Pant, Chief Minister of 
Uttar Pradesh, Mr. C. Rajagopalachari, former Chief Minister of 
Madras, and Mr. K. M. Panikkar, Dewan (Chief Minister) of the 
princely state of Travancore. During deliberations in the Committee, 
Pant wanted to know whether the "due process" clause would render it 
unconstitutional for persons to be detained, for short periods, without 
trial, or for landlords to be disabled from ejecting or evicting their 
tenants from urban houses and rural lands. And when he was informed 
that there was a possibility of the clause having such consequences, he 
expressed his strong opposition to it. He said: 
It comes to this. The future of this country is to be determined not by 
the collective wisdom of the representatives of the people, but by the 
fiats of those elevated to the judiciary. If this is the case, then I strongly 
oppose it. The words "due process of Jaw" should be altered. The lan-
guage should be fool-proof so that every judge may be expected to give 
the same sort of ruling. We should not put in words which give rise to 
controversies. 84 
Finally, the Committee accepted the suggestion made by Panikkar 
that "property" be taken out of the phrase "life, liberty and property" in 
the "due process" clause suggested by Munshi. 85 Munshi wisely yielded, 
saying, "I agree with this formula. We shall deal with property sep-
arately." The clause was, therefore, adopted in the truncated form, 
extending the "due process" guarantee only to "life and liberty." But 
Pant was not satisfied, because "liberty" could, in the first place, 
frustrate detention without trial, and, secondly, it could even defeat 
social legislation like tenancy reform, price-control, or legislation for 
the welfare of the poor, such as debt relief or amelioration of the 
working conditions of labour. He wanted the phrase "due process" to 
be out. He only said: "I do not agree, but I keep quiet. "86 
The matter, of course, did not rest there. Rau, who shared Pant's 
apprehensions about the protean concept of "liberty," continued to 
work at it. He persuaded the Drafting Committee to agree to qualify 
"liberty" by the word "personaJ."87 It was thought that so qualified, 
"liberty" could not be construed broadly to comprehend things like 
freedom of contract or even the right to free speech. Such of these rights 
83. Ibid., p. 166. 
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as were considered worthy of constitutional protection had already 
been secured separately. It was believed, perhaps, that ··personal lib-
erty" would mean no more than freedom from incarceration, and "due 
process" protection to "liberty" in this limited and qualified sense would 
only mean fair trial. 
It was at this stage that Rau made his visit to the United States and 
learned from Justices Frankfurter and Learned Hand that the "power 
of judicial review implied in the 'due process' clause of which there was 
a qualified version in Clause 16 of our Draft Constitution was not only 
undemocratic .. but also threw an unfair burden on the judiciary." 
The upshot of it was that he persuaded the Drafting Committee to 
remove the expression "due process" altogether from the draft to be 
placed before the Constituent Assembly. Article 15 of that draft was 
simply without the expression "due process." It read: "No person shall 
be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure 
established by Jaw." A footnote explained that the expression "except 
according to procedure established by Jaw," substituting the words 
"without due process of Jaw" was more specific and was taken from 
Article XXXI of the Japanese Constitution.8B 
Thus the attempt to incorporate the "due process" clause from the 
United States Constitution seemed to· have completely failed even 
before the Constituent Assembly began considering the Draft Constitu-
tion prepared by its Drafting Committee, and the expression "due 
process" found no mention anywhere in the Draft Constitution. 
Due Process: Strong but Disguised Comeback 
It was noted earlier that Article 13 of the Draft Constitution incor-
porated the seven freedoms, beginning with the freedom of speech, in 
clause (1), and the restrictions permitted to be placed on each of these 
freedoms for various purposes, such as the security of the State, public 
order, and the like, were stated in clauses (2) to (6) of the same article.s9 
88. Ibid., p. 523. 
89. Clause (I}, enumerating the seven freedoms, was in these terms: (I) Subject to 
the other provisions of this article, all citizens shall have the right (a) to freedom of speech 
and expression; (b) to assemble peaceably and without arms; (c) to form associations or 
unions; (d) to move freely throughout the territory of India; (e) to reside and settle in any 
part of the territory of India: (f) to acquire, hold, and dispose of property; and (g) to 
practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. 
A sampling of the qualifying clauses from (2) to (6) may be given: "(2) Nothing in 
sub-clause (a) of Clause (I) of this article shall affect the operation of any existing law of 
prevent the State from making any law, relating to libel, slander, defamation, sedition or 
any other matter which offends against decency or morality or undermines the authority 
or foundation of the State .... (4) Nothing in sub-clause (c) of the said clause shall affect 
the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law, imposing, in 
the interests of the general public, restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the 
said sub-clause (ibid., p. 522)." 
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In the United States these freedoms have been judicially "incorporated" 
in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the "due process" clause in the 
Fourteenth Amendment. However, the provision of Article 13 of the 
Draft Constitution fell short of the "due process" standards primarily 
for the reason that no standard of judicial review was prescribed for the 
restrictions to be imposed by the State on these freedoms. This was 
noticed by a large number of members in the Constituent Assembly, 
and a spate of amendments was moved to rectify the error. Explaining 
the deficiency, Sardar Hukum Singh observed: 
Now who is to judge whether any measure adopted or legislation enacted 
is "in the interest of the general public" or in the interest of public 
order, or whether it relates to "any matter which undermines the author-
ity or foundation of the State?" The sphere of the Supreme Court will 
be very limited. The only question before it would be whether the 
legislation concerned is "in the interest of public order." Only the bona 
fides of the legislation will be the main point for decision by the Court 
and when once it is found by the Court that the Government honestly 
believed that the legislation was needed "in the interest of the public 
order," there would be nothing more left for its interference.9o 
Hukum Singh pointed out that "in other countries like America, it is for 
the Supreme Court to judge the matter, keeping in view all the circum-
stances,'' and asked for the deletion of the qualifying clauses altogether. 
Mr. Damodar Swarup Seth referred to Ambedkar's explanation that 
the qualifying clauses corresponded to the police powers judicially 
evolved by the Supreme Court in the United States and said that "the 
limitations embodied in the Draft Constitution are far wider than those 
provided in the United States."9I 
But perhaps the most pertinent criticism and the best suggestion 
came from Pt. Thakur Das Bhargava. He endorsed the criticism made 
by the earlier speakers and observed that the provision of sub-clauses 
(2) to (6) would be satisfied as soon as a legislature claimed that it was 
satisfied or it honestly believed that the restrictions on the freedom were 
necessary for the purposes mentioned in those clauses. He, therefore, 
suggested that the word "reasonable" should be inserted in each of the 
clauses to qualify the permissible "restrictions." He said: 
Sir, one speaker was asking where the soul in the lifeless Article 13 was? 
I am putting the soul there. If you put the word "reasonable" there, 
the court will have to say whether a particular Act is in the interests of 
the public and, secondly, whether the restrictions imposed by the legisla-
ture are reasonable, proper and necessary in the circumstances of the 
case. The courts will have to go into the question and it will not be the 
legislature and the executive who could play with the fundamental 
90. C.A.D., vol. VII, p. 733 (C.A.D. stands for Constituent Assembly Debates). 
91. Ibid., p. 713. 
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rights of the people. It is the courts who will have the final say. There-
fore, my submission is that we must put in these words "reasonB:ble" 
or "proper" or "necessary," or whatever good word the House hkes. 
I understand that Dr. Ambedkar is agreeable to the word "reasonable." 
Otherwise, Article 13 is a nullity. It is not fully justiciable now and the 
courts will not be able to say whether the restrictions are necessary or 
reasonable.92 
Ultimately, Ambedkar accepted, amongst others, the amendment 
moved by Bhargava,93 and the restrictions permitted on the various 
freedoms in Article 13 became justiciable. 
Did. the several members of the Constituent Assembly who advo-
cated and won the cause of liberty by introducing the element of 
justiciability in regard to the seven freedoms in Article 13, beginning 
with the freedom of speech, realize that they were striving for the 
adoption of the "due process" doctrine so far as those freedoms were 
concerned? It may be safely assumed that they did not have any 
scholarly or technical knowledge of the doctrines of "due process" and 
"police powers." They might not have been aware, for instance, that in 
the Constitution of the United States the due process guarantee for "life, 
liberty and property" figures at two different places, namely, in the 
Fifth as well as in the Fourteenth Amendment. They might not have 
been familiar with the doctrine of selective incorporation of the Bill of 
Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment through a progressively widen-
ing construction of the word "liberty." Mr. Mahboob Ali Baig, for 
instance, while speaking of the distinction between leaving the deter-
mination of constitutionality to the judiciary, on the one hand, and to 
the legislature, on the other, said: 
This distinction was recognized by the framers of the American Constitu-
tion in that famous Fourteenth Amendment which clearly laid down that 
no Congress can make any law to prejudice the freedom of speech, the 
freedom of association and the freedom of the press. This was in 1791, 
and if the American citizen transgressed the limits and endangered the 
State, the judiciary would judge him and not the legislature or the 
executive. 94 
Yet, their sense of direction was perfect. They knew that the 
freedoms enumerated in the Thirteenth Article were meaningful only if 
legislation seeking to restrain them was justiciable on the ground of 
propriety or reasonableness or some other standard of assessment of 
desirability. They were also at least vaguely aware that in the United 
92. Ibid., pp. 739-740. 
93. Ibid., p. 741. For some reason, not quite apparent, the word "reasonable" was 
not inserted in Clause (2) of Article 19 relating to freedom of speech and expression. 
However, that was done a year and a half later, in June 1951, by the First Amendment to 
the Constitution. 
94. Ibid., p. 728. 
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States the Constitution has carried out the experiment of authorizing 
the judges to apply the standards, and the results there obtained 
encourage emulation. And they all knew that the "due process" clause 
was the key to the enforcement of judicially supervised standards. Some 
among them, like Bhargava, were certainly more knowledgeable and 
were able to see that the same standards can be enforced by using either 
the expression "due process" or the expression ·'reasonable." In either 
case, the standards are determined and the lines of demarcation be-
tween freedom and permissible restraint are drawn by the judges. 
The next battle for judicial standards was fought over Article 15 of 
the Draft Constitution. It was this Article which originally started with 
a full-fledged enunciation of the guarantee of "due process" against 
deprivation of "life, liberty or property." It was subsequently reduced to 
"due process" guarantee for "life and personal liberty." And, finally, 
"due process" was eliminated and the Article only guaranteed that no 
person shall be deprived of his "life or personal liberty except 
according to procedure established by law." Bhargava and like-minded 
members moved amendments seeking to restore the "due process" 
guarantee. 
Bhargava himself moved that the Article should read: "No person 
shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty without due process of 
law." In his speech explaining and supporting his amendment, Bhar-
gava said: 
The house has already accepted the word "reasonable" in Article 13. 
At least seventy percent of the Acts which can involve personal liberty 
have now come under the jurisdiction of the courts, and the courts are 
competent to pronounce an opinion on such laws, whether they are 
reasonable or not. The House is now estopped from adopting another 
principle. In regard to personal liberty and life, the question is much 
more important. So far as the questions of life and personal liberty are 
concerned, they must also be under the category of subjects which are 
within the jurisdiction of the courts. 95 
The debate on the amendment to restore "due process" in the text 
of Article 15 was, perhaps, one of the most assiduous debates in the 
Assembly. Those who supported the amendment and those who fa-
voured the status quo argued their cases with great zest, and opinion in 
the House seemed to sway from one side to another, each time a speech 
was made. The consideration of the amendment was postponed for a 
week at the request of Ambedkar, the Chairman of the Drafting 
Committee. And, finally, Ambedkar announced that he was himself un-
able to decide whether to accept the amendment or not. He left the matter 
to the decision of the House with these words: "It is rather a case where a 
95. Ibid., p. 847. 96. Ibid., p. 1001. 
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man has to sail between Charybdis and Scylla and I, therefore, would 
not say anything. I would leave it to the House to decide in any way it 
likes."96 
When put to a vote, the amendment was rejected by the House. But 
the matter could not rest there. It was realized by the members of the 
Drafting Committee itself that Article 15, as it stood, gave no guar-
antee of a ''reasonable" or "proper" or "due" procedure in matters of 
life and personal liberty. In particular, it gave no guarantee of a fair 
trial with aid of counsel in a duly established court of law. At the final 
state of the deliberations of the Assembly, therefore, Ambedkar himself 
moved an amendment introducing a new Article, 15A, to guarantee 
every person accused of an offense a fair trial and the right, pending the 
trial, not to be detained without the order of a magistrate. Introducing 
this new article, Ambedkar referred to the great dissatisfaction ex-
pressed in the House and outside when the amendments seeking to 
introduce the "due process" guarantee for "life and personal liberty" 
were negatived, and observed: 
We are, therefore, now, by introducing Article 15A, making, if I may say 
so, compensation for what was done then in passing Article 15. In other 
words, we are providing for the substance of the law of "due process" 
by the introduction of Article 15A.97 
Towards the end of the debate on the new article, Ambedkar again 
said: 
Ever since that Article (Article 15) was adopted, I and my friends had been 
trying in some way to restore the content of due procedure with its 
fundamentals without using the words "due process." I should have 
thought that the Members who are interested in the liberty of the indi-
vidual would be more than satisfied for being able to have the prospect 
before them of the provisions contained in Article 15A.98 
The new Article was, of course, approved by the House with certain 
minor amendments. 
Due Process: Courts Fail to Recognize 
It is evident from the debates in the Constituent Assembly that the 
framers of the Constitution of India consciously adopted the doctrines 
of "due process" and "police powers.'· True, they did not adopt the 
expressions "due process" and "police powers.'' They also did not use 
the famous phrase "life, liberty and property." The exigencies of their 
own circumstances led them to provide for the seven freedoms in a 
separate article, and the compulsions of social milieu persuaded them to 
accept departures from the textual and substantive details of the United 
States Constitution. Yet, they basically stuck to the core of "due 
97. C.A.D., vol. IX, p. 1497. 98. Ibid., p. 1556. 
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process," which is that the principal rights of speech, religion, associa-
tion, property, and so forth should be secure against arbitrary depriva-
tion or encroachment by the executive as well as the legislature through 
the operation of judicial review on the broad ground of reasonability or 
propriety of all governmental action, and that fair trial with the help of 
legal counsel should rule out arbitrary arrest, detention, or bodily 
injury. 
In fact, no constitution which secures liberties by providing for 
judicial review of executive and legislative action on the basis of 
judicially supervised standards of reasonableness can simply succeed in 
avoiding the doctrines of "due processs" and "police powers." Because, 
as Bhargava and other members of the Constituent Assembly rightly 
understood, "due process'' is none other than the test of "reasonable-
ness" applied by the judiciary in assessing the quality of the legislative 
measures affecting the liberty of the individual. And what is police 
power but the other side of the same coin? To define the boundary of an 
island is no different from defining the boundary of the sea that 
surrounds it. A statement of how far the State will be permitted to 
encroach upon the liberty of the individual is identical with the state-
ment of how far a citizen can enjoy his liberty without encroachment 
from the State, although the one is characterized as a statement of 
police powers and the other of liberty protected by due process. Conse-
quently, when the Constitution of India provided for the various 
freedoms in clause (1) of Article 19 and laid down the judicially 
supervised limits of permissible restraint in clauses (2) to (6) of the same 
Article, it provided for due process as well as police powers. The 
reasonable restrictions permitted in those. clauses are none other than 
the contours of the police powers permitted by the Constitution of 
India in regard to the liberties mentione9 in the main part of the Article. 
Similarly, Article 22, which secures the right to fair trial, and Article 20, 
forbidding double jeopardy, ex post facto penal laws, and self-incrimi-
nation, constitute part of the same scheme of demarcating the line 
dividing liberty and permissible restraint, or defining individual rights 
protected by due process and corresponding police powers of the State. 
It follows, therefore, that notwithstanding the differences of detail 
-which might in some instances be of no inconsiderable significance-
there is a basic identity of values and of the means and methods of 
achieving them among all the countries where civil liberties or funda-
mental rights are secured by judicial review. Consequently, institutional 
experiences of one country, particularly those concerning the judiciary 
and its functional relationship with the other two branches of govern-
ment, must have relevance and value for all others. Since the United 
States has had the longest experience, extending over two centuries in 
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this field where India is one of the latest to arrive, the experience of the 
former can illuminate vistas in the path of the latter. In the early years 
of the working of the Constitution of India, the United States prece-
dents were cited before the Supreme Court and were received with 
natural readiness. Gradually, however, their use has almost disap-
peared, and the keenness to maintain touch with the constitutional 
developments in the United States has generally palled. 
One reason for this decline of interest in United States juris-
prudence has been the belief prevalent among Indian lawyers that the 
Constitution of India has rejected the "due process" doctrine.99 This, we 
have noted, is evidently incorrect with regard to "liberty" as well as 
"property.'' Even "personal liberty" in the narrowest sense of freedom 
from imprisonment has been secured against arbitrary deprivation by 
the laying down of requirements of fair trial in Articles 20 and 22. 100 
99. This belief is grounded in certain observations in the Supreme Court opinions in 
the very first case that came up before the Court, namely, A. K. Gopa/an v. State of 
Madras (A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27). Chief Justice Kania observed: "A perusal of the report of 
the drafting committee to which our attention was drawn shows clearly that the 
Constituent Assembly had before it the American Article and the expression "due process 
of law" but they deliberately dropped the use of that expression from our Constitution . 
. . . If the Indian Constitution wanted to preserve to every person the protection given by 
the due process clause of the American Constitution there was nothing to prevent the 
Assembly from adopting the phrase, or if they wanted to limit the same to procedure 
only, to adopt that expression with only the word 'procedure' prefixed to 'law."' 
Mr. Justice B. K. Mukherjee (later he became Chief Justice) held: "In the first place it 
is clear that the framers of the Indian Constitution did not desire to introduce into our 
system the elements of uncertainty, vagueness and changeability that have grown round 
the 'due process' doctrine in America. . The uncertainty and elasticity are in the 
doctrine itself which is a sort of hidden mine, the contents of which nobody knows and it 
is merely revealed from time to time to the judicial conscience of the Judges .... In the 
Indian Constitution, the word 'due' has been deliberately omitted and this shows clearly 
that the Constitution makers of India had no intention of introducing the American 
doctrine" (p. 102). 
Mr. JusticeS. R. Das (later he became Chief Justice) observed: "That doctrine (due 
process) can only thrive and work where the legislature is subordinate to the judiciary in 
the sense that the latter can sit in judgment over and review all acts of the Legislature. 
Such a doctrine can have no application to a field where the Legislature is supreme. That 
is why the doctrine of 'due process of law' is quite different in England where Parliament 
is supreme .... In the main, subject to the limitation I have mentioned, our Constitution 
has preferred the supremacy of the Legislature to that of the judiciary. The English 
principle of due process of law is, therefore, more in accord with our Constitution than 
the American doctrine which has been evolved for serving quite a different system ... .In 
the next place, it is common knowledge that our Constitution makers deliberately 
declined to adopt the uncertain and shifting American doctrine of due process of law .... 
Finally, it would be incongruous to import the doctrine of due process of law without its 
palliative, the doctrine of police powers. It is impossible to read the last mentioned 
doctrine into Article 21" (pp. 117-118). 
I 00. Obviously the learned judges missed the true significance of these two articles as 
importing the essence of fair trial in the Constitution. As Ambedkar said, Article 22 (his 
Article 15A) was to make amends or compensate for what was denied by weeding out the 
expression "due process" from Article 21 (Article 15 of the Draft Constitution). 
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"Liberty" in the broader sense as inclusive of the freedoms of speech, 
and so forth, has been secured in Article 19. In spite of the fact that Rau 
and Pant succeeded in withdrawing "property" from "due process" 
protection, this right was also ultimately protected by sub-clause (f) of 
Clause (I) of Article 19 which guaranteed the right to "acquire, hold 
and dispose of property" subject only to "reasonable restrictions" like 
the other rights in that article. 
Another reason which made the doctrines of police powers and due 
process unpopular among the Indian lawyers was the failure of some 
early judges to perceive and recognize the police power in regard to the 
right of property in Clause (5) of Article 19. 101 The confusion caused by 
their unsuccessful explorations proved inhibitive.1o2 Lastly, perhaps the 
most important reason for the cooling down of the Indian lawyer's 
interest in the constitutional jurisprudence of the United States is his 
lack of acquaintance with it. Almost all the judges of the Supreme 
Court and the lawyers who argue before them have, from the very 
beginning, been persons familiar with the principles of English consti-
tutional law but not with those of the United States Constitution. And, 
as Indian precedents fill up the interstices of constitutional law even the 
initial need to consult and explore unfamiliar foreign constitutions 
seems gradually to wear down. 
This is not to suggest that United States precedents on specific 
issues should be regularly followed or even considered in India. That is 
neither possible nor at all desirable. Indian courts must build, as they 
have indeed been doing, their own corpus juris based on the text and 
social background of the Constitution of India. This text, as we have 
seen, makes significant departures from the United States Constitution 
101. In Charanjit Lalv. Union of India (A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 4!), State of West Benga/v. 
Subodh Gopal (A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 92), and Dwarkadas Shrinivas v. Sholapur Spinning 
and Weaving Mills (A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 119), Mr. JusticeS. R. Das steadily took the view 
that the police power in regard to the right of property is not to be found in Article 19 
which-after guaranteeing the right to acquire, hold, and dispose of property-permitted 
the State to impose reasonable restrictions on the right for the social objectives mentioned 
in Clause (6) of the Article. Instead, the learned Judge held that the doctrine of police 
powers in regard to property was to be found in Clause ( l) of Article 31 which said, "No 
person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law." This led him to two 
indefensible conclusions: first, that Article 19 has no relevance when the property is 
altogether lost to the owner, because then only Article 31 (I) is available; and second, that 
when "total deprivation" occurs as a result of law without actual "acquisition" by the 
State, there is no check of "reasonability" on the legislation, whereas that check is 
available if there is no "total deprivation" but only slight encroachment. For criticism and 
constructive suggestion, see P. K. Tripathi, op. cit. (n. 4 above), chapter 5 generally, and 
especially pp. 241 and 249. 
102. Thus, for instance, Seervai, in his Constitutional Law of India (N. M. Tripathi, 
Bombay, 1967), has criticized Mr. Justice Das, not for his failure to locate the doctrine of 
police powers in Article 19 (5), but for applying the doctrine at all (pp. 526-527). Seervai is 
criticized by the present writer; see P. K. Tripathi, op. cit. (n. 54 above), p. 329 et seq. 
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and makes its own innovations. It is meant to function in Indian 
conditions and to guide the destinies of the people of India compatibly 
with their genius. The Indian courts need not even care to think in terms 
of the United States doctrines like police powers and due process. In 
this regard the framers of the Constitution of India have themselves 
given the lead by abandoning the use of those expressions. Neverthe-
less, since both constitutions seek to uphold the somewhat incompatible 
principles of democracy and judicial review, there is bound to be a basic 
similarity of tensions, experiences, and perceptions, especially in situa-
tions where this ipstitutional incompatibility threatens to erupt into 
situations of crisis. In such matters the mature experience of the United 
States is bound to have great relevance for India, and insulation from 
that experience may prove needlessly expensive. 
One such matter where the United States experience must be 
emulated if the integrity of judicial review is to be seriously viewed as a 
cherished value concerns the age of retirement of the judges of the 
Supreme Court and the High Courts-the courts endowed with the 
exercise of that enormous and delicate power. Independence of the 
judges of any court, and especially of these courts, cannot be left merely 
to the faith in the individuals appointed as judges, although that faith 
remains a factor of considerable significance. The proved wisdom of the 
Act of Settlement, 1701, and of the United States Constitution which 
secures a life tenure for the federal judges cannot be brushed aside by 
superficial observations that the judges in India already have a longer 
and more secure tenure than the civil servants, or that Indian condi-
tions of climate and expectation of life are different. IOJ Unless judges of 
these courts are given a tenure up to the age of at least seventy years, 
and a pension thereafter equal to their emoluments while in office, it 
will be unfair to expect that they will not, immediately after retirement, 
seek employment either from the government or from private com-
panies-both powerful and wealthy clients before them while on the 
bench. Is it very difficult to perceive the danger to the system from such 
a situation? Is the danger too remote?I04 
What is noted about the age of retirement also holds equally good 
for their ridiculously low emoluments. Their salaries had been fixed 
more than a quarter of a century ago, and were not handsome even 
then. Since then, however, the decline in the buying power of the rupee 
has rendered the salaries almost ridiculous. Is a decent salary for a 
103. Under the Constitution of India, a judge of the Supreme Court is retired at the 
age of sixty-five and that of a High Court at the age of sixty-two. Before that time they 
can be removed only through the process of impeachment as in the United States. The 
pension after retirement is paltry. Most judges like to get work after retirement. 
104. In India nobody seems to bother. 
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judge expected to devote all his energies and thoughts to the enuncia-
tion and application of the principles of the Constitution a price too 
high? 
In his report to the President of the Constituent Assembly after his 
return from the United States, Rau had said: 
Again, Justice Frankfurter was very emphatic that any jurisdiction exercis-
able by the Supreme Court should be exercised by the full Court. His view 
is that the highest Court of appeal in the land should not sit in divisions. 
Every Judge, except, of course, such Judges as may be disqualified by 
personal interest or otherwise from hearing particular cases, should share 
the responsibility for every decision of the Court.I05 
It is difficult to see why this principle was not incorporated in the 
Constitution. As things stand, all the judges seldom sit together. And 
the possibility of a Chief Justice constituting benches altogether arbi-
trarily cannot be ruled out. Especially, some of the ablest judges may 
never get the chance to contribute their best to constitutional interpre-
tation. This has an obvious bearing on the independence of the Su-
preme Court judge. 
There is yet another matter in regard to which United States 
experience can be extremely valuable and has been unwisely ignored. 
The anti-majoritarian element implicit in the doctrine of judicial review, 
initially highlighted by Jefferson and Thayer, has been well recognized. 
That recognition never led to the abandoning of judicial review, but it 
did underscore the need for caution and restraint in its exercise. If ever 
such caution and restraint are ignored, the democratic will can hope to 
assert itself by the difficult but not altogether impracticable process of 
constitutional amendment. As Dean Rostow rightly observed: 
Where judges are carrying out the function of constitutional review, the 
final responsibility of the people is appropriately guaranteed by the pro-
visions for amending the Constitution itself, and by the benign influence 
of time, which changes the personnel of the courts.I06 
But can the judges obstruct the people from discharging this "final 
responsibility" by striking down constitutional amendments them-
selves? Surely, if the Constitution itself confers that power in express 
and unmistakable terms, it has to be exercised. It may, perhaps, in that 
event, have to be exercised even more cautiously and sparingly than the 
power to review ordinary legislation; but that is a different matter. Yet, 
how express and unmistakable must those terms be? Can the power be 
said to be conferred when there is no mention of it in the text of the 
Constitution? Can it be read in the following text? 
105. Shiva Rao, op. cit. (n. II above), vol. III, p. 219. 
106. Eugene V. Rostow, "The Democratic Character of Judicial Review," 66 
Harvard Law Review 193 (1952-53): 195. 
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PART XX 
AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION 
368. Procedure for amendment of the Constitution 
An amendment of this Constitution may be initiated only by the 
introduction of a Bill for the purpose in either House of Parliament, and 
when the Bill is passed in each House by a majority of the total m~m­
bership of that House and by a majority of not less than two-thtrds 
of the members of that House present and voting, it shall be presented 
to the President for his assent and upon such assent being given to the 
Bill, the Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms 
of the Bill: 
Provided that if such amendment seeks to make any change in-
(a) Article 53, Article 55, Article 73, Article 162 or Article 241, or 
(b) Chapter IV of Part V, Chapter V of Part VI, or Chapter I of 
Part XI, or 
(c) any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule, or 
(d) the representation of States in Parliament, or 
(e) the provision of this article, 
the amendment shall also require to be ratified by the Legislatures of 
not less than one-half of the States by resolutions to that effect passed 
by those Legislatures before the Bill making provision for such amend-
ment is presented to the President for assent. 
I take the liberty of quoting the entire Part XX of the Constitution 
of India here because there comes a time when sophisticated argument 
must yield place to each one's seeing it for himself. I respectfully take 
the view that the Article does not empower the Court to strike down 
constitutional amendments on substantive grounds, in such explicit 
terms at least without which the power of judicial review ought not to 
be extended to constitutional amendments. The Supreme Court of 
India, in fact, held, as early as in the year 1951, that the "Constituent 
power" of Parliament in Article 368 cannot be subjected to judicial 
review on the ground that it offends the fundamental rights.I07 How-
ever, in 1967, by a majority of six against five in the Golak Nath case, 10s 
the Supreme Court reversed that decision and held that constitutional 
amendment was subject to the guarantee of fundamental rights in the 
same way as ordinary legislation. This doctrine rested mainly on the 
theory that there was no difference between ordinary law and the 
Constitution, or, more realistically, on the inability of Government 
lawyers to articulate the distinction between the two. Subsequently, the 
present writer articulated that distinction in his first Telang Memorial 
lecture at the Bombay University in 1971. 109 Consequently, in 1973, in 
the Kesavananda Bharati case, the Supreme Court almost unanimously 
107. Shankari Prasad v. Union of India (A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 458). 
108. /. C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab (A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1643). 
109. P. K. Tripathi, op. cit. (n. 4 above), chapter I, "Golak Nath: A Critique," p. 17. 
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overruled Golak N ath; IIO but at the same time what is claimed to be a 
majority of the thirteen-judge bench has laid down that the "basic 
structure and framework of the Constitution" cannot be altered or 
impaired by a constitutional amendment under Article 368. That 
position, again, as on earlier occasions, is sought to be reversed by a 
constitutional amendment; 111 and the validity of the amendment will 
itself depend upon the soundness of the "basic structure" ruling given 
by the Supreme Court which it seeks to reverse! 
That the power to strike down a constitutional amendment on the 
ground that it affects or injures the "basic structure" of the Constitution 
flows from the text of Article 368 is, with due respect, at best a 
"benevolent illusion" of the type referred to by the late Professor 
Alexander Bickel in the context of Justice Black's insistence that the 
text of the First Amendment is absolute. til Such illusions help people 
to imagine that they rule themselves. To quote Bickel's thoughtful 
words: 
But it is very dangerous. To begin with, the illusion is a two-edged 
sword, which can be turned very sharply against the Court .... What is 
even more ominous, the illusion may even engulf its maker and breed, 
and it has occasionally done, free ranging "activist" government by the 
judiciary. Such government is incompatible on principle with democratic 
institutions, and in practice it will not be tolerated. This way lie crises 
such as the Court-packing fight of 1937, in which the Court, if it per-
sists, must ultimately be the loser. The truth is that the illusion of judi-
cial impotence and automation may, when fostered, be first acquired by 
the people and last, with the accompanying feel of omnipotence, by 
the judges themselves. But it is also first lost by the people and last by 
the judges. One day the judges may abandon it too late. 113 
In Bickel's words, again, no court, like the Supreme Courts of the 
United States and India, should "tell itself or the world that it draws 
decisions from a text that is incapable of yielding them. That obscures 
the actual process of decision, for the country, and for the judges 
themselves, if they fall in with the illusion. "11 4 That also ignores the 
ground rule that "the integrity of the Court's principled process should 
remain unimpaired, since the Court does not involve itself in compro-
mises and expedient actions."ll5 
Nothing can furnish a more convincing vindication than recent 
events in India of Thayer's view, endorsed by Bickel, that judicial 
review "may, in a larger sense, have a tendency over time seriously to 
110. KesavanaTda Bharati v. State of Kerala (A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461). 
Ill. The Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976. 
112. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (Indianapolis: Hobbs-
Merrill, 1962), p. 92. 
113. Ibid., pp. 92-93. 114. Ibid., pp. 96-97. 115. Ibid., p. 95. 
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weaken the democratic process." Throughout the years when Mr. 
Nehru was Prime Minister the opposition parties in the Parliament 
were divided and weak. The fundamental right to get compensation for 
property acquired by the State for public purpose was construed 
throughout the period somewhat in favour of the individual, and 
Parliament passed a series of constitutional amendments, to undo, as it 
were, the damage caused by judicial interpretation to the provisions of 
Article 31 of the Constitution.ll6 The people looked upon the Court 
rather than the opposition parties for the vindication of the funda-
mental right, and the opposition remained weak, apologetic, and 
ineffective. Then, after Nehru's death the Court gave, in 1967, the 
wrong decision in Golak Nath, attempting to deny Parliament the 
power to abridge a fundamental right by constitutional amendment. It 
was followed, in 1970, by the decisions in the Bank Nationalisation 
case, which invalidated a Central Act acquiring the business and assets 
of the fourteen biggest Banking Companies in India, 117 and the Privy 
Purse case, 11s which invalidated the Presidential Order terminating the 
pensions and other privileges of the erstwhile princes. Both these 
judgments could be criticized for departing from the strict construc-
tionist views of the relevant constitutional provisions and excessive 
concern for the property rights of the indivi'dual. In fact, they both 
derived their strength from Golak Nath, which stood behind them to 
assure that the fundamental right to property as construed by the 
Supreme Court would remain beyond the reach of Parliament's power 
of amendment. Thus judicial activism aiming to create new funda-
mental rights for the citizen had reached its zenith. It was at this stage 
towards the end of 1970 that Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi snapped the 
decision to hold the elections to Parliament a year earlier than due, with 
the proclaimed objective of obtaining the electorate's approval for her 
economic programmes and expropriatory legislation. Mrs. Gandhi's 
party was returned to power with a stunning majority of more than two-
thirds in Parliament, and the opposition was completely routed. That 
proved beyond doubt that judicial protection to fundamental rights had 
blunted the edge of democratic protest. 
Then came the declaration of emergency in June 1975, followed by 
several arrests and occasional complaints of harsh treatment of jailed 
politicians. But this time, in Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur v. 
Shiv kant Shukla, 119 the Supreme Court refused to issue habeas corpus 
during the period when a Presidential Order under Article 359 of the 
Constitution had suspended the enforcement of the fundamental rights 
116. See n. 4 above. 117. R. C. Cooper v. Union of India (n. 4 above). 
118. Madhay Rao Scindia v. Union of India (A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 530). 
119. A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1207. 
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of equal protection (Article 14), personal liberty (Article 21), and fair 
trial (Article 22). Yet, no sooner did the Court step aside than the 
Thayer doctrine began to operate in the reverse, as it were, and the 
democratic forces began to rally around the fundamental rights of the 
individual. The upshot of it all was that the opposition, which had laid 
divided and ineffective and spurned by the electorate ever since the 
commencement of the Constitution, was united and galvanized into a 
single party, under the name of the Janata Party, and in an unprece-
dented response from the people secured an absolute majority in the 
House of People, or the lower house of Parliament, relegating the 
Congress Party for the first time in the history of the Constitution to the 
opposition benches.l20 The Congress Party lost practically all the seats 
to the House from the nine North-Indian states supposed to be the 
bulwark of its strength;I2I and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was 
herself defeated in her constituency by a convincing margin of over fifty 
thousand votes. One is tempted to say, in retrospect, that the philoso-
phy of judicial restraint and tolerance of the democratic processes 
commended itself to the Supreme Court several years too late. It may 
not be too rash to surmise, too, that if the Court had once again 
persisted in assuming to itself the mantle of the Constitution makers, as 
in Golak Nath and other cases, and if it persuaded itself to bypass the 
barrier of the constitutional inhibition in Article 359 to enforce the 
fundamental right by issuing the writ in the recent habeas corpus 
cases, the democratic process would not have sprung into action as it 
did. Anyone in India who cared to acquaint himself with the United 
States experience and with the thinking of American jurists on these 
matters would have known that the surest way to destroy fundamental 
rights is to try to protect them Golak Nath style by stretching and 
bending the text of the Constitution to the frustration of the demo-
cratically expressed will of the people-that there are no shortcuts to 
the hard way of winning the support of the electorate for drubbing the 
governmental policies one does not like. Also, it is hoped that Ameri-
cans who care to know about events in India will find satisfying 
confirmation of their own experience on this crucial aspect of the 
working of their great institutions. 
120. In the elections held in March 1977, the Congress Party secured only 151 seats in 
a House of 542. 
121. These are the states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal, Orissa, Madhya 
Pradesh, Rajasthan. Punjab, Haryana, and Himachal Pradesh. 
v 
Indonesia 
Editorial Note 
Fifth largest in population among the world's nations, with a popula-
tion approaching 140 million, Indonesia's land area is nonetheless 
scattered out over a 4,000-mile archipelago of nearly 14,000 islands. 
One of these, Java (including here two small adjacent islands for 
statistical convenience), though only 7 percent of Indonesia's land area, 
houses four hundred volcanoes, more than two-thirds of the citizenry, 
and, every year, an additional one and a half million new people on the 
job market. Enriched and exacerbated by languages, dialects, and 
ethnic groups numbering in the many hundreds, Indonesia's social and 
political fabric is possibly unparalleled in diversity and complexity. 
Exultant anticipation of dramatic advance upon the liberation 
from Dutch political shackles in 1949 stumbled painfully upon Cold 
War rocks, imposed and ill-fitted Western "problem-solving" mecha-
nisms, the detritus of innumerable decades of Dutch exploitation and 
neglect, and recrudescent traditional conflicts. Sporadic forays toward 
independent development initiatives fell repeatedly afoul the vicious 
cycle of rich nation/ poor nation disparities. Today, by standard 
measure of income from such exports as oil, timber, tin, copper, nickel, 
bauxite, coffee, and rubber, Indonesia-it is claimed-has made ten- to 
Note: Chief Justice Seno-Adji's paper was adapted for this symposium by Lawrence W. 
Beer, with the author's permission. All footnotes in this chapter have been added by the 
Editor and Daniel S. Lev. 
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twenty-five-fold brobdingnagian leaps forward toward a better life. One 
counters that the average Indonesian remains by far the poorest Asian 
in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, has had no schooling, 
and grows perhaps less literate. And oil, the biggest bubble of sophisti-
cated early seventies enterprise, representing some three-fourths of 
Indonesia's annual increment of hard dollars and cents in the bank, 
imploded overnight in 1975. It now represents a lead balloon of debt, 
which despite Western rescue operations will encumber Indonesia for 
years to come and which challenged the most basic premises of current 
governmental policy. But Indonesia is rebounding. 
The paraphernalia of constitutional democracy are maintained and 
occasionally elaborated or simplified, but pressures of exigency-and 
protection of incumbency-at times expanded the militarization of ac-
tual governmental functioning. Parliamentary bodies and political 
parties are faint shadows of their former stature, yet even at their height 
were derivative, faintly foreign, uncomfortable creations in their Indo-
nesian incarnation. And the brutal reality may be that the survival of 
these institutions is irrelevant before the immediate, material challenge 
to alleviate the enduring problems of everyday survival. 
No less complex is Indonesia's legal order, which has undergone 
considerable evolution since the revolution of 1945-1950. The formal 
base of Indonesian law is the colonial version of Dutch civil law, and 
the Indonesian legal system remains fundamentally within the civil law 
Rechtsstaat tradition. The colonial institutional heritage, which con-
sisted of distinct court systems for various population groups, under-
went a drastic revision that began during the Japanese occupation of 
1942-1945. At that time the civil courts were unified into a single, three-
instance hierarchy, now consisting of first instance courts (pengadilan 
negen) at the district level, appellate courts (pengadilan tinggl) gen-
erally at the provincial level, and a supreme court of cassation (Mah-
kamah Agung) in Jakarta. Customary courts were eliminated by 1960. 
Alongside the civil judiciary, however, there remains a nationwide 
system of Islamic courts, organized under the Ministry of Religon, as 
well as a system of military justice under the Ministry of Defense. 
Administrative courts are provided for in the Basic Law on Judicial 
Organization of 1971, but have not yet been established. The Supreme 
Court has no substantial review powers, though there have been lively 
debates over the issue in Indonesia's recent legal history. 
Indonesia's substantive law awaits major revision. The procedural 
code (H.I.R.) inherited from the colony remains in force, as does the 
criminal code (K.U.H.P.). The civil and commercial codes have been 
amended considerably in fact by the operation of new statutes, but 
there is yet to be a successful attempt at drafting wholly new codes. In 
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one area of substantive law, however-family law, particularly with 
respect to inheritance-the Supreme Court itself has been a major force 
for innovation. 
Indonesia's turbulent political history is reflected in its constitu-
tional evolution. The first constitution in 1945 provided for strong 
executive leadership, but was set aside in favour of a parliamentary order 
in the constitution of 1950, which replaced a short-lived federal consti-
tution. The 1950 constitution was provisional, however, pending de-
bates over a new constitution in the Constituent Assembly elected in 
1955. These debates did not progress very far before the Constituent 
Assembly was permanently adjourned by President Sukarno in 1959. In 
July of that year the 1945 constitution was restored and remains in 
effect. 
DANIEL S. LEV 
ROGER K. PAGET 
An Indonesian Perspective on 
the American Constitutional Influence 
Oemar Seno Adji 
Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Indonesia 
Indonesia's Constitutional History 
While discussing the principles and elements of the Indonesian State, one 
of Indonesia's founding fathers stated that in framing our Constitution 
he took the Constitution of the United States of America as a basic 
source for comparison. The resultant Constitution of 1945 naturally 
differs from the U.S. Constitution in many respects; but one can also 
find parallelism and similarities in both spirit and structure. Was this 
merely coincidence, or did the U.S. Constitution have a perceptible 
influence on the Indonesian Constitution of 1945? We know that the 
Dutch constitutional influence was not the basic source. But these 
matters should be looked at in the context of the constitutional history 
of Indonesia. 
Indonesia was under Dutch colonial control for centuries prior to 
World War II, when it was occupied by the Japanese. In the waning 
days of that war in 1945, Indonesian nationalists proclaimed Indepen-
dence and promulgated what is called "the Constitution of the Procla-
mation State." However, the Dutch still controlled large areas of the 
country, and years of struggle and negotiation passed before all of 
Indonesia was free of colonial control. 1 In 1949 a provisional constitu-
tion of the United States of Indonesia was developed; but the federal 
structure of this constitution was ill-suited to the needs of a nation 
composed of many thousands of islands, and so this system remained in 
effect only from January to August 1950. At that point, in 1950, the 
Provisional Constitution of the Unitary State was promulgated. This 
1950 document, like the 1945 Constitution, provided for a unitary and 
parliamentary system of government. But the 1945 Constitution differs 
from both the 1949 and 1950 constitutions in that it established a 
presidential cabinet system of a non-parliamentary character, under 
I. On the history of Indonesia's nationalist movement, see George MeT. Kahin, 
Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia {Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952). 
(102) 
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which the President is both the chief executive and the head of state, as 
is the President of the United States. 2 
In I 959 a movement emerged demanding a return to the I 945 
Constitution. This movement succeeded, and since that time the I 945 
Constitution has been in force in Indonesia. 
Underlying all the constitutions of Indonesia and binding the State 
together has been an unchanging State ideology, a string of unity, the 
Poncosilo (Five Principles, or pillars) oflndonesian society: (I) belief in 
God; (2) a humanism which is just and civilized; (3) the unity of 
Indonesia; (4) democracy guided by prudence through consultation and 
representation; and (5) social justice for the whole Indonesian people.3 
The Preamble to the Constitution of I 945 states, among other things: 
. . that to be independent is indeed the right of every nation and there-
fore every kind of colonialism in the world shall be abolished, because 
it is in discord with humanity and justice. And the struggle for inde-
pendence already has arrived at the blessed moment, that brings Indo-
nesia in happiness and safety to the gate of freedom, united, sovereign, 
just and prosperous. 
With the blessing of God, the Almighty and by the urge of noble 
desire for an independent national existence, the Indonesian people 
therefore hereby declares its independence. Pursuant to this declaration, 
in order to establish an Indonesian Government, which protects the 
whole Indonesian nation and the whole Indonesian fatherland, to pro-
mote the public welfare, to educate the nation, and to participate in 
the implementation of a world order based on independence, eternal 
peace and social justice, the independence of the Indonesian nation is 
established under a Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and 
embodied in the structure of the Republic of Indonesia in accordance 
with popular sovereignty and (the Pancasila]. 
It can be said that this Pancasila ideology stands unchangeable, by 
whatever legal means, whether the Constitution establishes a federal 
system or a unitary system, and whether the government is or is not 
parliamentary. 
The Five Principles of the Pancasila were formulated in the 
2. A translation of the 1950 constitution can be found in R. Supomo, The 
Provisional Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, trans. Garth N. Jones (Ithaca: 
CMIP, 1964). A translation of the 1945 constitution can be found in DanielS. Lev, The 
Transition to Guided Democracy (Ithaca: CMIP, 1966). Formal features of the federal 
structure are discussed in A. Arthur Schiller, The Formation of Federal Indonesia /945-
1949 (Hague and Bandung: van Hoeve, 1955). Comparative discussions and analyses of 
Indonesia's three constitutions are available in A. K. Pringgodigo, The Office of 
President in Indonesia as Defined in the Three Constitutions in Theory and Practice, 
trans. Alexander Brotherton (Ithaca: CMIP, 1957); and J. A. C. Mackie, "Indonesian 
Constitutions, 1945-60," in R. N. Spann, Constitutionalism in Asia (Bombay: Asia 
Publishing House, I 963). 
3. The Pancasila originated in a speech by the late President Sukarno, on June I, 
I 945, during discussions of a committee whose function it was to prepare for indepen-
dence as the Japanese occupation drew to an end. See Kahin, op. cit., pp. 122ff. 
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Preamble of the 1945 (and current) Constitution, which also includes a 
declaration of independence by the Indonesian people. A comment of 
one of the framers of our Constitution, Professor Mr. Mohd. Yamin, 
calls to mind the drafting of the Constitution of the United States of 
America:4 
Before me is the structure of the Republic of the United States of 
America, which time and again has been used as an example for several 
constitutions in the world, for this is the oldest constitution existing in 
the world and contains three elements: (I) the Declaration of Rights in 
the city of Philadelphia ( 1774); (2) the Declaration of Independence of 
July 4, 1776; (3) finally, the Constitution of the United States of 
America ( 1787). 
The Indonesian declaration of independence in the preamble of its 
Constitution reminds one of the U.S. Declaration of Independence, 
which categorically states, in the following well-known formulation, 
"that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator 
with certain unalienable rights ... "and "to secure these rights, govern-
ments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the 
consent of the governed." The U.S. Constitution, embodying the 
principles of the Declaration, is the true beginning of modern docu-
mentary constitutionalism, and shares much in spirit with the Indo-
nesian Constitution. 
The President, the Parliament, 
and the People's Consultative Assembly 
Indonesia's system is one of presidential government, in which the 
President is not responsible to Parliament as under a parliamentary 
structure. State Ministers are answerable to the President, not to the 
legislature. The legislature, like the U.S. Congress and unlike a parlia-
mentary system, does not have the power to remove an elected Presi-
dent; but Indonesia differs from the United States in that it does not 
have such a legal institution as "impeachment." Instead, Indonesia has 
a system of presidential responsibility to the People's Consultative 
Assembly, and the President cannot dissolve either this body of 920 
members or the Parliament. The elucidation of the 1945 Constitution 
(the so-called "Proclamation Constitution") refers to the People's Con-
sultative Assembly as the supreme holder of State power (Die gesamte 
Staatsgewalt /iegt al/ein bei der Majelis) and, from the people's stand-
point, a personification of the whole Indonesian people ( Vertretung-
sorgan des Willens des Staatsvolkes). The People's Consultative As-
sembly consists of all members of Parliament (460 persons) and an 
4. Yamin, Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 (Documents on the 
Preparation of the 1945 Constitution. Jakarta: Yayasan Prapanca, 1959), vol. I, p. 229. 
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equal number of representatives drawn from regional groups and 
functional groups.s The People's Consultative Assembly defines the 
broad outlines of State policy, and elects the President and Vice-
President by majority vote. If the President is seen to deviate from the 
Constitution and basic State policy, the Parliament can convene an 
extraordinary meeting of the People's Consultative Assembly, and the 
People's Consultative Assembly can remove him from office. This 
happened during the late 1960s in the case of the late President 
Sukarno. 
The Indonesian Constitution 
and Forms of Law 
The American Declaration of Independence goes side by side with the 
United States Constitution as a constitutional document; similarly, the 
Indonesian declaration of independence found in the Preamble is 
historically inseparable from the 1945 Constitution. A constitution 
embodies not only legal rules but also non-legal rules which express the 
spirit of the constitution, a geistlichen Hintergrund, and the atmosphere 
surrounding the text of the constitution. For Indonesian constitution-
makers, the U.S. Constitution was a "documentary forerunner,'' and 
Rousseau's Social Contract was a "literary forerunner" contributing to 
the constitutional spirit of Indonesia. 
The election of 1971 constituted the present Parliament, and the 
People's Consultative Assembly, which elected President Suharto and 
his Vice-President, duly specified the outline ofState Policy.6 Provisions 
for periodic general elections are not laid down in the 1945 Constitution, 
but are stipulated in an organic Law (loi organique) of the Constitution. 
A word about the relationships between the Constitution, State Policy, 
and various forms of laws is in order. 
The Constitution serves as the highest form of law and the basis 
and sources of all subordinate legal provisions of the State, such as 
Resolutions of the People's Consultative Assembly, Laws, Government 
Regulations such as Substitutional Laws, Government Regulations, 
Presidential Decrees, and other implementing regulations such as a 
Minister's Regulations. 
The Constitution of Indonesia, under Article 37, can be amended 
under the following conditions: two-thirds of the members of the 
5. Functional groups include, for example, students. women, intellectuals, 
labor, etc. 
6. General (now President) Suharto successfully crushed the attempted coup of 
September 30, 1965. He thereafter assumed authority for maintaining order and in 1967 
was designated acting President by the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly. He 
was made President in 1968 and reelected in 1973, when the Assembly also elected the 
Sultan of Yogyakarta as Vice-President. Presidential elections are held every five years. 
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People's Consultative Assembly must be present during discussions of 
amendment, and at least two-thirds of those present during the discus-
sions must approve an amendment. Thus, we have a "rigid constitu-
tion." As a matter of legal policy, there has been little tendency to alter 
or amend the 1945 Constitution since its reinstatement. Mor.eover, 
Indonesian jurists consider the Pancasila found in the Preamble un-
alterable by legal process. 
The 1945 Constitution is very brief, containing only thirty-seven 
Articles. This Constitution provides for the establishment of the basic 
State organs, such as the Executive-the President, Vice-President, and 
State Ministers-the People's Consultative Assembly, the Parliament, 
the Supreme Court, the Supreme Advisory Council, and the Supreme 
Auditing Office. But the organization, tasks, competence, and compo-
sition of these institutions are left to the lois organiques for further 
specification. The Basic Police Law, the Basic Law on Public Prose-
cutors, the Basic Law of the Judiciary, the Law on General Elections, 
the Laws on the Composition and Powers of the Parliament and the 
People's Consultative Assembly, the Laws on the Supreme Advisory 
Council, and the Laws on the Supreme Auditing Office are examples of 
such legislation. 
A Resolution of the People's Consultative Assembly is of a higher 
legal order than a Law. A Law may be seen as executing not only the 
Constitution but also Resolutions of the People's Consultative Assem-
bly. Resolutions of the People's Consultative Assembly present policy 
outlines to be implemented either by legislation or, in executive matters, 
by presidential decree. Thus, for example, a Resolution of the People's 
Consultative Assembly in the 1960s (No. II I 1966, 1968) requires that 
general elections be held that are direct, public, independent, and secret; 
and that the drawing up of the necessary pursuant laws be completed 
within the period oftime specified by the Resolution ofthe Assembly. At 
the same time, a Resolution of the People's Consultative Assembly 
ordered the Government jointly with the Parliament to issue laws 
simplifying and regulating party organizations and functional 
organizations. 
Indeed, based on the above-mentioned Resolution of the Assem-
bly, the Law on General Elections, the Law concerning Members of the 
People's Consultative Assembly and Representative Bodies, the Laws 
on the Composition and Powers of the People's Consultative Assembly, 
the Parliament, and the Regional Representative Councils were sub-
sequently issued. Furthermore, based upon said laws, the General 
Election of 1971 took place and the legislative bodies were established. 
The brevity of the Indonesian Constitution of 1945 calls to mind a 
statement made by K. C. Wheare when replying to the question "What 
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should a Constitution contain?" His answer was very brief: "The very 
minimum and that minimum to be rules of Law"; and at another point 
he summ~d up by saying, "One essential characteristic of the ideally 
best form of Constitution is that it should be as short as possible."7 
Such a perspective accords with the spirit of the "Framers of the 
Constitution of Indonesia," who limited themselves to establishing the 
Basic Rules in the Constitution and assigned implementation thereof to 
Resolutions of the People's Consultative Assembly. The Assembly in 
turn entrusts to the Government the task of their execution, in execu-
tive matters, and to the Parliament the role of legislation ( Gesetzge-
bung). This charge to implement Resolutions is mandatory. 
"Rechtsstaat" Indonesia and 
Separation of Powers 
The Indonesian State is a Rechtsstaat, not a Machtstaat, a constitu-
tional system, not an absolutist State. Textually, the Constitution of 
1945 contains no explicit provision calling for a Rechtsstaat, nor is any 
further information on the subject offered in the Note of Explanation of 
the 1945 Constitution. 
However, the Indonesian conception of Rechtsstaat, as outlined in 
jurisprudence and duly adopted by the government, contains three 
special characteristics. These have arisen from comparisons made 
between the principles of "Rule of Law" (in a sense broader than that of 
A. V. Dicey)& and "Socialist Legality," as follows: 
I. Recognition and protection of fundamental rights, embodying equal-
ity in the political field, in law, and in the social, economic, cultural 
and educational fields. 
2. Legality, in the sense of law in all its forms. 
3. An independent judiciary, which is impartial and free from the influ-
ence of any other power or force. 
As discussed earlier, the State ideology on which the Indonesian 
Rechtsstaat is founded is the Pancasila (Five Principles). There is 
similarity here with the principles of all "Rule of Law" states, including 
the United States of America, particularly as those principles have been 
broadly outlined by the International Commission of Jurists. The 
International Commission of Jurists focuses on both the dignity of men 
and their diversity, but not so as to prejudice the three above-mentioned 
special characteristics of Indonesian constitutionalism. 
In the Indonesian scheme of "separation of powers," there are five 
powers, not three as in the U.S. Constitution: the Executive, the 
7. K. C. Wheare, Modern Constitutions (London: Oxford University Press, 1966, 
2nd ed.), pp. 33-34. 
8. A. V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (London: 
Macmillan, 1961, lOth ed.), p. 183. 
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Legislative, and the Judicial powers, the Supreme Advisory Council, 
and the Supreme Auditing Office. These powers are separate. However, 
as C. F. Strong notes, the business of constitutional government is so 
complex that it is difficult to define the area of each department in such 
a manner as to leave each independent and supreme in its allotted 
sphere.9 As an example, let us look briefly at the status of the Indo-
nesian judiciary. 
With respect to the courts of the Unitary Indonesian State, an 
independent judiciary is one essential element of Indonesian constitu-
tionalism. Article 24 of the Constitution stipulates that judicial power 
shall be vested in the Supreme Court and such subordinate courts as 
may be established by law, and that the organization and competence of 
those courts shall be provided by law. A high point and crowning 
achievement in judicial development came with the Basic Law of the 
Judiciary in 1970.10 Courts of four different jurisdictions are estab-
lished: Ordinary Courts of general jurisdiction, Religious Courts., Mili-
tary Courts, and Administrative Courts. The Supreme Court, at the 
pinnacle, holds exclusive jurisdiction over cases in cassation. The courts 
are independent and free in carrying out their functions. But following 
civil law traditions, rather than American common law tradition, the 
Supreme Court does not have the power of judicial review over acts of 
the executive or legislative branches of government, though it may 
review regulations that are pursuant to legislative acts. Laws may be 
interpreted, but not reviewed as in American judicial practice. 
Indonesia does not have a body like the Conseil Constitutionelle of 
France, which can rule on the constitutionality of organic laws before 
their promulgation and on regulations of the parliamentary assemblies 
before they are first applied. Neither is there found in Indonesia what is 
called the Bundesverfassungs-gericht, or Constitutional Court, as in 
West Germany, which has the competence to exercise judicial review of 
the laws, and whose own position must be made to accord with that of 
the Supreme Court, the highest tribunal. 
In judicial decision-making, we rely upon a combination of code 
law (in the civil law tradition), legislation, and jurisprudence more than 
upon case law or precedent. However, Indonesian courts also follow 
adat law (customary law) and enforce it in private disputes; this reminds 
us of the common law and the law of equity. In this respect, our 
approach to adat law in the courts places us in a unique intermediate 
position between civil law courts and common law courts. As Professor 
ter Haar has noted, the codification and court system under Indonesian 
9. C. F. Strong, Modern Political Constitutions (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 
1958, 5th ed.), pp. 255-256. 
10. Law 14/1970, Lembaran Negara (State Gazette) no. 74, elucidation no. 2951. 
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statutory law is akin to the civil law system of Continental Europe, but 
Indonesia's unwritten law resembles more the common law system and 
the law of equity. 11 
Fundamental Rights in 
Indonesian Constitutionalism 
Finally, the Indonesian Constitution, like that of the United States, 
guarantees the freedom of opinion, expression, and religion, and 
provides for equality before the law. (Article 27 provides that all 
citizens are equal before the law and in government and shall without 
exception respect the law and the government.) But as with the history 
of United States "separate but equal" doctrine until 1954, our history, 
society, and politics have conditioned the meaning of these principles in 
Indonesia. 
It is interesting to us that while our Basic Press Law upholds the 
notion of "a free and responsible press," as recommended by the 
American Commission on the Freedom of the Press chaired by Robert 
Hutchins, the press in the United States takes a more libertarian view of 
its functions. Furthermore, there are guarantees of press freedom in 
both the U.S. Constitution (First Amendment) and the U.S.S.R. 
Constitution (Article 25), but principles and performance are in fact 
quite different in the two countries. Our press has observed at close 
hand both authoritarian and libertarian conceptions in practice, and 
Indonesia's law and journalists favor stress on the idea of the social 
responsibility of the press, a free and responsible press. 
As mentioned earlier, belief in God is a basic principle of our 
constitutional State, and freedom of religion is guaranteed. Our his-
torical experience leads us to a more positive affirmation of God than 
is accepted by the American constitutional notion of freedom of 
religion.'2 There does not exist in Indonesia a "wall of separation of 
Church and State," rigidly dogmatic in character and without flexi-
bility, such as that found in the rulings of the United States Supreme 
Court and the Criminal Code of the U.S.S.R. Neither is there in 
Indonesia a "separation" ( Trennung) that glorifies the separation ( vom 
Staat und Kirche) in such a way as to encourage anti-God and anti-
religious conceptions and laws, as in the U.S.S.R. Such a spirit would 
II. Of works available in English on Indonesia adat law the most prominent is B. 
ter Haar, A dar Law in Indonesia (New York: IPR, 1948), a translation from the Dutch by 
E. Adamson Hoebel and A. Arthur Schiller. 
12. Indonesia is predominantly an Islamic country, with perhaps 90 percent of the 
population professing to be Muslims, but with varying degrees of devoutness. Hinduism, 
Catholicism, and Protestantism also have substantial followings and are recognized by 
the Ministry of Religion, whose fundamental responsibilities, however, have mainly to do 
with Islam. The political party system has traditionally been organized in part around 
religious symbols, and religious conflict has been endemic. 
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be contrary to that found in the legal life of Indonesia. Indonesia 
accepts the principle of "non-preferential treatment" of all religions 
existing in Indonesia, but does not recognize the unity of State and 
Church (Einheit von Staat und Kirche). There is neither separation nor 
unity of Church and State; the secular and the spiritual are distinguish-
able, but they flow together. 
In conclusion then, along with the historical influence noted above 
of the Declaration of Independence and the constitution of the United 
States, I can say there are both similarities and differences in the 
Indonesian and U.S. Constitutions deriving from the historical and 
political development and the aspirations and ideologies of our two 
states. 
VI 
Japan 
Editorial Note 
Japan is an ancient Northeast Asian country composed of the four 
main islands of Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu, and thou-
sands of small islands. In its premodern history, Japan was usually 
isolated from substantial external contacts, but is now actively trading 
with virtually all the nations of the world. No noteworthy in-migration 
of foreign peoples has occurred in recorded Japanese history, apart 
from the forced immigration of Koreans for war labor purposes before 
1945. For many centuries the Japanese people have been remarkable 
for their racial, ethnic, linguistic, and cultural homogeneity. Since her 
defeat in World War II (1945) Japan has been pacifist, in principle, 
preference, and international practice, while becoming the world's 
third-ranking economic power and a leader in science, technology, 
education, and the arts. Japan and the United States carry on the 
largest overseas trade in human history. 
Japan is a bit smaller than California, and only 15 percent of the 
land area can be farmed. About 80 percent of the 113 million people on 
the islands live in urban environments. Japan is extraordinarily depen-
dent on imports of food, industrial raw materials, and energy resources. 
Her economy is oriented toward mass consumption and the export of 
sophisticated manufactured goods. 
Note: Footnotes have been added by Ronald G. Brown, who adapted Professor Ukai's 
paper for this symposium. Professor Ukai then edited the chapter and notes. 
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For almost a century, except during an interlude of firm-handed 
military rule (ca. 1930-1945) and foreign expansion, Japan has chosen 
to establish its system of law upon a constitutional form of government. 
Since the forced opening of Japan to Western commerce and influence 
in the 1850s, foreign categories have shaped the form, but not neces-
sarily the content, of the legal system. Partly because of the changes to 
dominance of German legal influence in the late nineteenth century and 
of American legal impact after 1945, Japan has experienced two consti-
tutions whose texts are fundamentally different in their visions of 
national policy. 
The first modern constitution, adopted in February 1889, came 
after nearly two and a half centuries in which a fairly strong central 
government (Tokugawa), presiding over hundreds of feudal domainS, 
felt no need to set forth national ideals in a constitutional document. 
Although Tokugawa law, feudal house law, and local customary law 
constituted a sophisticated legal system, the only premodern consti-
tution-like document in Japanese history was the seventeen articles 
drafted by Prince Shotoku in A.D. 604 which exhorted the nation to 
respect the Emperor and to follow certain moral principles. In the 
Constitution of the Empire of Japan (1889), the Emperor Meiji was 
"restored" (Meiji ishin) formally to his proper place as the nation's real, 
not merely ritual sovereign. So it was said, but others continued to rule 
Japan in the Emperor's name. The institutional forms were based, in 
part, on the studies of officials and law students who had traveled to 
Germany, France, and the United States. Legally protected opportuni-
ties for popular participation under the constitutional scheme were 
rather narrow, but its major characteristics won approbation from 
leading European and American legal scholars. 
If the first constitution was foreign inspired, the second constitu-
tion may be said to have been foreign induced. Within five months after 
the end of World War II, various constitutional revisions suggested by 
the Japanese government to the American Occupation authorities were 
rejected. However, after only one more month of Occupation-super-
vised constitution-writing, a document was produced which established 
far-reaching protections of equality, freedom, and political participa-
tion. The Constitution of Japan (Nihonkoku Kempa) became effective, 
without major changes, about a year later in the spring of 1947. 
Certain features of the 1889 Constitution may still be found in the 
1947 Constitution. The Emperor remains, but as a "symbol of the unity 
of the people." Both documents provide guarantees of freedom of 
expression, but the Meiji Constitution contains more restrictive qualify-
ing clauses. Significantly, neither constitution was instituted on popular 
demand; rather, the 1889 Constitution was an imperial gift, while that 
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of 1947 was approved by the Diet and the Occupation authorities. 
The present Constitution enumerates the basic rights of the people 
in thirty-one articles (Chapter III). It expressly provides for rights of 
univeral adult suffrage (Article I 5), education for all (Article 26), 
freedom to travel (Article 22), and collective bargaining (Article 28), 
rights which in the United States, by comparison, have only been 
recognized as the result of judicial interpretation, laws, or constitu-
tional amendment-not in the original Constitution itself. Other provi-
sions in Japan's Constitution have yet to be adopted in the United 
States or widely accepted elsewhere. For example, Article 9 is unique in 
expressly renouncing war as a right or an instrument of national policy; 
and in other countries, provisions like Article 24, which upholds the 
"equality of the sexes," are still in dispute. 
In Japan, as elsewhere, gaps exist between constitutional rights in 
the text and in actual practice. Nevertheless, there is little influential 
talk of rewriting or scrapping the present Constitution. In fact, it is 
remarkable that despite heavy doses of foreign influence, neither consti-
tution was or has been changed by amendment. 
If the direction of Japanese constitutional law is to change toward 
a restriction or strengthening of individual rights, the evolution most 
likely will come about through interpretations by an independent 
judiciary. Judges are constitutionally independent in administration 
and decision-making under the Supreme Court, but are bound by the 
Constitution (Article 76). The courts, in tandem with other forces in 
Japan's political and economic life, will decide whether the Constitu-
tion will continue as a living and maturing document or will become but 
a dead letter whose precepts have outlived their historical usefulness. 
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Japan's Modern Constitutional History 
Commodore Perry's visit to Japan in 1853 was the fanfare to the 
opening of a nation which had been closed to most outside influences, 
especially that of modern Western civilization, for more than two 
hundred years. The issue of the opening of Japan resulted in a split of 
its leadership between two factions. One side supported the idea to open 
the country to foreign influence. The other continued to believe in the 
divine nature of Japan and strongly advocated the slogan "Respect the 
Emperor and repel the barbarians!"I 
In several instances, the threat of military force was necessary to 
convince the more militant, anti-Western, feudal lords who controlled 
Japan prior to Perry's visit. However, in one of history's little ironies, 
those who earlier were so insistent on resisting the encroachment of the 
West were the first to turn toward the adoption of Western-like institu-
tions with admiration and to eagerly receive all the blessings that such 
a society might provide. 
The aim of the Meiji Restoration in 1867 was to restore the formal 
powers of government to the Emperor, who was only a symbolic 
figurehead under the prior feudal system. Nevertheless, much day-to-
day political power remained in the hands of samurai leaders from two 
prominent clans (Satsuma and Choshu) who served as the Emperor's 
advisors. Immediately, they adopted an American type of organiza-
tional system in their government, which attempted to incorporate the 
spirit of democracy by institutionalizing the election of government 
officials.2 Later, when a Western type of electoral system of legislature 
I. W. G. Beasley, The Modern History of Japan (New York: Praeger Publishers, 
1963), pp. 85-87. 
2. Ibid., p. 132. The organization of the Meiji era government, established January 
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was adopted, squabbles among political parties and government efforts 
to dictate voting behavior were notorious. 
In 1889, the year before the first elections for the lower house of the 
Japanese parliament were carried out, a written constitution was 
promulgated by the Emperor as the "Constitution of the Empire of 
Japan." Based on the monarchy-focused constitutions of Germany and 
Austria in that period, the document was drafted by a group of 
bureaucrats, led by Prince Hirobumi Ito, who believed both in imperial 
sovereignty and in authoritarian administration.3 It was this vision of 
government which established a pseudo-constitutional monarchy that 
Jed, after a series of assassinations and revolts, to the takeover of the 
government by the militarists in the 1930s, ultimately a deplorable war, 
and then the subsequent surrender in 1945. 
The text for Japan's modern-day Constitution was drafted by staff 
members of General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander 
for the Allied Powers (SCAP), and then, in effect, given to the 
Japanese. It was officially promulgated in 1946 and became fully effec-
tive in May 1947. The new Constitution is generally a mixture of 
American and British constitutions; its scope is quite unlike the basic 
emphasis of the Meiji Constitution, since it embodies the principle of 
popular sovereignty.4 
In adjusting to the postwar Constitution, Japan clearly has evolved 
political and legal institutions which at times accelerate Western con-
stitutional tendencies while in great part retaining the vitality of the 
indigenous forces of the Japanese social context. We can briefly 
consider examples of this phenomenon. First, if we look at the political 
scene, we can find that the General Headquarters of SCAP in 1945 
encouraged Japan to adopt the American model of a strong legislature 
3, 1868, revolved around "three offices" (sanshoku): (I) a General Director, the post 
occupied by an imperial prince; (2) a group of Conferees, consisting of court nobles and 
some daimyo, the feudal lords in the earlier period; and (3) a group of Councilors, 
including many young samurai, the military leaders. 
3. For a comparative analysis of pre-1945 and present-day Japanese constitu-
tionalism, see "Introduction," H. Itoh and L. W. Beer, The Constitutional Case Law of 
Japan (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1978). See also Nobutaka Ike, Begin-
nings of Political Democrac)' in Japan (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), pp. 171-180, 
188-191; Kenzo Takayanagi, "A Century of Innovation: The Development of Japanese 
Law, 1868-1961," in Arthur T. Von Mehren (ed.), Law in Japan: The Legal Order in a 
Changing Society (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963); and Yosiyuki Noda, 
Introduction to Japanese La~·· translated from French by A. H. Angelo (University of 
Tokyo Press, 1976). An Enghsh translation of the Meiji Constitution can be found in 
Hideo Tanaka, assisted by M. D. H. Smith, The Japanese Legal System (University of 
Tokyo Press, 1976), p. 16. 
4. The Emperor is regarded as the symbolic leader of the State, but his position is 
derived from the will of the people. The Constitution of Japan (1947), art. I (hereafter 
cited as Constitution). 
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like the U.S. Congress. But although the present Japanese system is a 
combination of the British parliamentary government and the Ameri-
can theories of separation of powers between executive and legislature, 
the daily operations of government are controlled by a strong Cabinet. 
In a similar way, the Japanese legal system also has selectively 
adopted Western ideas. Supposedly, the Occupation in 1945 was initi-
ated upon Japan's so-called unconditional surrender. But, actually, the 
legal terms were not strictly unconditional. The conditions in the 
Potsdam Declaration and the basic principles in the postwar 
Constitution itself established that the Japanese government should 
henceforth faithfully observe fundamental freedoms, such as freedom 
of religion, thought, and the press. With its many centuries of tra-
dition of strong government, Japan was not prepared for this sudden 
burst of freedoms. But because of the importance of these rights the 
Supreme Court's job of interpreting such fundamental freedoms in the 
Japanese context has taken on added significance. 
In both the political and the legal sphere, the example of the 
United States has been instructive for comparative purposes. In the 
United States, Cabinet members do not initiate bills directly in the 
Congress. Similarly, in Japan, there is a theory that the Cabinet lacks 
power to initiate bills in the Diet, the two-house Japanese parliament 
(consisting of a House of Representatives and a House of Councilors). 
This theory, however, is quite different from the Meiji Constitution, 
which expressly provided for "government bills" on the principle that 
legislative power was in the hands of the Emperor with the consent of 
the Diet.5 Furthermore, there was a clear provision in the law of the 
Diet that "government bills" would be considered prior to deliberation 
of any individually sponsored bills.6 In practice, the present situation 
has changed so that both the Cabinet and the Diet have legislative 
bureaus which help prepare bills for consideration. As in Britain, 
however, there may be little real difference between a "government bill" 
and a "member's bill" of the majority party since the majority party 
controls the Cabinet. 7 
Judicial Review in Japan 
In regard to judicial powers, we can make further useful comparisons 
with the United States to illustrate. In the United States, the doctrine of 
judicial review by which the Supreme Court has the power to review 
legislative actions was announced by the Court itself in Marbury v. 
5. The Constitution of the Empire of Japan, 1889, Art. 38. 
6. The Diet Law (Kokkai ho) of 1890, Art. 26. 
7. Concerning delicate intra- as well as inter-party politics, see Hans Baerwald, 
Japan's Parliament (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 82-102. 
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Madison,s rather than explicitly stipulated in the U.S. Constitution. By 
contrast, the postwar Japanese Constitution expressly sets forth the 
power of judicial review of acts of the Diet as well as review of admin-
istrative rules and official acts. 9 Probably because the doctrine is so 
clearly stated in the Japanese Constitution, the Supreme Court has 
been extremely careful in declaring laws invalid. Prior to 1976, for 
example, the Japanese Supreme Court had not followed the lead of the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr, 1o in which the judicially imposed 
barrier of "political questions" was removed to permit review of 
legislative reapportionment cases. On April 14, 1976, the Japanese 
Supreme Court found that the apportionment provisions of the Elec-
tion Law were unconstitutional," since they were contrary to the 
principle of political equality guaranteed by Article 14 of the 
Constitution.' 2 
Up to this point, I have commented generally on the development 
of political and legal institutions that were adopted along with the 
postwar Japanese Constitution. Beyond this initial discussion, however, 
it is also instructive to consider the evolution in interpretations of the 
Constitution as practiced by the lawyers and judges in Japan. In 
particular, I feel that this is a good time to reconsider the legacy of the 
Occupation in the light of fundamental concepts of political liberty in 
the United States. 
In 1949, the United States Cultural Mission, composed of five 
distinguished American professors (including Professor Edwin 0. Rei-
schauer), visited Japan. In its subsequent report, the scholarly panel 
touched upon the importance of securing a greater degree of freedom in 
Japan. They felt that, because of Japan's past record of direct govern-
ment interference in universities, it was necessary to take extraordinary 
precautions to insure the continuing intellectual freedom of scholars.l3 
In a country like Japan, which has a long history of absolute 
government control and strict limitations on basic civil rights, a much 
larger degree of freedom should be recognized by the courts, perhaps 
8. I Cranch 137 (1803). Concerning judicial review in Japan generally, see John M. 
Maki, Court and Constitution in Japan (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964), 
pp. 306-348 passim; and Tanaka, op. cit. (note 3 above), pp. 686-694. 
9. Constitution, Art. 81. 
10. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Concerning "political questions" in Japan generally, see 
Dan F. Henderson (ed.), The Constitution of Japan: Its First Twenty Years, /947-67 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1968), pp. 125, 145, 165. 
II. Kurokawa v. Chiba Prefecture Election Supervision Commission, Hanrei 
Jiho (No. 808) 24 (Sup. Ct., G. B., April 14, 1976). 
12. Constitution, art. 14 (1): "All of the people are equal under the law and there 
shall be no discrimination in political, economic or social relations because of race, creed, 
sex, social status or family origin." See also the discussion in the text at note 35. 
13. Civil Information and Education Section, Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers, Report of the U.S. Cultural Science Mission to Japan, January 1949, pp. 101-6. 
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more even than in the United States. In a country that does not have a 
tradition of basic freedoms, the people cannot be expected to exercise 
their rights to the fullest extent immediately. In Japan, even the 
slightest limitation on these freedoms may cause the people to back 
away from asserting their rights, thus creating a much greater restric-
tive effect than is actually applied by the courts. This kind of effect is 
what the United States Cultural Mission was referring to in its report. It 
is in this area that the influence of the United States experience can play 
a vital role. 
During its first thirty years, the postwar Japanese Supreme Court 
has decided in only two cases that laws were unconstitutional after it 
was claimed that basic rights were infringed. The often stated judicial 
pretext for this exceptionally careful attitude is that the Diet should be 
the sole authority to decide the extent of legislative acts. 
In the first instance in which a law or a State action was found 
unconstitutional the case centered on a provision in the Customs Law 
that permitted confiscation of goods and ships which were owned by 
third parties and used in illegal customs activities. The Court ruled that 
such confiscation could occur only when the third party had prior 
knowledge that the goods were used illegally. 14 The Court concluded 
that without notice and a hearing the provision in Article 31 of the 
Constitution for due process of law had been violated. In 1963, the Diet 
passed an additional law which now provides for detailed procedures, 
including notice and a hearing, before confiscation is permitted of 
property held by a third party in customs cases.Is 
The second case concerned a defendant who was raped by her 
father, bore several children, and was coerced into continuing the 
irregular relationship even after she had a chance to start a normal, 
married life. She was convicted of murdering her father under the 
.. patricide provision" of the Japanese Criminal Code, which calls for a 
more severe penalty in cases of patricide than in other cases of murder 
or manslaughter.I6 In 1950, the Court had rendered a decision in a 
similar case, declaring that the "patricide provision" was constitutional 
14. Nakamura eta/. v. Japan, II Keishu (No. 16) 1593 (Sup. Ct., G. B., November 
28, 1962). An English translation of this decision can be found in ltoh and Beer, op. cit., 
Case 7. See also Nobushige Ukai and Nathaniel L. Nathanson, "Protection of Property 
Rights and Due Process of Law in the Japanese Constitution," in Henderson, op. cit., 
pp. 248-250. 
15. Emergency Measure on Confiscation Procedure as to Third Party Possession in 
Criminal Matters (Keiji jiken ni okeru daisansha shoyubursu no bosshu tetsuzuki ni 
kansuru okyu sochi hO), Law No. 138 of 1963. 
16. Article 199 of the Criminal Code specifies that the penalty in murder cases can 
range from a minimum sentence of three years in prison to a maximum sentence of death. 
However, in patricide cases, which are governed by Article 200, only the alternative 
sentences of life imprisonment or death can be given by the judge. 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA 119 
on the grounds that the distinction between patricide and other forms 
of homicide was reasonable, and therefore differently assigned penalties 
did not impair the "equality under the law" provision in Article 14 of 
the Constitution. In that decision, only two dissenting opinions were 
filed among the fifteen justices participating. 17 However, in 1973, given 
the facts as stated above, the Supreme Court reversed itself and found 
that another "patricide provision" was contrary to Article 14. 18 It is 
interesting that although the decision was nearly unanimous (except for 
one dissent based on precedent by Justice Takezo Shimoda, former 
ambassador to the United States), the rationale for the decision was 
divided into two points of view. Eight justices representing a clear 
majority on the court, led by Chief Justice Kazuto Ishida, reasoned that 
since the penalty for patricide was too heavy, it could not be deemed 
constitutional. 19 Six other justices, a progressive group headed by 
Justice Jiro Tanaka, argued that the "patricide provision" was per se 
unconstitutional because establishing separate treatments and applying 
unequal penalties according to family linear relationships was in-
herently a violation of Article 14. The concurring opinion stated that 
the "patricide provision" reflected an undemocratic tendency remaining 
from the Chinese codes and from the Tokugawa era of Jaw, which was 
in effect just before the opening of Japan in the mid-nineteenth century 
-a tendency which could not be tolerated in a modern democratic 
nation such as Japan. 
The effect of these two cases declaring Jaws unconstitutional is not 
clear. In theory, we can say either that the decisions result in the 
elimination of the offending unconstitutional provision from the text of 
the Jaws or that the decisions merely bind only further cases which 
appear before the courts. However, in my opinion, decisions of uncon-
17. Japan v. Yamato, 4 Keishii(No. 10) 2126 (Sup. Ct., G.B., October 25, 1950). See 
Maki, op. cit. (n. 8 above), pp. 129-155. 
18. Aizawa v. Japan, 27 Keishii(No. 3) 256 (Sup. Ct., G.B., April4, 1973). See John 
0. Haley, "Recent Developments-Constitutionality of Penalty Under Article 200 of the 
Penal Code for Killing of Lineal Ascendant," 6 Law in Japan: An Annua/(1973), pp. 173-
174. While the court in Aizawa found the patricide provision in Article 200 of the Penal 
Code unconstitutional, this decision did not upset the result in Yamato that the similar 
provision in Article 205 of the Code was constitutional. Therefore, in a later case brought 
under Article 205 (which establishes a comparatively severe penalty for accidental 
patricide), the Supreme Court declared that provision constitutional. Matsui v. Japan, 28 
Keishii (No. 6) 329 (Sup. Ct., First Petty Bench, September 26, 1974). 
19. If a defendant surrenders voluntarily, his sentence of life imprisonment, 
according to Articles 42 and 68 of the Criminal Code, is automatically mitigated to a 
seven-year term, and later, according to individual circumstances, under Articles 66, 71, 
and 68 of that Code, can be reduced further to a term of half of that period, i.e., only three 
and a half years. However, further mitigation of sentence, such as stay of execution, 
cannot be granted, since it is possible only when the assessed sentence is three years or 
less. Therefore, no such mitigation in penalty could apply to patricide cases, since only life 
imprisonment or death are alternative sentences. 
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stitutionality can be applied only to the actual parties affected by the 
decisions. Differences in opinion among the justices as to the precise 
ruling can be resolved by positive action by the Diet to clear up 
ambiguities. For instance, it is necessary for the Diet either to strike a 
provision from the code or to reduce penalties assigned to infractions 
under the law to meet judicial objections of unconstitutionality. Until 
the Diet acts, the possibility remains that the same question might again 
be brought before the Supreme Court. 
With regard to legal theories about the effect of a law that is 
declared unconstitutional and with regard to other types of legal 
questions, the Japanese judicial system could learn a great deal from the 
constitutional experience of the United States. Today, in the Japanese 
courts, we can find arguments about basic theories of U.S. constitu-
tional law, such as "void on its face," "void for vagueness," and "prior 
restraint," which can be used as the rationale to strike down or limit 
laws which, if enforced, would be unjustly applied against fundamental 
human rights. Leading U.S. cases which have shaped these theories are 
often cited by the courts, opposing attorneys, and scholars in both law 
and political science.2o In such a climate, I think that the need for 
specific decisions by Japanese courts which guarantee fundamental civil 
rights is evident, and, furthermore, I believe that the Supreme Court 
can best assume this responsibility. But what form should this re-
sponsibility take? Using examples from individual cases, I should like 
to indicate two points which seem important for clarification about the 
areas into which the Supreme Court must move in order to guarantee 
basic civil rights. 
The "Dual Standard" Principle 
and the "Public Welfare" 
First of all, the Court must provide more clarifying distinctions between 
property rights and personal rights. A "dual standard" approach would 
apply different approaches to these two kinds of fundamental rights, 
since there are genuine differences between rights derived from a 
tangible or economic basis and those derived from an intangible or 
moral basis. Both of these ideas are tied to the concept of "public 
welfare," an expression developed in the American constitutional ex-
perience. In the United States, the battle in legal thinking was between 
lawyers who believed that the U.S. Constitution protected the freedom 
of contract and enabled unrestricted disposition of property, and the 
lawmakers who believed that principles of social rights implied in the 
20. Among the commonly cited U.S. cases are Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 
( 1960), statute required membership reports, and Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 
500 ( 1964), passport statute found restrictive of right to travel. 
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same document required legislation to control big business in order to 
help the less fortunate in society. An intermediary position would argue 
that fundamental rights can be restricted if the public welfare demands 
it. However, in the sphere of personal civil liberties, no restrictions 
should be imposed. Such guarantees should be more or less absolute, as 
in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In actual practice, 
only the guarantees of economic rights should be limited by the phrase 
"public welfare." 
In a general way, the Japanese Constitution appears to be sympa-
thetic toward the "dual standard" principle. Based on the United States 
experience, the drafters of the Constitution were astute enough to place 
the "public welfare" limit on human rights in two separate articles. 
Article 22 guarantees the freedoms of residence and occupation, but 
only "to the extent that [they] do not interfere with the public wel-
fare."21 Article 29 guarantees the right to own or hold property, but 
only "in conformity with the public welfare.'' The insertion of the 
"public welfare" concept, especially in the light of the prior history in 
the United States of constitutional disputes about economic and social 
rights, was a wise precaution. On the other hand, the deletion of the 
words "due" and "property" in Article 31, which describes the freedoms 
of "life" and "liberty" that may not be taken away from a "person," 
clarifies the state of the law. This article makes it clear that restrictions 
on property should be considered separately from questions about due 
process of law, thus precluding Japan from the difficulties encountered 
in the United States when the Supreme Court declared that an early 
child labor law was unconstitutional.22 In Japan, the presence of the 
"public welfare" language in Article 29 considerably strengthens the 
impact of Article 31. An alternative interpretation, perhaps more 
generally accepted, suggests that, although Article 31 guarantees "life" 
21. General provisions concerning the "public welfare'" are found in the Constitu-
tion, Arts. 12 and 13: "Article 12. The freedoms and rights guaranteed to the people by 
this Constitution shall be maintained by the constant endeavor of the people, who shall 
refrain from any abuse of these freedoms and rights and shall always be responsible for 
utilizing them for the public welfare. Article 13. All of the people shall be respected as 
individuals. Their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent 
that it does not interfere with the public welfare, be the supreme consideration in 
legislation and in other governmental affairs." Concerning the public welfare clause in 
relation to civil liberties, see Lawrence W. Beer, "Freedom of Expression in Japan with 
Comparative Reference to the United States," in R. P. Claude (ed.), Comparative Human 
Rights (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 99. 
22. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). After the U.S. Supreme Court 
struck down child labor legislation based on the power of Congress to regulate interstate 
commerce, the Congress attempted to circumvent the decision by regulations through the 
use of the congressional power to tax and at one time even considered a constitutional 
amendment. However, in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), the Court 
questioned the wisdom of the Hammer decision and upheld minimum wage provisions 
based on the commerce power. 
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and "liberty" but not "property," the rights of property are nevertheless 
an authentic part of liberty, since they are implicitly guaranteed. By this 
view, the guarantee of "due process of law" is nothing more than the all-
encompassing "by the law of the land," which is found in the British 
tradition. The difficulty with this interpretation is whether it can be said 
that, even if the key word "property" is eliminated, the same "due 
process of law" guarantee still prevails. Despite the general acceptance 
of the view of implicit guarantees, I still believe that the drafters 
displayed wisdom and foresight in the selective insertion and exclusion 
of key words. 
Whichever interpretation is accepted, one can still observe that the 
"dual standard" approach is maintained in constitutional litigation in 
Japan. However, since it is not always easy to identify whether a 
particular freedom should be classified as a property right or a personal 
right, various cases have brought about a mixture of results. For 
example, in a case involving the regulation of pharmaceuticals, the 
Supreme Court declared that a law restricting the minimum distance 
between two pharmacies was unconstitutional because it infringed upon 
the guarantee of freedom of occupation in Article 22 of the Constitu-
tion.23 The Court reasoned that the distance requirement lacked a 
necessary and rational relationship to the purpose, which was to 
prevent the distribution of inferior medicines.24 In a different case, a 
majority of the Court reached a contrary result, rejecting the claim that 
a basic freedom had been impaired. The majority decision sustained a 
penal provision25 which regulated the distribution of books when the 
purpose was to control the expression of obscenity.26 One indication 
that the results in these two cases are not easily reconcilable is the fact 
that some justices in the latter case filed strong dissents. 
Japan's Supreme Court on 
Individual Rights and Liberties 
A second area which requires clarification in discussing the future 
direction of the Japanese Supreme Court centers on the applicability of 
constitutional guarantees to relationships among private citizens. This 
area appears to be quite sensitive. Apparently, a theory that would 
directly apply such guarantees has little support. But some urgent 
23. Pharmaceutical Law ( Yakuji hO), Law No. 145 of 1960, Art. 6 (2), (4). 
24. K. K. Sumil'oshi v. Governor of Hiroshima Prefecture. Saibansho Jiho (No. 
665) (Sup. Ct., G. B.: April 30, 1975). See also John 0. Haley, "The Freedom to Choose 
an Occupation and the Constitutional Limits of Legislative Discretion," Law in Japan: 
An Annual 8 (1975), pp. 188-204, which includes a translation of the decision. 
25. Criminal Code (Keiho), Law No. 45 of 1907, Art. 175. 
26. Ishii eta/. v. Japan, 10 Keishil(No. 23) 1239 (Sup. Ct., G.B., October 15, 1969). 
For a translation of the famous De Sade Decision, see H. ltoh and L. W. Beer, op. cit. (n. 
3 above), Case 26. 
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problems, such as matters in which private discrimination is alleged, 
can be resolved by the indirect application of such guarantees. In 
particular, the use of the judicial principle of "state action" as conceived 
by the United States seems attractive to Japan in this respect.27 The 
"state action" principle is based on the premise that private actions can 
be regulated to the extent that private agreements will be enforced 
through decisions by the courts. Essentially, the principle combines the 
best of both the direct and indirect application methods. The principle 
may not be as all encompassing as the direct approach, but at the same 
time it is stronger than the indirect approach. I can best explain my 
point of view by looking at some recent cases before the Japanese 
Supreme Court. These cases, in general, indicate the need for more 
judicial recognition of civil liberties. All three of the following cases 
deal with incidents arising from employment relationships. 
For convenience, we can refer to the first of these examples as the 
Post Office Employees Case. The defendants, officers of the Post Office 
Employees Union, were given criminal penalties for urging workers at 
the Tokyo Central Post Office to participate in a union meeting during 
working hours. Their efforts resulted in thirty-seven postal employees 
leaving their working place. For our purposes here, the significance of 
the case is whether the rights of the convicted union leaders to assemble 
the work force should have been constitutionally protected by the 
Supreme Court. 
Two legal provisions are relevant to the case. First of all, Article 28 
of the Japanese Constitution guarantees the right of workers to orga-
nize and act collectively. However, a special provision in the law 
governing workers in the postal service provides a penalty for those 
who obstruct postal service activities.2s 
According to the Supreme Court decision, labor rights, alihough 
guaranteeed as fundamental human rights, are not absolute in charac-
ter, but may be restricted within constitutional limits. A majority of the 
Court viewed the Constitution as requiring an equilibrium between 
property rights and labor rights. The approach is flexible and purpose 
oriented. In its view, the rational constitutional balance would apply 
restrictions on labor only within a "necessary minimum." Although 
acknowledging that public employees generally are denied the right to 
strike,29 the majority reasoned that an obstruction caused by a strike, 
27. In the United States, the "state action" principle was initially applied to deny the 
enforcement of racially restrictive covenants in a property sale agreement, She/lev v. 
Kraemer 334 U.S. I (1948). A narrower statement of the principle requires that the state 
must be invo~ve~ "to some significant extent" before private conduct will be regulated, 
Burton v. W1lmmgton Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
28. Postal Law (Yubin hO), Law No. 165 of 1947, Art. 78. 
29. Public Enterprise Labor Relations Law (Ko k l'o kigvotaito rodo kankei ho) 
Law No. 257 of 1948, Art. 17 (I). 0 0 • 
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even if illegal, would be justified if it was not accompanied by violence. 
Since the applicable laws did not provide explicitly for a criminal 
penalty in the case of an illegal strike, the punishment assessed against 
the defendants could not be sustained. Therefore, the Supreme Court 
reversed the lower court's decision which convicted the defendants, on 
the grounds that the only proper sanctions were discharge from em-
ployment or civil compensation, not a criminal penalty.Jo 
By contrast, the minority view provides a rigid, harsh, and text-
oriented approach which we can find repeated in later decisions. The 
minority, looking at the strict language of the relevant laws,3t argued 
that, since the right to strike was prohibited in the Public Enterprise 
Labor Relations Law and a criminal penalty for obstructing the postal 
service was specified in the Postal Service Law, the two statutes read 
together left no room for denying the illegality of the defendants' 
actions. 
The same patterns in judicial approach, alternating between flexi-
bility and rigidity, can be seen in the series of decisions in the Sarufutsu 
case. The town of Sarufutsu, having a population of about 5,000 
persons, lies on the extreme tip of Hokkaido, the large island in the 
northernmost part of Japan. The case, again involving a post office 
employee, dealt with a conviction under a provision of the National 
Public Employees Law which generally prohibits political activities of 
national government employees.32 For putting up political posters in his 
spare time, the employee was convicted in the initial judicial proceeding 
in the summary court and fined 5,000 yen (now about $20). 
In this instance, a more flexible approach to basic freedoms was 
based on the principle of the "least restrictive alternative," an American 
legal doctrine, which was submitted in a brief by Professor Nobuyoshi 
Ashibe of Tokyo University. The theory, which also is sometimes 
described in terms of the "less drastic means" or the "less offensive 
alternative," is designed to enable the court to choose a reasonable, less 
difficult course in applying the law in order to sidestep the particular 
problems of constitutional questions.33 In this instance, the Sapporo 
High Court adopted the principle in order to declare the public service 
law unconstitutional only insofar "as applied" to the facts here.34 
30. Sotoyama v. Japan, 8 Keishii(No. 20) 901 (Sup. Ct., G. B., October 26, 1966). 
31. Ibid. 
32. National Public Employees Law (Kokka komuin ho), Law No. 120 of 1947, Art. 
102 (1). See also Lawrence W. Beer, "Recent Developments-Constitutionality of 
Restricting the Freedom of Expression of Public Employees," 8 Law in Japan: An 
Annual (1975), pp. 205-8. 
33. The criteria by which the U.S. Supreme Court may choose to apply a "least 
restrictive alternative" rather than face a constitutional question directly appear in the 
concurring opinion of Justice Louis Brandeis in Ash wander v. TV A. 297 U.S. 288 ( 1936). 
34. Japan v. Ozawa, Hanrei Jiho(No. 560) 30 (Sapporo High Court, June 24, 1969). 
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However, a newly emerging majority on the Supreme Court, which 
favored the rigid approach, led to a reversal of the High Court decision. 
The Court held that since government employees must be politically 
neutral in order to retain the trust of the public, prohibitions on certain 
political activities by government employees did not exceed the limits of 
reasonable, necessary, and unavoidable restrictions on freedom of 
expression under the Constitution.35 As a result, the Court refused to 
loosen the restrictions on a basic freedom enjoyed by all other workers 
in Japan except public employees. Control in Japan over a government 
worker's political activities continues to be much stricter than in 
Western countries. 
As a final example of recent Supreme Court cases dealing with civil 
liberties, we can consider the implications of the Mitsubishi Plastic 
Company case. In this instance, a graduate of Tohoku University 
successfully passed a placement examination at the plastic company 
and was subsequently hired on a trial basis. At the end of the test 
period, however, he was denied permanent employment on the grounds 
that he had failed to disclose his political activities as a student. The 
Supreme Court ruled on the case as a matter of law, but remanded to 
the lower court on a question of fact-finding as to what the plaintiff 
employee had actually said in the placement interview and what he 
actually had done politically while a student.36 
The precise question of law concerns whether a prospective em-
ployer may properly investigate a job applicant's creed or thought and 
then require the applicant to report these matters. A unanimous 
Supreme Court ruled that an enterprise, by denying employment on the 
basis of an applicant's thought or creed, does not necessarily act 
illegally. In reaching this conclusion, the Court cited a law which 
guarantees that laborers will not be discriminated against because of 
their creed,37 but it narrowly read the provision as not applying to job 
applicants. Hence, an employer may freely choose his employees. 
Furthermore, the Court noted, a reserve clause which gives an employer 
the right to dismiss an employee after a trial period of evaluation and a 
background investigation is proper within reasonable limits. 
A short while ago, an out-of-court settlement was reached in this 
case. The former employee was rehired, received the equivalent of 
thirteen years of back pay and additional consolation payments totaling 
35. Japan v. Ozawa, 28 Keishii (No. 9) 393 (Sup. Ct., G.B., November 6, 1974). 
36. Takano v. Mitsubishi Jiishi K. K., 27 Minshii 1536 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 12, 
1973). See "Recent Developments-Constitutional Law-Applicability of Civil Rights 
and Freedom of Thought Clauses to Conduct of Private Parties," 7 Law in Japan: An 
Annua/151 ( 1974). Constitution," Art. 19. Freedom of thought and conscience shall not be 
violated." 
37. Labor Standards Law (Rodo kijun hO), Law No. 49 of 1947, Art. 3. 
126 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
25 million yen (about $100,000), and also became entitled to all the 
rights and privileges of other employees at the Mitsubishi Plastic 
Company. 
From these three cases which we have examined, I think it is 
evident that strong support for imposing restrictions on civil liberties 
still exists within the Japanese Supreme Court. In recent years, the 
trend toward the more rigid, restrictive approach has resulted mainly 
from the mandatory retirement of justices who favored the more 
flexible approach. There is a particular danger in the implications of the 
Mitsubishi case, since the ruling suggests that guarantees of equality 
and freedom of thought and conscience do not apply to relations 
between private persons. This problem can be analyzed by focusing on 
the Fourteenth Amendment in the U.S. Constitution in connection with 
racial discrimination problems. In the United States, discrimination in 
restaurants, theaters, and other similar places cannot be regarded as 
legal so long as the discriminatory acts are regarded as state action or as 
denying rights against discrimination in particular places guaranteed in 
such laws as the Civil Rights Act. However, in Japan we have the 
situation that the Constitution protects those who suffer under discrim-
ination, but does not apply to citizen-to-citizen relationships. 
If a private person believes in a certain religious sect, can he 
discharge an employee who does not believe in that religion? Can a 
newspaper published by a certain political party discharge an employee 
who is not loyal to the party? These questions can only be answered 
affirmatively in a legal context in which constitutional guarantees are 
not applied to cases between individuals. In such cases, as I mentioned 
earlier, I feel that it is proper for the American theory of "state action" 
to be applied. 
Methods of Interpretation 
What is basically important in comparative legal research is not to 
concentrate on a detailed scrutiny of legal terminology used in the text 
of the Constitution, a practice common in prewar Japan. Rather, the 
emphasis must be on learning and understanding the differences in 
historical backgrounds of the countries that are compared. Only then 
can we construct the proper infrastructure which can serve as the 
driving force in a remodeling of society based on structures that 
facilitate freedom and peace. To this writer, there appears to be a 
fundamental dichotomy between the new type of Japanese constitu-
tional methodology based on the American approach and the older 
type based on the German approach. Yet, we cannot call either right or 
wrong, but must simply choose the method that suits the historical 
context of Japan. In my opinion, for the last quarter of this century, 
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and possibly for generations to come, the American type of constitu-
tional methodology and interpretation will best suit Japan. 
Under the old and new constitutions in Japan, different styles of 
interpretation have become fashionable. Under the Meiji Constitution, 
there existed only two schools of interpretation, one oriented toward 
the Emperor and the other toward the Diet. All seventy-six articles in 
the Constitution were interpreted according to one of these views with 
the result that the prevailing tendency was toward an authoritarian 
approach.38 Under the present Constitution, however, the interpreta-
tions are much more diversified. One interpretation becomes the guiding 
principle to settle particular cases only after many ramifications and 
contrasting views are discussed. 
In conclusion, I believe that the constitutional experience of the 
United States can be an important model for Japan, since the Japanese 
Constitution itself is a direct result of the United States experience of 
more than two hundred years. Since we have not yet developed a self-
oriented behavior pattern in the confusion of the postwar period, we 
Japanese have tried to organize a new society with the Constitution of 
Japan as its guiding star. 
38. See Frank 0. Miller, MinlJbe Tatsukichi-lnterpreter of Constitutionalism in 
Japan (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965), and Richard H. 
Minear, Japanese Tradition and Western Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1970). 
VII 
Malaysia 
Editorial Note 
Malaysia in its diversity and far-flung geographical profile bears some 
similarity to Indonesia. Yet special problems have followed from the 
fact that two groups perceived as ethnically alien to the region, Chinese 
and Indians, make up nearly half the population. Malaysia's twelve 
million people are preponderantly concentrated in peninsular Malaya, 
leaving Sarawak and Sabah geographically distant, sparse in popula-
tion, and appreciably less advanced, in conventional civilizational 
terms, despite greater ethnic diversity. 
Malaysia-formally proposed in 1961 to include peninsular Ma-
laya, Singapore, and the northern Borneo territories of Sabah, Sara-
wak, and Brunei-came into existence in 1963, but without Brunei, 
which chose to remain separate. Like the several other federations 
brought into existence under British auspices during the same period, 
the creation of Malaysia entailed considerations of the dissolution of 
the empire, reduction of military obligations balanced by offsetting 
Western ally pressures to create viable states, and responsiveness to 
genuine nationalist aspirations. Although, compared with the other 
experiments in federationism, Malaysia boasts the distinction of sur-
vival, this has been accomplished only with considerable, ongoing costs. 
The brittle fabric of contorted constitutional quid pro quo de-
Editor's Note: Concerning the author, see J. Victor Morais, A Man of His Time: Lord 
President Tan Sri M. Suffian (Kuala Lumpur: Percetakan Perdana Sdn. Bhd., 1974). 
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signed to appease the diverse territorial, ethnic, language, resource, 
religious, and other interests first splintered in 1965, with potentially 
ugly racial and territorial conflict resulting in the severance of Singa-
pore, which became a separate, independent nation. 
Some years of showcase democracy then transpired, until 1969 
when racialism in peninsular Malaya erupted at a pitch of violence with 
serious socio-political consequences in terms of the growth ofsecurity 
forces and structured provisions for racial favoritism. And the Bornean 
components, on a different plane altogether, chafe at what some feel is a 
new form of colonial tutelage. 
Still, Malaysia's complex party structure has endured in relative 
success, helped by a healthy economic base, diversified in recent years 
through aggressive programs to attract foreign investment and to 
develop an industrial base. Staple exports such as rubber, palm oil, tin, 
copper, and timber are increasingly augmented by sectors of urban 
high-technology production. While Malaysia's $2,000 per capita gross 
national product lags markedly behind Singapore, the fundamental 
resources base affords more stable long-term economic security. 
The heritage of English law in both Malaysia and Singapore 
remains very influential, the links with the formal tradition having 
suffered no major breaks through political revolution or domestic 
upheaval. The strength of these links is manifest still in the Malaysian 
provision for appeal from the Supreme Court to the British Privy 
Council, a connection strongly favored by many lawyers. Similarly, 
until recently, most lawyers in Malaysia and Singapore were trained in 
England. Law training was begun at the University of Singapore in 
1957, and the first law faculty in Malaysia was opened in the early 
1970s. 
In both countries there are unified civil judiciaries, whose Supreme 
Courts exercise both original and appellate jurisdictions. In Malaysia 
Islamic courts are organized in each constituent state, and in Singapore 
also provision is made for Islamic justice for the minority Malay 
population. The legal professions of Malaysia and Singapore are well 
developed and growing. 
Substantive law in Malaysia and Singapore has evolved also from 
principles rooted in English common law tradition. In Malaysia, how-
ever, as in Indonesia, local customary (adat) law has always received 
considerable attention as a special area of national law. 
DANIEL S. LEV 
May 1978 ROGER K. PAGET 
The Malaysian Constitution and 
the United States Constitution 
Tun Mohamed Suffian bin Hashim 
Lord President of Malaysia 
First, a few words about Malaysia. The country is to the south of 
Vietnam about two hours away by jet and is in two parts: Peninsular 
Malaysia on the Asian mainland and, across the South China Sea, two 
states, Sabah and Sarawak, sometimes referred to collectively as East 
Malaysia. Malaysia is about the same size as California and its popula-
tion is approximately ten million. 
Malaysia is a federation of thirteen states headed by His Majesty 
the Yang Dipertuan Agung (King). The Federation has fourteen legisla-
tures and fourteen governments: one for the Federation and one for 
each of the thirteen states. Each of the nine Malay states is headed by a 
hereditary Sultan, and each of the other four states by a Governor 
federally appointed. 
The Federation first came into existence in 1895, and in 1946 was 
enlarged to embrace all the states in the Malay peninsula. On August 
31, 1957, it was granted independence by the British, who had ruled for 
125 years. (Previously we had been ruled for 125 years by the Portu-
guese, who conquered us in 1511, a few years after Columbus had 
reached America and thought he was in the East Indies, and thereafter 
by the Dutch for 150 years.) In 1963 the Federation, then named the 
Federation of Malaya, was further enlarged and renamed Malaysia 
when Singapore and the two states in Borneo (Sabah and Sarawak) 
joined it on being granted independence by the British. (Singapore left 
Malaysia in 1965.) 
Malaysia is a parliamentary democracy and has held general 
elections every five years as prescribed by the Constitution: in 1959, 
1964, 1969, and 1974. The Malaysian King acts in accordance with the 
advice of the federal Cabinet, and each Sultan and Governor in accor-
dance with the advice of the state Cabinet. Legislative and executive 
power is divided between the federal government on the one hand and 
each of the state governments on the other by a written constitution. 
(130) 
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This constitution (promulgated on August 31, 1957) as amended is 
known as the Malaysian Constitution and applies not only to the 
federal government but also to all state governments. At the same time 
each state has its own written constitution, applying only to that state. 
In what way has the Malaysian Constitution been influenced by the 
United States Constitution? 
At the outset I should say that I learned my law in England, where 
the law schools hardly touched on the U.S. Constitution, probably for 
fear that Malaysians and others from the Empire might follow the bad 
example set by the organizers of the Boston Tea Party, and so I should 
admit that my knowledge of the United States Constitution is rather 
meagre. I should further and frankly admit that the Malaysian Constitu-
tion has been little influenced by the U.S. Constitution, at least directly, 
except for the incorporation of concepts that are universal and are found 
in the constitutions of many countries, such as the separation of powers 
between the three branches of government, the supremacy of the 
constitution, the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary and of the 
bar, the outlawing of discrimination, the guarantee of fundamental 
liberties, and the like. Our Constitution has been little influenced by the 
U.S. Constitution because, unlike the Philippines and Japan, we have 
had little political and legal contact with the United States. Our main 
legal links have been with Britain, India, and Australia.' (At one time 
we were governed by the British from Calcutta.) The Malaysian Consti-
tution is modelled on the Indian Constitution.2 It bears many similarities 
to that Constitution and the Constitutions of many Commonwealth 
countries that were granted independence after World War II as the 
British dismantled their Empire. (It would have borne many more 
similarities to the United States Constitution, if Americans had not two 
hundred years ago jumped the gun and taken the law into their own 
hands by unilaterally declaring their independence.) 
Here I shall discuss the main similarities and the main differences 
between the Malaysian and United States constitutions. 
The main similarities are these: (I) Both constitutions are written. 
(2) The United States and Malaysia both operate on the principle of 
supremacy of the constitution and judicial review of legislative and 
executive acts. (3) Both constitutions guarantee fundamental liberties, 
I. Ed. note: Ahmad Bin Mohd. Ibrahim, Toward a History of Law in Malaysia 
and Singapore (Singapore: Stamford College Press, 1970). 
2. Ed. Note: For analysis, see the author's An Introduction to the Constitution of 
Malaysia, 2nd ed. (Kuala Lumpur: Ibrahim Bin Johari, P. K. Govt. Printer, 1976); Tun 
Mohamed Suffian, H. P. Lee, and F. A. Trindade (eds.), The Development of the 
Constitution of Malaysia in Its First Twenty Years: 1957-1977 (Selangor, Malaysia: 
Oxford University Press, 1978); and L. A. Sheridan and H. E. Groves, The Constitution 
of Malaysia (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1967). 
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which are, in the main, enforceable. (4) Both constitutions provide for 
nations operating on the federal principle and provide for distribution 
of power between federal and state organs. (5) Both federal legislatures 
are bicameral. 
The main differences are these: (I) The nature of the two constitu-
tions is different. (2) The systems of government are different (parlia-
mentary system versus presidential system). (3) Approaches to and 
contents of fundamental liberties are different. (4) Methods of imple-
menting the federal principle are different. (5) The Malaysian Constitu-
tion expressly allows derogation from certain fundamental liberties. (6) 
Citizenship provisions differ. (7) Certain features of the Malaysian 
Constitution are not found in the U.S. Constitution. Examples are the 
position of our King (the Yang Dipertuan Agung), the position of 
rulers, and the position of religion. Islam is a religion of the Federation, 
but freedom of religion is guaranteed. 
With regard to main similarity (1), though both are written, the 
nature and approach of the two constitutions differ. The United States 
Constitution is a short one, containing only seven articles in the original 
text, and twenty-six subsequent amendments. It includes only essential 
and fundamental provisions, which are written in general terms, leaving 
other provisions to be worked out by legislation. The Malaysian 
Constitution (like the Indian) is more elaborate and detailed; many 
provisions which could have been left to legislation are included in the 
Constitution. The Malaysian Constitution has Articles 1 to 181, but the 
actual number of articles is more than 181 because many amendments 
(19) have since 1957 introduced new articles which are referred to as, for 
example, 16A, 43A, 43B, and also there are thirteen schedules. (The 
United States Constitution, too, might have been a long and complex 
document if it had not been drafted two hundred years ago by a small 
elite serving a small population with not too many lawyers.) 
The Malaysian Constitution was drafted in 1956-57 by an indepen-
dent five-member Royal Commission headed by the late Lord Reid, a 
distinguished Judge of the House of Lords, and consisting of Professor 
lvor Jennings, a retired Governor-General of Australia, a retired Chief 
Justice of the Allahabad High Court, and a Judge of the High Court of 
Pakistan. At the last minute a Canadian member could not participate. 
This Commission spent a year in the country traveling everywhere, 
listening to the views of every political party, every organization, and 
any individual who wished to make representations. Its draft was 
published for further public discussion, debated, and, with amendments 
to accommodate all conflicting interests, became our Constitution 
when it was confirmed as law by the federal and state legislatures. (In 
this way our constitution-makers secured public and social support for 
our supreme law.) 
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A second main similarity is that both our countries follow the 
system of constitutional supremacy and judicial review of unconstitu-
tional legislative and executive acts. As the Malaysian Constitution is 
the supreme law of the land, the Malaysian government is a limited 
government. Although the King enjoys legal immunity, he is sworn to 
uphold the Constitution, and if any of his official acts is unconstitu-
tional or unlawful, the minister through whom he acts may be called to 
account in the courts. Similarly, the power of ministers and other public 
officials is limited by the Constitution, and so is that of Parliament, 
which may make law only on subjects specified in the Constitution and 
provided that it is not contrary to the Constitution. To adjudicate on 
the constitutionality or validity of executive and legislative acts, the 
Malaysian Constitution establishes an independent judiciary whose 
members may not be removed from office before the compulsory 
retirement age of sixty-five, except on the recommendation of a com-
mittee of five judges, whose salary and conditions of service cannot be 
altered to their disadvantage, and who are entitled to a pension. (The 
rest of the public service retire at fifty-five and are only eligible for a 
pension.) 
Though it is true that neither the Malaysian nor the United States 
government enjoys plenary powers to do what it likes, yet there are 
some differences in our systems. The first difference is that the United 
States Constitution does not expressly say that laws which conflict with 
the Constitution are invalid and can be so declared by the courts: that 
basic principle had to be established by the courts. (What the United 
States Constitution states in Article VI, Section 2, is that "this Consti-
tution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme law of the land.") The 
Malaysian Constitution, on the other hand, makes this concept explicit: 
Article 162 (6) provides that any pre-independence law that is incon-
sistent with the Constitution has to be construed so as to bring it into 
accord with the Constitution, and Article 4 provides that any post-
independence law that is so inconsistent is to the extent of the incon-
sistency void. 
The United States Constitution itself does not restrict judicial 
review; any restrictions are imposed by the courts themselves, by 
doctrine such as locus standi, or by the doctrine of avoiding consti-
tutional questions, and so forth. The Malaysian Constitution, however, 
contains express provisions limiting the extent of judicial review.J For 
instance, Article 4 (3) says that the validity of any law made by the 
3. Ed. note: For judicial precedents, see S. Jayakumar, Constitutional Law Cases 
from Malaysia and Singapore, 2nd ed. (Singapore: Malayan Law Journal Pte. Ltd., 
1976); for current developments, see The Malayan Law Journal (1302 Shenton House 
Shenton Way, Singapore 1). ' 
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legislature cannot be questioned on the ground that it is outside the 
power of the legislature concerned except in three types of proceedings: 
(a) in proceedings for a declaration that the law is invalid on the ground 
that it is outside the power of the legislature; or (b) if the law is made by 
the federal legislature, in proceedings between the Federation and one 
or more states; or (c) if the law was made by a state legislature, in 
proceedings between the Federation and that state. Article 4 (4) further 
provides that proceedings of type (a) shall not be commenced without 
leave of a judge of the Federal Court (the highest court in the land) and 
that the Federation shall be entitled to be a party to any such proceed-
ings, and so shall any state that would or might be a party to 
proceedings brought for the same purpose under types {b) and (c). 
With regard to main similarity (3), though both constitutions 
guarantee fundamental liberties which are in the main enforceable, our 
approach and the contents of our provisions are different from those of 
the United States. The United States Constitution (so I understand) 
enshrines fundamental liberties without restrictions and qualifications; 
the U.S. courts take on the task of determining what kinds of restric-
tions are permissible in the interest of society as a whole. The Malaysian 
Constitution, on the other hand (like the Indian), expressly provides 
that certain fundamental liberties are qualified (not absolute) and may 
be diminished. 
For example, Clause (2) of Article 9 provides that every Malaysian 
citizen has the right to move freely throughout and to reside anywhere 
within the Federation, but at the same time it provides that this right is 
subject to any law relating to security, public health, public order, or 
the punishment of offenders. 
Another example is Article 10, which provides that every citizen 
has the right to freedom of speech and expression, but that Parliament 
may by law restrict this right in the interest of security, friendly 
relations with foreign states, public order or morality, and so forth. 
Other examples of the different contents of our provision for funda-
mentalliberties are (a) equal protection, (b) due process of law, (c) right 
to counsel, and (d) citizenship. In the U.S. Constitution the equal 
protection concept is not elaborated, and the courts have to determine 
what is and what is not in violation of equal protection. But in the 
Malaysian Constitution, while certain types of discrimination are pro-
hibited, yet exceptions are allowed. For example, Article 8 (2) provides 
that there shall be no discrimination against citizens on the grounds 
only of religion, race, descent, or place of birth in any law or in the 
appointment to any office or employment under a public authority or in 
the administration of any law relating to the acquisition, holding, or 
disposition of property or the establishing or carrying on of any trade, 
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business, profession, vocation, or employment. At the same time it 
provides that this prohibition is subject to exceptions authorized by the 
Constitution: for example, Clause (5) of the Article provides that this 
Article does not invalidate or prohibit, among other things, any provi-
sion relating to personal law, and Article 153 expressly provides for 
favoured treatment of Malays and natives of Borneo. 
The U.S. Constitution contains the due process concept whereby 
no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property ·'without due 
process of law." This concept has been evolved by the U.S. courts in 
such a way that the law must not be arbitrary or capricious, and the law 
itself may have to conform to rules of natural justice. In Malaysia we 
have Article 5 (I), which provides that no person shall be deprived of 
life or personal liberty "save in accordance with law," and Article 13, 
which provides that no person shall be deprived of property "save in 
accordance with law." At first glance these two Articles seem similar to 
the due process concept. But the Malaysian courts have interpreted 
"law'' to mean enacted law, and therefore, first, Articles 5 and 13 
impose restrictions only on the executive and not on the legislature, 
and, second, there is no scope for including rules of natural justice in 
"law."4 
In the United States Constitution the Sixth Amendment provides 
inter alia that "in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the 
right ... to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." The U.S. 
courts have interpreted this and other provisions in recent years to 
mean that the right to counsel commences from the moment of arrest 
and that the accused is entitled to counsel from that moment. In 
Malaysia, on the other hand, the corresponding Article 5 (3) provides: 
"Where a person is arrested he shall be informed as soon as may be of 
the grounds of his arrest and shall be allowed to consult and be 
defended by a legal practitioner of his choice." The courts have 
interpreted this to mean that although the right to counsel commences 
from arrest, the right cannot be exercised immediately, as a balance has 
to be struck between that right and the duty of the police to protect the 
public from wrongdoers by apprehending them and collecting whatever 
evidence exists against them. 5 Also, in Malaysia there is no suggestion 
that a person on a criminal charge is entitled to counsel at public 
expense, though persons on a capital charge are as a matter of course 
assigned counsel by the courts at the public expense. (A legal aid 
scheme under the control of the Attorney-General is still in its infancy.) 
4. Comptroller General of Inland Revenue v. N.P. (1973) I M.L.J. 165; and 
Arumugam Pillai v. Government of Malaysia ( 1975) 2 M.L.J. 29. 
5. Ooi Ah Phua v. Officer-in-Charge, Crimina/Investigation, Kedahf Per/is ( 1975) 
2 M.L.J. 198. 
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Concerning citizenship, the United States Constitution provides 
simply that "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and 
of the State wherein they reside" (Fourteenth Amendment). So the 
United States has only two categories of citizens: those born in the 
United States and subject to its jurisdiction, and those who have been 
naturalized. In Malaysia the Constitution provides for four categories 
of citizenship: by operation of law, by registration, by naturalization, 
and by incorporation of territory. Also, not everybody born in Malay-
sia is a citizen: one is so only if he was born on and after independence 
(August 31, 1957) and before October 1962; if he was born after 
September 1962, but before September 16, 1963, he is a citizen only if 
one of his parents was at the time of his birth either a citizen or a 
permanent resident, or if he was not born a citizen of any other country; 
and if he was born on or after September 16, 1963, he is a citizen only if 
one of his parents was at the time of the birth either a citizen or a 
permanent resident. 
As for main similarity (4) (both the United States and Malaysia 
operate on the federal principle and provide for distribution of power 
between federal and state organs), in the United States the Constitu-
tion spells out what powers "are delegated" to the centre "nor pro-
hibited" to states and provides that anything not so delegated to the 
centre nor prohibited to the states is reserved to the states respectively 
or to the people. The Malaysian Constitution, on the other hand, 
follows the Indian Constitution in providing for a federal list, a state 
list, and a concurrent list, which spell out in great detail federal subjects, 
state subjects, and concurrent subjects with respect to which the 
federation, the states, and both the federation and states, respectively, 
have legislative and executive power, and further in providing in Article 
77 that residual power on subjects not in the lists shall be vested in 
states. (Malaysia is a small country, and consequently the Constitution 
deliberately provides for a strong central government: thus subjects like 
the police and education, which in the United States are state subjects, 
are federal in Malaysia.) 
With respect to main similarity (5) (both the United States and 
Malaysia have bicameral legislatures), in the United States members of 
the Senate are elected directly by the people of each state, whereas in 
Malaysia each state legislature elects two senators, and in addition the 
federal government also has power to appoint thirty-two senators. 
Also, the Malaysian Senate has less power than the lower house (the 
House of Representatives); our Senate can at best delay but not veto 
legislation (except for constitutional amendments), while in the United 
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States the Senate's approval is essential. In both countries members of 
the lower house are elected directly by the people. 
Apart from the differences mentioned above, the most significant 
difference relates to the system of government. The United States 
follows the presidential system. The American President is elected 
independently from legislators; he is not a member of the legislature 
and not answerable to it (he is responsible to the people), nor can the 
legislature throw him out on a vote of no confidence as in the United 
Kingdom, India, and Malaysia (but he may be dismissed by impeach-
ment). Furthermore, since the President is not a member of the 
legislature, his party may not be the one in control of either house or 
both. Also, in the American system only the President and Vice-
President are elected. Cabinet members are not elected, and indeed they 
must not be members of the legislature, and they may be (and have 
been) appointed by the President even from amongst members of the 
party in opposition to his. Prime Ministers envy the President his 
ability to appoint to his Cabinet individuals of paramount ability from 
outside of politics. 
In Malaysia, because we follow the United Kingdom system of 
parliamentary government, the head of state (the King) is distinct from 
the head of government (the Prime Minister). The Prime Minister must 
be a member of the legislature, and his choice of Ministers is limited to 
persons who are willing enough to stand the rough and tumble of 
politics to run for Parliament, not necessarily a good qualification for 
high office. The Prime Minister's party or coalition is in the majority in 
the legislature, and he and his Ministers are responsible to the people, 
not directly but indirectly to their representatives in Parliament; his 
party or coalition must give up office if they cease to enjoy the 
confidence of the majority in the legislature. Our King, like the British 
Queen and the Indian President, must act on Cabinet advice and has no 
significant discretionary power. 
Other main differences may be described thus: 
Malaysia, as was already stated, is a federation of thirteen states, 
nine of which are headed by a hereditary Sultan and four of which are 
headed by a Governor. There is a Conference of Rulers, established by 
the Constitution, in which Sultans and Governors are members; every 
year this Conference meets three or four times, with the King and Prime 
Minister present, to discuss and decide policies of national importance. 
The King of Malaysia is unique. Although he is elected, only a 
Sultan may stand. He is a hereditary Sultan, and yet he holds the office 
of King for a fixed term of five years. He is elected by the Conference of 
Rulers, yet Governors who are members of the Conference cannot 
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participate in this election. While King he ceases to function as Sultan, 
and before coming to Kuala Lumpur he appoints a Regent to exercise 
his functions in his home state. The Constitution contains elaborate 
rules regarding his election, but for the purpose of this discussion 
suffice it to say that generally he is elected by seniority. (Some senior 
Sultans decline to stand because the King is very much a prisoner of 
palace and protocol.) 
As for religion, while the American founding fathers, smarting 
under the religious persecution of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
Europe (when Christians were burning each other, all in the name of 
God), forbade the establishment of any religion, the Malaysian Consti-
tution expressly provides that Islam shall be the religion of the Federa-
tion. But this does not mean that there is no religious freedom, for the 
Constitution further provides that other religions may be practiced in 
peace and harmony in any part of the Federation. Because of her 
geographical position at the crossroads of Asia, Malaysia has for 
centuries been exposed to the influence of Arabia, India, China, and 
Europe, and this has contributed to the spirit of religious and cultural 
toleration that animates her people. 
Personal Reflections 
Our Constitution has been amended too many times, in my opinion 
(nineteen times. It is amendable by Parliament; if two-thirds of the total 
members of each house approve, no ratification by states is necessary). 
This is regrettable, for a constitution should be regarded as sacrosanct 
and should not be amended often; but it is also understandable because 
our Constitution is long and contains many matters that should be left 
to ordinary legislation. It is now too late to shorten it. 
The trend of amendments is to further strengthen an already strong 
central government. This is inevitable in a small country the size of 
ours, but care should be taken not to destroy state autonomy al-
together. 
Our Constitution mentions the rights of citizens, but not their 
duties to the country-and to their fellow-citizens-and this is a pity. 
Rights should be balanced by duties, and this should be made clear in 
the Constitution. 
The Constitution mentions equality before law. It should also 
mention other forms of equality-such as economic, social, and cul-
tural equality. The government and Malaysian leaders are aware, 
however, that without these other forms of equality there cannot be 
social justice, and that without social justice the country will fall prey to 
the Communist menace. Hence, vigorous efforts are being made to 
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implement successive Five-Year Development Plans so as to increase 
the size of the national cake and everybody's share of it. 
The Constitution secures and is a symbol of our political indepen-
dence. Malaysians should also strive for economic independence and 
for a fair price for her produce compared with imported manufactures. 
For instance, in my youth the price of I ,330 pounds of rubber (Malay-
sia is the world's greatest producer of natural rubber) bought a car (the 
cheapest); today we have to sell six to seven times that much rubber to 
buy the cheapest car. In international trade there must be interdepen-
dence, but at the same time newly independent countries should not 
remain at the mercy of well-established trading nations. 
Malaysia's Constitution and system of parliamentary democratic 
government have survived for twenty years. During our limited ex-
perience we have found that the contents of a constitution are important, 
but more important is the spirit of the men at the top whose duty it is to 
carry out its provisions. Do they believe in the system? Were they 
honest when they swore to uphold the Constitution and to uphold the 
rule of Ia w? Do they believe in the independence of the judiciary and the 
value of a strong bar, incorruptible and fearless? If they do, then the 
Constitution is viable and there is hope and a future for the country. 
But if they are rogues or charlatans, determined only to satisfy their 
own personal and family ambitions, regardless of the wider interest of 
the nation, then the country will head toward the abyss-no matter how 
long and hard its founding fathers laboured to write the most nearly 
perfect Constitution in the world. So far Malaysia has been fortunate in 
having good men at the helm to guide her destiny. 
VIII 
The Philippines 
Editorial Note 
The Republic of the Philippines comprises an archipelago five hundred 
miles off the southeast coast of Asia. It includes seven thousand islands, 
of which several hundred exceed one square mile in area, and eleven 
account for 95 percent of both the nation's population of 45,000,000 
and its land area of 116,000 square miles. 
The Filipino people are of mainly Malay origin, with a consider-
able Chinese and a lesser Spanish infusion. Population is increasing at 
more than 3 percent per year. Nearly 85 percent of the people are 
Roman Catholic. Muslims account for 5 percent of the population and 
are dominant in the Sulu islands and parts of Mindanao. The Philip-
pines has achieved relatively high standards of health and education, 
with life expectancy now close to sixty years, and a literacy rate over 80 
percent. Most Filipinos speak one or more of seventy indigenous 
Malayo-Polynesian languages, many speak English as well, and a 
declining number also speak Spanish. Tagalog, the language of the 
Manila Region, and the basis of a national language known as Pilipino, 
has gained increasing currency throughout the country. English and 
Spanish are also recognized as official languages. 
The Philippine economy is predominantly agricultural. Major 
crops include rice for domestic consumption, and sugar, coconut 
products, and bananas for export. Forestry and mining also contribute 
importantly to export earnings. Major trading partners are Japan and 
(140) 
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the United States. Despite official policies to encourage domestic 
ownership, the modern industrial sector remains dominated by Ameri-
can corporations. Gross national product per capita is estimated 
at $350. 
At the beginning of the sixteenth century the Philippine Islands 
were inhabited principally by small Malay settlements along sea and 
lake coasts, with little organization of society above the village and clan 
level. In the southern islands, however, Islam was advancing rapidly, 
bringing larger and more complex social and political forms. After 
Magellan's "discovery" of the Philippines in 1521, Spain checked the 
Islamic advance and established a colonial regime that lasted until the 
Filipino revolution and American intervention at the end of the last 
century. 
The Americans forcibly suppressed the revolutionary movement 
which the Filipinos had begun against Spain and continued against the 
United States. The new rulers soon reached an accommodation with the 
Filipino elite, and rapidly constituted a Filipino legislature, bureau-
cracy, and judiciary with considerable autonomy in internal affairs. The 
American colonial regime developed extensive public health and educa-
tion systems. It did little, however, to develop a strong economy and a 
more equitable distribution of wealth and power. To the contrary, the 
American policy of free trade perpetuated an essentially colonial econ-
omy, which persists to this day. 
In 1934, after long but amicable struggle on the part of the Filipino 
leadership, the United States Congress passed the Philippine Indepen-
dence Act, providing for full independence in 1946 after a ten-year 
transitional period as a largely autonomous Commonwealth under 
American sovereignty. The following year the Filipino people voted 
acceptance of a Constitution drafted by the Philippine Constitutional 
Convention to establish both the transitional Commonwealth govern-
ment and the independent Republic to be inaugurated in 1946. The 
Commonwealth period was interrupted by the Japanese occupation 
during World War II, but the Philippines attained independence as 
scheduled in 1946. 
As an independent nation the Philippines achieved rapid recovery 
from the destruction of World War II, impressive standards of health 
and education, and until 1972, a democratic, though in significant 
aspects an ineffectual, government. Although heavily protective eco-
nomic policies stimulated rapid growth of a complex of light import-
substitution industries under Filipino entrepreneurship, those policies 
soon outlived their usefulness, and the economy stagnated. The govern-
ment's effort to shift policy to promote labor-intensive export manufac-
turing met with only modest success. The crucial weakness of the 
142 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
government was its inability to implement fundamental reforms and to 
subordinate special interests to the public good in accordance with 
officially declared policies and standards. Land reform legislation was 
not carried out effectively. Welfare and social justice programs were 
overly ambitious in stated objectives and grossly deficient in the fiscal 
and political support required for implementation. Economic and 
political power remained concentrated in a few families. Political 
conflict among powerful factions became increasingly violent, and 
public order deteriorated. 
In 1972, President Marcos declared martial law. This enabled him 
to manipulate a sitting Constitutional Convention to elicit a proposed 
new Constitution which would enable him to remain in office and, 
particularly in its transitional provisions, assure him of continuing 
power without interference by the legislature, the courts, the press, or 
necessity of election. In 1973, he proclaimed the new Constitution to be 
in effect by reason of approval in an informal plebiscite, which had been 
conducted in many areas by a show of hands under military supervision. 
Indigenous Filipino law prior to Spanish rule was embedded in the 
norms, customs, and hierarchical patterns of a village society. The 
colonial regime established a formal legal system but never gained 
sufficient authority to give pervasive effect to formal law. By the end of 
the Spanish period, the Philippines enjoyed (or was afflicted by) a full 
array of codes and legal enactments, but these were of little effect in the 
day-to-day life of most people. 
American rule brought an infusion of liberal political doctrine and 
constitutional law. When the struggle for independence shifted from 
armed revolution to legal and political channels, lawyers became 
prominent in politics and government, and they remain so today. The 
Philippines now has more lawyers per capita than most European 
nations. 
The Constitution of 1935 incorporated fundamental principles of 
American constitutional law, such as separation of powers, judicial 
review of legislation, a bill of rights, and due process. The judiciary 
assumed an important role in the government and politics of the 
Commonwealth and the Republic. Although the lower courts were 
congested, slow, and often accused of favoritism and corruption, the 
Supreme Court enjoyed great respect and did not hesitate to nullify 
legislative and executive action. Politically prominent lawyers vigor-
ously defended criminal defendants and political dissidents, and major 
political conflicts were translated into and resolved as legal disputes. 
The Constitution of 1973 maintained most of the established 
Constitutional principles in form, but the President, invoking its transi-
tional provisions and emergency powers, has been able to exercise 
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power without regard to constitutional constraint. Although the judi-
cial system was left intact by the declaration of martial law, jurisdiction 
of a number of politically sensitive cases was shifted to martial law 
tribunals. The Supreme Court has remained free from overt presi-
dential manipulation, and it has heard cases presenting political issues 
of the most fundamental order. In a crucial case decided by a bare 
majority, with four justices dissenting, the Court declared the new 
Constitution to be in force and effect. To date, the Court has not 
decided an important case in direct opposition to the position of the 
President. 
June 1978 JAMES L. MAGA VERN 
The American Constitutional Impact 
on the Philippine Legal System 
Enrique M. Fernando 
Senior Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the Philippines 
It is a privilege highly esteemed to have been invited to take part, even if 
in a modest capacity, in the Bicentennial celebration of the American 
Declaration of Independence. Rightfully has it been observed by Laski 
that the history of the United States "has changed the outlook of 
mankind wherever there has been power to reflect on the meaning of 
human affairs." As he stated further: "No state, until our own day, has 
done so much to make the idea of progress part of the mental make-up 
of man. No state, either, has done more to make freedom a dream 
which overcame the claims both of birth and of wealth."! De Tocque-
ville and Bryce, writing at earlier periods, were similarly laudatory.2 
There is considerable justification for the United States, then, to take 
legitimate pride in what has been accomplished these past two hundred 
years and to look forward with reasonable and cautious optimism to 
what may be achieved in the next century. 
As an Asian coming from a nation which for almost half a century, 
from 1898 to 1946, was under American sovereignty, the author of this 
paper is a product of the American system of education then followed 
during that period. If the further consideration be borne in mind that 
the Philippines was under Spanish colonial rule for over three hundred 
years dating from 1565, it may be readily discernible why his thinking is 
colored by Western legal ideas. There was a time when there was a well-
nigh automatic acceptance of their applicability to Philippine condi-
tions. Fortunately, that time is no more. Since independence, there has 
been a greater sense of discrimination and a greater appreciation of the 
nation's Oriental heritage, even insofar as the ways of the law are 
concerned. The author, however, belongs to a generation that was not 
the beneficiary of such an approach. As a result, his study of the legal 
I. Harold Laski, The American Democracy (New York: Viking, 1948) p. 3. 
2. De Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1830); Bryce, The American Com-
monwealth ( 1888). 
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systems of neighboring Asiatic countries is rather meager. Nonetheless, 
an attempt will be made to refer briefly to comparable constitutional 
provisions in the charters of Southeast Asian states including India, 
Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, formerly Ceylon. Japan and South Korea will 
also receive some attention. The concentration though, for obvious 
reasons, will be on the legal system of the Philippines. 
The American influence in Asian constitutional systems may be 
viewed from an abstract or conceptual level or in its more concrete or 
specific manifestations in terms of actual provisions or doctrines em-
bodied in Asian charters. The former deals with constitutionalism as 
identified with a fundamental law, its supremacy being assured in the 
United States through the function of judicial review. The latter may 
refer to such broad categories as federalism, the presidential form of 
government, and the Bill of Rights. As, by and large, the first two have 
not recommended themselves for adoption in this part of the world,3 
necessarily, the major inquiry is centered on the extent to which 
fundamental rights and freedoms, as protected in the United States 
Constitution, have found their way in Asia. It may not be amiss, 
however, to speak of the depth of nationalistic fervor in the Asian scene 
and why, this factor notwithstanding, the United States Constitution 
served as a model. 
Nationalism in Asia 
Nationalism embodies the principle of self-determination-one nation, 
one state. It exemplifies the concept that a state is nothing but the 
juridical personification of the nation.4 President Woodrow Wilson was 
its vigorous champion after World War I. His impassioned advocacy 
struck a responsive chord: it intensified the feeling of nationalism 
among peoples still smarting under foreign rule; it evoked their enthu-
siasm and stirred their hopes; it signified for them the end of colonial-
ism-and it was high time, too. For those in Asia and Africa, the regret 
was that the blessing of such a gospel was not extended to them until 
after World War II. Then they had their day. Speaking of Asia alone, 
the Philippines gained her independence on July 4, 1946. In 1947, India, 
Pakistan, and Ceylon, now Sri Lanka, dissolved their ties with Great 
Britain. Burma followed early in 1948; so did Malaysia, but not until 
1957. The Indonesians broke away from Dutch rule as early as 1945. 
The former French Indo-China now comprises Vietnam, Cambodia, 
3. India and Malaysia are now the only two countries that have a federal structure. 
It was so with Pakistan until Bangladesh seceded in 1971. The presidential system is also 
in disfavor, except in Indonesia and Korea. 
4. Cf. H. E. Cohen, Recent Theories of Sovereignty (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1937), p. 15. 
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and Laos, the first of them asserting her freedom in 1945 and the last 
two in 1949. Singapore left Malaysia in 1965, and Bangladesh seceded 
from Pakistan in 1971. Korea, occupied by the United States and 
Russian armed forces after World War II, was lost to Japan in 1945, at 
present there being the Democratic People's Republic in the north, and, 
in the south, the Republic of Korea. 
At long last, a number of Asian peoples of diverse creeds and 
cultures, but with the common objective of freeing themselves from the 
grip of alien rule, assumed their independent status, full of hopes and 
aspirations for a better way of life. Adlai Stevenson, writing in 1954, 
could speak of millions of human beings from Africa to Indonesia, 
·•emerging from foreign domination and fiercely demanding relief from 
hunger, pestilence, and oppression."5 There was, and understandably 
so, the flowering of nationalism, as a means of attaining what he had so 
felicitously termed their .. suddenly unattained aspirations."6 Competent 
observers of the Asian scene, Orientals and Occidentals alike, are thus 
unanimous in their view of its potent influence at work. W. L. Holland 
could picture it "as a huge and often controlled source of energy."7 
Asiatic peoples, according to C. A. Buss, "usually cool and unemo-
tional about political programs, become heated over gationalism."s As 
L. K. Rosinger stated, the "fires of nationalism" burn brightly, having 
been fed by the "poverty and discontent of masses of people" and "the 
deep Asian resentment at Western racial attitudes."9 The same thought 
was echoed by Stevenson: "Nationalism is rampant. And the West, 
identified with the hated colonialism, is suspect." 10 G. E. Taylor, with 
specific reference to American foreign policy, was quite categorical: 
"Mutual confidence is hard to establish, for most of the countries of 
Southeast Asia have been colonies for varying lengths of time and their 
nationalist movements have a history of anti-West and often anti-
capitalist feeling. "11 
There is pertinence to the query, therefore, of the effect of such 
dominant sentiment on the influence of American constitutional ways 
in the framing of the fundamental laws of each of these new states. The 
question does not admit of a uniform answer. The fires of nationalism 
burned just as brightly in the Philippines in the past as they do now, but 
5. Adlai Stevenson, Call to Greatness (New York: Harper, 1954), p. 38. 
6. Ibid., p. 43. 
7. William L. Holland, ed., Asian Nationalism and the West (New York: Mac-
millan, 1953), p. 5. 
8. Claude A. Buss, The Arc of Crisis (New York: Doubleday, 1961), p. 24. 
9. Lawrence K. Rosinger et al. (eds.), The State of Asia (London: G. Allen, 
1953), p.3. 
10. Call to Greatness, p. 73. 
II. George E. Taylor, The Philippines and the United States (New York: Praeger, 
1964), p. 8. 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA 147 
with only one exception there has never been any period marked by 
deep resentment, much less bitter hostility, against the West. The last 
decade of the nineteenth century and the first few years of the twentieth 
century constitute the exception. For it was in 1896 that the full-scale 
rebellion by the Filipinos against Spain started, although for several 
years previous to that the separatist movement had been growing. From 
our standpoint it was a success: by 1898, the Spanish resistance was 
reduced to insignificance. It was the hope of the Filipinos that the 
United States in view of her tradition and her philosophy would be 
sympathetic to their cause. Such, unfortunately, was not the case; by 
the Treaty of Paris of 1898, the United States, having gone to war 
against Spain, acquired the Philippines by cession. The Filipinos had 
no choice but to continue the struggle against that country. As could 
have been expected, the superiority in arms and resources was too much 
to overcome. By 1904 at the latest, what was referred to by us as the 
Filipino-American War, and by Americans as the Philippine Insurrec-
tion, was at an end. 
The policies adopted by the United States proved acceptable. 
Autonomy was promised, ultimately to lead to independence. Educa-
tion and health received preferential attention. The civil service was 
efficient. While Protestant missionaries came to the Philippines, there 
was no interference with Catholicism. Indeed, civil and political rights 
were respected. With the acceptance of the democratic ways and institu-
tions introduced by the United States, the rise of nationalism did not 
pose an obstacle to Philippine-American friendship. World War II gave 
further impetus to the cordiality that marked such relations. The Fili-
pinos fought by the side of the Americans. After the surrender of 
Bataan and Corregidor, guerrillas continued to harass Japanese troops 
in the Philippines. They aided in the liberation of the Philippines by the 
American armed forces in 1945, ending the grim period of Japanese 
Occupation. 12 Then in 1946, the promised independence became a 
reality. 
That was in accordance with the Philippine Independence Act 
enacted by the United States Congress in 1934. The recognition of 
Philippine political freedom was postponed until after a ten-year 
transition period under a Commonwealth status, the last stage from an 
American unincorporated territory to an independent existence. As was 
12. As was noted in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Guerrero, L-20812, 
September 22, 1967, 21 Supreme Court Reports Annotated, hereinafter referred to as 
SCRA, 180, the role that the United States played in liberating the Philippines, 
considering that from 1942 to 1945 the Japanese army during the occupation period 
enforced repressive measures, severe in character, "elicited a vast reservoir of goodwill for 
the United States, one that has lasted to this day notwithstanding irritants that mar ever 
so often the relationship even among the most friendly of nations." At 188. 
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to be expected, there was a requirement that there be a constitution for 
such a regime. The understanding of the Philippine Constitutional 
Convention of 1934-35 was that the fundamental law to be drafted was 
not only for the Commonwealth but for the future Republic. With the 
training in self-government under American tutelage in the past three 
decades, it is easy to understand why such Constitution would embody 
certain basic features of that polity, such as the presidential form of 
government, the function of judicial review, and a bill of rights. It thus 
becomes even more evident why the upsurge of nationalism in the 
Philippines with its vehement cry for membership in the world com-
munity was certainly no bar to practices followed the years past. The 
United States Constitution, serving as a fit model, was ready-made for 
the purpose. 
South Korea, now the Republic of Korea, is equally nationalistic, 
but having been spared from domination by a Western power, experi-
enced no sense of dissatisfaction with the United States, to which, 
moreover, she is bound by ties of gratitude, as it was U.S. troops that 
played a decisive role in the bitter fratricidal conflict with the North. 
India, Pakistan, Burma, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and Singapore, all 
former colonies of Britain-even if there were long pent-up grievances 
against the latter-appeared content with the introduction in their 
respective legal systems of the English common law, the merits of which 
they recognized. It is easily understandable, then, why for them there 
may be certain American constitutional concepts that could serve as 
models for possible inclusion in their respective charters. Indonesia, 
formerly a Dutch possession, was hardly an enthusiast as far as occi-
dental culture is concerned. It does not mean, however, that the United 
States has nothing to offer as far as drafting a constitution is concerned. 
Considering recent events, it would be highly unrealistic to look for 
traces of American influence in the fundamental laws still in the making 
in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. 
The case of Japan is unique. She has been and is now fiercely 
nationalistic. For a long time she kept the West away from her shores, 
but from the Meiji era in the last third of the nineteenth century, she 
successfully made use of occidental institutions and practices suitable to 
her needs. Then came World War II, where she was among the 
vanquished. That was followed by the framing of her present Constitu-
tion, under Allied occupation with General Douglas MacArthur as the 
Supreme Commander. There is nothing surprising in her incorporating 
therein a large number of well-known American doctrines, especially 
where individual rights are involved. There is, in addition, the adoption 
of the concept of judicial review. 
What may be impressed with more significance, however, is not so 
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much the absence of any evidence indicative of displeasure with or 
resentment against the United States as a major Western power-this in 
the face of the brand of nationalism aroused in these new Asian states. 
It is the relative freedom possessed by them in the framing of their 
constitutions upon assuming their independent status. They could 
examine the contents of existing charters and determine which were 
suitable. They had, as it were, a wide counter from which to make their 
selection. To paraphrase Alexander Hamilton, they were given the 
opportunity to show their capability of establishing a good government 
from reflection and choice rather than depending solely on accident and 
force.n They could and did envision their constitutions as a vehicle, in 
the language of A. J. Zurcher, "to codify a rational and progressive 
political order [and] to discourage the abuse of political power."14 Not 
only could they serve as symbols of political unity or as instruments of 
political discipline, they could also demonstrate political maturity. 
With such ideals in mind, certainly, the U.S. Constitution of 1787, as 
amended and as interpreted in landmark decisions, could very well 
serve as a fit model. That would be to reinforce faith in the possibility 
that what Jefferson called "the disease of liberty" may be spread in 
distant lands and far-off domains. 
The influence of the United States, as was noted, could be shown 
by the incorporation, whether in express terms or by implication, of 
selected provisions or doctrines traceable to her Constitution. To be 
realistic, it may be on a purely verbal level, for the warning of the great 
jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes is ever timely. Constitutional provisions are 
not to be considered in the light of mathematical formulas having their 
essence in their form. They are organic living institutions, and their 
significance is vital, not formaJ. 1S As he so emphatically pointed out: 
"Constitutions are intended to preserve practical and substantial rights, 
not to maintain theories." 16 It would be to err on the side of undue 
optimism if the presence in the charters of these new Asian states of 
juridical formulations traceable to the U.S. Constitution were to be 
equated with the complete acceptance of what they signify for the 
American legal system. It does not admit of doubt, though, that by their 
inclusion there is at least manifest an intention not to ignore the 
meaning attached to them in the country of origin. There is likely to be 
that subtle weaving of what is native with what is foreign. It would be 
disappointing if the result is merely a canonization of accepted and 
13. Cf. Alexander Hamilton, in The Federalist (Modern Library Edition, 1937), 
p. 3. 
14. Arnold J. Zurcher, Constitutions and Constitutional Trends Since World War 
II (New York: New York University Press, 1951), p. I. 
15. Cf. Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914). 
16. Cf. Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 457 (1904). 
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traditional concepts, divorced from the actualities in their new locales. 
No juridical bridge of firmness could be built on so shaky a foundation. 
The Supremacy of the Constitution 
American influence on Asiatic constitutions, as was set forth at the 
outset, may be both on an abstract or conceptual level or in concrete or 
specific manifestations as evidenced by the adoption of provisions 
found in the United States Constitution or of doctrines based on them. 
Insofar as the former is concerned, reference may be made to the 
fundamental postulate of the supremacy of a constitution, the idea of a 
higher law, one which has superior obligation and validity. As far back 
as 1803, in the landmark decision Marbury v. Madison,l 7 Chief Justice 
Marshall, after taking note of "the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is," continued: 
So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and 
the Constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must 
either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the consti-
tution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the 
court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. 
This is of the very essence of judicial duty. If then, the courts are to 
regard the constitution, and the constitution is superior to any ordinary 
act of the legislature, the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must 
govern the case to which they both apply. Those then who controvert 
the principle that the constitution is to be considered in court, as a 
paramount law, are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts 
must close their eyes on the constitution, and see only the law. This 
doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions. 18 
That fundamental postulate of a fundamental law setting forth the 
criterion for the validity of any public act, whether proceeding from the 
highest official or the lowest functionary, is basic to the American 
system of a constitutional democracy. That is, to manifest fealty to the 
rule of law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost 
rung in the legal hierarchy. The three departments of government in the 
discharge of the functions with which they are entrusted have no choice 
but to yield obedience to constitutional commands. Whatever limits are 
imposed must be observed. Congress in the enactment of statutes must 
ever be on guard lest the restrictions on its authority, whether sub-
stantive or formal, be transcended. The presidency in the execution of 
the laws cannot ignore or disregard what it ordains. In its task of 
applying the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the judiciary is 
called upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental 
law. Even its power of judicial review to pass upon the validity of the 
acts of the coordinate branches in the course of adjudication is a logical 
17. I Cranch 137. 18. Ibid., 176-177. 
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corollary of this overriding principle that the Constitution is paramount. 
Any governmental measure that fails to live up to its mandates falls to 
the ground. Thereby there is a recognition of its being the supreme 
law. 19 
The Function of Judicial Review 
It is through the awesome and delicate power of judicial review, to 
follow the oft-quoted observation of Chief Justice Hughes made at a 
time before he became the chief magistrate, that while the United States 
is under a Constitution, "it is what the judges say it is."2° For in 
discharging the task of inquiring into whether a challenged executive or 
legislative action is in conformity with, or repugnant to, its Consti-
tution, the meaning attached to its provisions becomes authoritative 
when it is the United States Supreme Court that speaks. Such a 
pronouncement, Justice Jackson, in a work published when he was 
Attorney General, characterized as "the most understandable and 
comprehensive summary of American constitutional law. He pointed 
out, though, that there was no explicit constitutional grant of this 
power, that it was "left to lurk in an inference." At any rate, he 
continued, "Political evolution has supplied the omission, and the 
course of history has established that power in the Supreme Court."21 It 
had its genesis in the aforesaid Marbury decision, where the doctrine 
was first enunciated and applied by the Supreme Court of the United 
States. It declined to issue the writ of mandamus to the then Secretary 
of State, James Madison, on the ground that it was not vested with such 
original jurisdiction under the Constitution of the United States. The 
authority conferred by a congressional act was not warranted by the 
fundamental law and hence was declared void. What is to be stressed is 
the absence in the Constitution of any such explicit grant of competence 
to annul statutes. It was merely an implied power, on the basis of the 
cardinal precept that the Constitution is paramount and thus overrides 
any statute that conflicts with its mandate. 
The course of history, or "political evolution" in the words of 
Justice Jackson, has at any rate erased any doubts as to the existence of 
the power of judicial review. It did not take long. Justice Story, in his 
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, published in 
1833, could speak of "the duty or course of justice to declare any 
19. Cf. Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, L-32717, Nov. 26, 1970, 36 SCRA 
228, 234-5. 
20. Cf. W. B. Lockhart, Y. Kamisar, J. H. Choper, Constitutional Law, 3rd ed. (St. 
Paul, Minn.: West Pub. Co., 1970), p. 8, citing a speech of Chief Justice Hughes delivered 
on May 3, 1907. 
21. Robert H. Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy (New York: Knopf, 
1941), pp. 3, 4, 5. 
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unconstitutional law passed by Congress or by State Legislaturevoid."22 
Even as of that time, he could affirm that "the right of all courts, state 
as well as national, to declare unconstitutional laws void, seems settled 
beyond the reach of judicial controversy."23 The power of judicial 
review was not again utilized to nullify an act of Congress untill857 in 
the Dred Scott decision,24 where the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
act known as the Missouri Compromise was void, as Congress was 
without power to legislate on the issue of slavery. This attempt on the 
part of the Supreme Court to settle the slavery question proved 
singularly ineffective. It was in the crucible of the Civil War that the 
issue was decided. Nonetheless, Thomas Cooley in his Constitutional 
Limitations, first published in I 868, affirmed that "under some circum-
stances, it may become the duty of the courts to declare that what the 
legislature has assumed to enact is void, either from want of constitu-
tional power to enact it, or because the constitutional forms or condi-
tions have not been observed."25 D. Watson, in his treatise on the 
Constitution of the United States, could by 1910 categorically state: 
"The Constitution does not confer authority upon the courts to declare 
an act of Congress to be in conflict with that instrument, yet from the 
beginning of the Government the courts have exercised such power, and 
will continue to do so."26 W. W. Willoughby, in 1929, in his three-
volume work on the Constitutional Law of the United States, could 
emphatically assert: 
The principle that statutory law, in order to be recognized as valid by 
the courts, must, in all cases, be in conformity with constitutional 
requirements, is a product of American law, and though now found in 
the jurisprudential systems of some other countries, has nowhere received 
the development and extended application that it has received in the 
United States.27 
Judicial Review in the Philippines 
In a leading case, the first of its kind after the effectivity of the 1935 
Constitution, Angara v. Electoral Commission,28 the Philippine Su-
preme Court stated that the power of judicial review "is granted, if not 
expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of Article VIII of our 
Constitution."29 This Article stated that the Supreme Court was not to 
22. Third ed., 1858, p. 645. 23. Ibid. 
24. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393 (1857). 
25. Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed. (Boston: 
Little, Brown, 1927), vol. I, p. 332. 
26. D. Watson, Constitution of the United States, vol. 2 (Chicago: Callaghan, 
1910), p. 1168. 
27. W. W. Willoughby, The Constitutional Law of the United States, 2d ed. (New 
York: Baker Voorhis, 1929), p. I. 
28. 63 Phil. 139 ( 1936). 
29. Ibid., 158. The opinion was penned by Justice Jose P. Laurel, the delegate who 
was the Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights in the 1934 Convention. 
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be deprived of its jurisdiction "to review, reverse, modify, or affirm on 
appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, final judgments and decrees in 
... (l) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, 
law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question." Then in 
a subsequent section, the number of votes required was provided for: 
"All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty or law shall be 
heard and decided by the Supreme Court en bane, and no treaty or law 
may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of two-thirds 
of all the members of the Court" (Sec. I 0). In the present Constitution, 
which became effective in 1973, with a Supreme Court of fifteen 
members, four more than was formerly the case, there were necessarily 
some changes. Thus: "All cases involving the constitutionality of a 
treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the 
Supreme Court en bane, and no treaty, executive agreement, or law 
may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least 
ten Members" (Art. X, Sec. 2, par. [2]). 
A brief historical background is not amiss. At the time when the 
United States acquired the Philippines from Spain in 1899, one of the 
principles of constitutional law binding on the territorial government 
established by her in the Philippines was this same principle of judicial 
review. It was natural for American lawyers admitted to practice in the 
Philippines to challenge the validity of statutes or executive orders, 
whenever the interests of their clients so demanded. The Filipino 
justices and judges, who with their American brethren administered 
justice, were soon made aware that the power to pass on the constitu-
tionality of such statutes and executive orders was part of their judicial 
function. The Filipino lawyers vied with the American members of the 
bar in raising the question of constitutionality whenever appropriate. 
The American practice, therefore, of appealing to courts, by means 
of lawsuits, decisions reached by either the executive or legislative 
branches of the government, became a part of the accepted doctrines of 
constitutional law in the Philippines early in the period of American 
sovereignty. 
Although it was not until March 22, 1907, that the Supreme Court 
of the Philippines set aside an act of the legislative branch in the case of 
Casannovas v. Hord, 30 as early as February 14, 1902, the Court in the 
case of In re Prauteh,31 dismissed as untenable the objection that there 
was an impairment of contractual obligation. A year later, on May 16, 
1903, in United States v. Dorr,32 it firmly rejected the assertion that the 
judgment of the lower court was void, as it did not provide for a jury 
trial as required by the American Constitution. In a disbarment pro-
ceeding in 1904, In re Montagne,JJ the plea by respondent attorney that 
30. 8 Phil. 125. 31. I Phil. 132. 32. 2 Phil. 269. 33. 4 Phil. 1. 
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he was denied due process of law met with no sympathetic response 
from the Supreme Court. Various other cases could be cited to show the 
readiness with which counsel would seize upon an alleged infringement 
of constitutional rights and call upon the Court to exercise the power of 
judicial review. 
Then came the period under the 1935 and the present constitu-
tions. It may safely be asserted that the Philippine Supreme Court was 
and is ever alert to entertain constitutional questions. In the valedictory 
address before the 1934 Constitutional Convention, Claro M. Recto, its 
President, spoke of the trust reposed in the judiciary, in these words: "It 
is one of the paradoxes of democracy that the people at times place 
more confidence in instrumentalities of the State other than those 
directly chosen by them for the exercise of their sovereignty."J4 The 
assumption was that whenever a constitutional question was posed, the 
Court should act. It was expected that it would discharge such a task 
without regard to political considerations and with no thought except 
that of discharging its trust. Witness these words of the same Justice 
Laurel in an early landmark case, People v. Vera,35 decided in 1937: 
If it is ever necessary for us to make any vehement affirmance during 
this formative period of our political history, it is that we are indepen-
dent of the Executive no less than of the Legislative department of our 
government-independent in the performance of our functions, unde-
terred by any consideration, free from politics, indifferent to popularity, 
and unafraid of criticism in the accomplishment of our sworn duty as 
we see it and as we understand it.36 
The hope, of course, was that such assertion of independence and 
impartiality was not mere rhetoric. There could not be the least doubt 
that what elicited the approval of the Filipino people was the belief that 
the judiciary is called upon to inquire into alleged breaches of the 
fundamental law to avoid its being infringed. To do so is merely to do 
what is expected of it. Thereby no invasion of spheres appropriately 
belonging to the political branches occurred. The judiciary had to act 
only when there was a suit with proper parties before it, wherein rights 
appropriate for judicial enforcement were sought to be vindicated. Nor 
would it approach constitutional questions with dogmatism or apodic-
tic certainty. There was also the expectation that there would be the 
search for jural consistency and rational coherence. Once allowance is 
made for the fact that, for all its care and circumspection, a Supreme 
Court is manned by human beings fettered by fallibility, but none-
theless earnestly and sincerely striving to do right, it is easy to under-
34. VII Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention (S. Laurel, ed.), 
Appendix L, 800. 
35. 65 Phil. 56 ( 1937). 36. Ibid., 96. 
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stand the public acceptance of its vigorous pursuit of the task of 
assuring that the Constitution be obeyed. 
On a more specific level, reference may be made to an impressive 
number of cases to show that in the Philippines there had been neither 
judicial timidity nor reluctance in the exercise of the power of judicial 
review. In the period before the Japanese Occupation in 1942, the 
Supreme Court was called upon to rule on a dispute between two 
constitutional agencies, the National Assembly and the then Electoral 
Commission,37 on the reorganization of the judiciary,38 and on the 
extent of the supervisory power over local governments.39 After libera-
tion, controversies more momentous in their implications for the 
welfare of the country were taken to the Supreme Court for resolution. 
Again it had its hands full of cases decisive in their impact on the 
political and economic future of the Philippines. The presence of the 
United States Army in the Philippines introduced added complications. 
Instances of its none-too-tender regard for the liberties of individuals 
were called, in appropriate cases, to the attention of the Supreme 
Court. 40 The legality of proceedings against those Filipinos who worked 
with the Japanese with such intensity and enthusiasm as to qualify their 
collaboration as treasonable was dumped in its lap. 41 Thereafter came 
cases of equal significance, among them those involving the suspension 
of three Senators allegedly owing their election to terroristic activities 
of certain radical groups;42 the sufficiency of the votes on the parity 
rights amendment to constitute a valid proposal, with three Senators 
and eight Representatives still under suspension and thus unable to 
participate;43 the near-crisis brought about by well-nigh one-half of the 
Senators refusing to attend sessions after the incumbent Senate Presi-
dent was ousted by declaring the office vacant at a time when according 
to them there was no quorum;44 the exercise by at least two Presidents 
(Roxas and Quirino) of the power to legislate under the Emergency 
Powers Act even after the return of normalcy with Congress actually in 
operation;45 the independence of the Commission on Elections from the 
Executive,46 and the scope of its authority to assure free and honest 
37. Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936). 
38. Zandueta v. De Ia Costa, 66 Phil. 615 ( 1938). 
39. Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil. 62 ( 1939), and Vi/lena v. Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil. 
451 (1939). 
40. Raquiza v. Bradford, 76 Phil. 50 (1945); Tubb v. Griess, 78 Phil. 249 (1947). 
41. Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil. 856 (1947). 
42. Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192 (1946). 
43. Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. I (1947). 
44. Avelino v. Cuenca, 83 Phil. 17 (1949). 
45. Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 (1949), and Rodriguez v. Gel/a, 92 Phil. 603 
( 1953). 
46. Nacionalista Party v. Angelo Bautista, 85 Phil. 101 (1949). 
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elections;47 the legal consequence of there being a lone Senator from the 
opposition, thus tilting the balance in favor of the majority party in the 
Electoral Tribunal;48 the limits that should be placed on presidential 
authority over local governments;49 the legality of midnight appoint-
ments by the President, whether during the closing days of the Garcia so 
or the Macapagal51 administration; the restrictions placed on political 
parties as well as civic groups to nominate candidates for the 1971 
Constitutional Convention,s2 as well as the limits on the freedom of 
expression of candidates to such body;sJ and the piecemeal submission 
of proposals to amend the 1935 Constitution for ratification.s4 
How far the Supreme Court of the Philippines in the exercise of 
the function of judicial review could participate in the power process of 
the government was indicated by four cases arising from the present 
state of emergency. The first, Lansang v. Garcia,ss overruled earlier 
Philippine decisionss6 by its pronouncement that the suspension of the 
privilege of habeas corpus is a judicial not a political question. It also 
held that the test of whether or not such power was unconstitutionally 
exercised is arbitrariness. There being no such showing, the 1971 
suspension of the privilege by President Marcos was sustained. The 
next three decisions all were promulgated under a regime of martial law 
declared under the 1935 Constitution. Aquino v. Ponce EnrifeS7 was a 
habeas corpus petition seeking the release of a detained Senator, one of 
the many filed by a number of those individuals who were detained 
after martial law for possible complicity in the insurrection, the main 
ground being the nullity of such proclamation.s8 The challenge was 
unsuccessful. Again there was no showing of arbitrariness, considering 
the Muslim rebellion by the Muslim Filipinos in the second biggest 
island in the Philippines, Mindanao, and the Maoist uprising in Luzon, 
where Manila is located. The validity of the martial law proclamation 
was thus upheld. The then Chief Justice Makalintal and seven other 
47. Nacionalista Party v. Commission on Elections, 85 Phil. 149 (1949). 
48. Tafiada v. Cuenca, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957). 
49. Hebron v. Reyes, 104 Phil. 175 ( 1958). 
50. Aytona v. Castillo, L-19313, January 19, 1962, 4 SCRA I (1962). 
51. Guevara v. lnocentes, L-25577, March 15, 1966, 16 SCRA 379 (1966). 
52. Jmbong v. Ferrer, L-32432, September II, 1970, 35 SCRA 28 (1970). 
53. Badoy v. Comelec, L-32546, October 17, 1970, 35 SCRA 285 (1970). 
54. Tolentino v. Comelec, L-34150, October 16, 1971, 41 SCRA 702 (1971). 
55. 42 SCRA 448. 
56. Barcelona v. Baker, 5 Phil. 87 (1905), and Montenegro v. Castaneda, 91 Phil. 
882 (1952). The latter case dealt with the suspension of the privilege under Philippine 
President Elipidio Quirino in 1950. 
57. 59 SCRA 183 (1974). 
58. Petitioner Aquino was the only political figure of consequence, being one of the 
leaders of the Liberal Party who was still under detention when the case was decided. 
Charges had been preferred against him, but there was still a pending action, Aquino v. 
Military Commission, to determine whether he could be tried by respondent body. 
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members of the Court spoke their minds on the crucial issue of martial 
law.59 The presidential action under martial law was challenged in the 
two other petitions,6o the first assailing the power of the President to 
call a referendum on crucial issues, and the second questioning the 
jurisdiction of a military commission to try petitioner, a civilian. Again, 
no constitutional infirmity was found. The unanimity that character-
ized the decision arrived at in the first case61 was no bar to seven 
Justices submittiQg their considered views on the various constitutional 
aspects of the litigation.62 It was again a divided Court in the latter 
suit, 63 with two outright dissents, 64 two concurring and dissenting 
opinions,65 and one concurrence66 to the main opinion. What clearly 
emerges is that even during a period of martial law, any order of the 
President, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, could still be 
tested for alleged constitutional infirmity. The vitality of the institution 
of judicial review even during emergency times is thus evident. 
Judicial Review in Other Asiatic Countries 
Judicial review as a mode of assuring the supremacy of the Consti-
tution is now an accepted legal institution in other Asiatic countries. 
The American influence is marked, as could be expected, in Japan and 
Korea. What is remarkable is that, even in those nations with previous 
ties to Great Britain, it has found acceptance. In that group may be 
included Burma, India, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka. 
The Constitution of Japan is quite explicit: "The Supreme Court is 
the court of last resort with power to determine the constitutionality of 
any law, order, regulation or official act" (Art. 81). On this point, the 
words of a distinguished Japanese constitutionalist, Professor Masami 
Ito, are instructive: 
59. The reference was to the eight other petitions docketed: L-35538, Races v. 
Ponce Enrile; L-35539, Diokno v. Ponce Enrile; L-35540, Soliven v. Ponce Enrile; L-
35547, Voltaire Garcia v. Fidel Ramos; L-35556, Yuyitung v. Ponce Enrile; L-35567, 
Doronila v. Ponce Enrile; L-35571, Guiao v. Ponce Enrile; L-35573, Rondon v. Ponce 
Enrile. Respondent in eight such suits is the Secretary of National Defense. In the other, 
the party against whom the action was brought, General Ramos, is the Chief of the 
Constabulary. 
60. Aquino v. Commission on Elections, 62 SCRA 275, and Aquino v. Military 
Commission, 63 SCRA 546. 
61. Aquino v. Commission on Elections, 62 SCRA 275 (1975). Justice Makasiar 
spoke for the Court. 
62. Justices Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Antonio, Fernandez, and Munoz Palma, 
along with the writer, spelled out their thinking on the subject. The main opinion was 
penned by Justice Antonio. 
63. Aquino v. Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546 (1975). 
64. Justices Teehankee and Muiloz Palma dissented. 
65. Justice Castro and the writer qualified their acceptance of the judgment of the 
Court. 
66. It came from Justice Barredo. 
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The Japanese Constitution legalizes the doctrine in two ways. In the first 
place, fundamental human rights receive strong guarantees against arbi-
trary exercise of any governmental power. Under the present Constitu-
tion, even a law enacted by the Diet, which under Article 41 of the 
Constitution is the highest organ of state power, shall not have legal 
force when it invades the constitutional area of individual freedoms and 
rights. In the second place, judicial review of legislation is recognized. 
Modeled after American constitutional practice, article 81 vests the 
courts, especially the Supreme Court, with the power to determine the 
constitutionality of any law, order, regulation, or official act. The power 
of judicial review seems to be the most universally typical institution 
embodying rule of law. "It was Coke's version of the supremacy of the 
common law principles as exemplification of rules of reason and of 
justice that served as a convenient precedent when American justices 
were confronted with the demand that limits must be placed on legis-
lative powers in order to safeguard individual rights and privileges."67 
In the Korean Constitution, there is a variant of the function of 
judicial review as traditionally known in the United States. Chapter 
VIII, Article 109, provides that it shall be vested not in its Supreme 
Court but in a Constitution Committee, which "shall judge the follow-
ing matters: I. The constitutionality of a law at the request of the Court. 
2. Impeachment. 3. Dissolution of a political party." It is "composed of 
nine members, who are appointed by the President." Three of them are 
to "be appointed from persons selected by the National Assembly, and 
[three others from those] nominated by the Chief Justice ." It is 
further provided: "( l) When the Constitution Committee makes a 
decision in the case of a constitutional violation, impeachment or dissolu-
tion of a political party, the approval of more than six members shall be 
required. (2) The organization, operation and other necessary matters 
of the Constitution Committee shall be determined by law" (Art. Ill). 
Thus, instead of the Korean Supreme Court passing upon the consti-
tutionality of any challenged legislation, the function is exercised by 
this Constitution Committee. 
Then, there are the other Asiatic countries, Burma, India, Malay-
sia, and Sri Lanka, with their constitutional practices deriving mainly 
from English legal institutions. Nonetheless, as was noted, judicial 
review is now an accepted feature in their polity. 
Great Britain, while lacking a written charter, is justly famed for its 
respect for constitutionalism. It is traceable, according to a number of 
scholars, to the Magna Charta. This is how Professor Dunham puts the 
matter: 
67. Masami Ito, "The Rule of Law: Constitutional Development in Law in Japan," 
in Law in Japan: The Legal Order in a Changing Society, Arthur T. Von Mehren (ed.) 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 207-8. 
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First of all, the Charter did help to stimulate and to sanction the for-
mulation of the concept, the due process of law. It also preserved the 
medieval ideal of the law's supremacy and so promoted the principle 
of the rule of law. Furthermore, the fact of the Great Charter itself, 
following a century-old tradition of coronation charters-virtually, en-
gagements between sovereign and subject-and the subsequent forty-four 
confirmations of the Charter, all these fostered the principle of contract, 
government by agreement. Also, the inviolability that men attributed 
to the Charter made of it a higher kind of law by which they might 
appraise the validity of ordinances and statutes. Thus Magna Carta, as 
a criterion of recognition of validity, inspired Englishmen eventually to 
create a set of principles that have assured the certainty in public law 
and the consistency in governance that form the quintessence of British 
constitutionalism. 68 
The view expressed by the late Professor de Smith in his work The 
New Commonwealth and Its Constitution would indicate that there is a 
fundamental agreement between the American and British concepts as 
to the significance of a constitution. According to him, a constitution 
defines and establishes the principal organs of government; it is the 
source of their authority, it prescribes the manner in which and the 
limits within which their functions are to be exercised, and it determines 
their interrelationship. In this sense, it is a body of fundamental law. 
It is, moreover, hierarchically superior to rules of law enacted by the 
legislature except insofar as they have been made in a manner and form 
which, in terms of the constitution itself, clothes them with validity.69 
He had occasion to note that among 
the characteristic features of modern Commonwealth constitutions are 
the limitation of parliamentary sovereignty, guarantees of fundamental 
human rights, judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation, the 
transfer of the responsibility for terminating a superior judge's tenure 
of office from a legislative to a judicial forum, and the vesting of full 
control over the public service and the conduct of elections in the 
hands of independent commissions.70 
Such an observation was repeated later in his work in the following 
words: 
Each country has a written constitution, the more important provisions 
of which cannot be altered except by a special procedure requiring more 
than a bare legislative majority vote, and in each of them the courts have 
jurisdiction to pronounce a measure void if it is repugnant to the 
constitution. 71 
More specifically, the Constitution of India has this provision: 
68. Samuel E. Thorne et al., The Great Charter(New York: Pantheon, 1965), p. 41. 
69. S. A. de Smith, The New Commonwealth and Its Constitutions (London: 
Stevens, 1964), pp. 109-110. 
70. Ibid., pp. 107-108. 71. Ibid. 
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(I) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings 
for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed. 
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders 
or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, 
prohibition, quo warranto, and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, 
for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part. (3) 
Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by 
clauses (I) and (2), Parliament may by law empower any other court 
to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the 
powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2). (4) The right 
guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise 
provided for by this Constitution. (Art. 32) 
This other provision is equally relevant: 
(I) If at any time it appears to the President that a question of Jaw 
or fact has arisen, or is likely to arise, which is of such a nature and 
of such public importance that it is expedient to obtain the opinion 
of the Supreme Court upon it, he may refer the question to that Court 
for consideration and the Court may, after such hearing as it thinks 
fit, report to the President its opinion thereon. (2) The President may, 
notwithstanding anything in the proviso to Article 131, refer a dispute 
of the kind mentioned in the said proviso to the Supreme Court for 
opinion and the Supreme Court shall, after such hearing as it thinks 
fit, report to the President its opinion thereon. (Art. 143) 
The Constitution of Malaysia states the following: 
(I) The Federal Court shall, to the exclusion of any other court, have 
jurisdiction to determine: (a) any question whether a law made by 
Parliament or by the Legislature of a State is invalid on the ground that it 
makes provision with respect to a matter with respect to which Parlia-
ment or, as the case may be, the Legislature of the State has no power to 
make Jaws; and (b) disputes on any other question between States or 
between the Federation and any State. (2) Without prejudice to any 
appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Court, where in any proceedings 
before another court a question arises as to the effect of any provision of 
this Constitution, the Federal Court shall have jurisdiction (subject to 
any rules of court regulating the exercise of that jurisdiction) to deter-
mine the question and remit the case to the other court to be disposed of 
in accordance with the determination. (3) The jurisdiction of the Federal 
Court to determine appeals from a High Court or a judge thereof shall be 
such as may be provided by federal Jaw. (Art. 128) 
This power was characterized by Tun Mohamed Suffian bin Hashim, in 
these words: 
If Parliament is not supreme and its Jaws may be invalidated by the 
courts, are the courts then supreme? The answer is yes and no-the 
courts are supreme in some ways but not in others. They are supreme in 
the sense that they have the right-indeed the duty-to invalidate Acts 
enacted outside Parliament's power, or Acts that are within Parliament's 
power but inconsistent with the constitution. But they are not supreme as 
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regards Acts that are within Parliament's power and are consistent with 
the constitution. The court's duty then is quite clear; they must apply the 
law in those Acts without question, irrespective of their private view and 
prejudice. If judges are free to inject personal prejudice into their duty, 
there will be grave disquiet_72 
The Constitutuion of Burma provides for judicial review in this 
wise: "No law shall be enacted excepting from the appellate jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court cases which involve questions as to the validity of 
any law having regard to the provisions of this Constitution" (Art. 137). 
Sri Lanka has a separate Constitutional Court. In the language of its 
Constitution: 
(I) There shall be a Constitutional Court for the performance of the 
functions assigned to it by the Constitution. The President shall appoint, 
for a term of four years, five persons to be members of the Constitutional 
Court. Whenever occasion arises for the determination of any matter 
arising under subsection (2) of this section or of section 55, three 
members of the Constitutional Court chosen in accordance with the rules 
of the Constitutional Court shall determine such matter. (2) Any ques-
tion as to whether any provision in a Bill is inconsistent with the 
Constitution shall be referred by the Speaker or, when he is unable to 
perform the functions of his office, the Deputy Speaker to the Constitu-
tional Court for decision if (a) the Attorney-General communicates his 
opinion to the Speaker under section 53; or (b) the Speaker receives 
within a week of the Bill being placed on the Agenda of the National 
State Assembly a written notice raising such a question signed by the 
leader in the National State Assembly of a recognized political party; or 
(c) the question is raised within a week of the Bill being placed on the 
Agenda of the National State Assembly and signed by at least such 
number of members of the National State Assembly as would constitute 
quorum of the National State Assembly; or (d) the Speaker or, when he is 
unable to perform the functions of his office, the Deputy Speaker takes 
the view that there is such a question; or (e) the Constitutional Court on 
being moved by any citizen within a week of the Bill being placed on the 
Agenda of the National State Assembly, advises the Speaker that there is 
such a question. (3) No proceedings shall be had in the National State 
Assembly in relation to a Bill referred to the Constitutional Court under 
subsection (2) of this section or of section 55 until the decision of the 
Constitutional Court under subsection (4) of this section or its opinion 
under section 55 has been given. (4) The decision of the Constitutional 
Court upon a reference under subsection (2) of this section shall bind the 
Speaker and shall be conclusive for all purposes. No institution adminis-
tering justice and likewise no other institution, person or authority shall 
have the power or jurisdiction to inquire into, pronounce upon or in any 
manner call in question a decision of the Constitutional Court. (Art. 54) 
72. Tun Mohamed Suffian bin Hashim, An Introduction to the Constitution of 
Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur, 1976), p. 18. 
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The Bill of Rights 
The United States Bill of Rights 
The United States Constitution, as drafted by the Philadelphia 
Convention in 1787 and as ratified, had no separate article on a Bill of 
Rights. Not that the subject was completely ignored. Article I, dealing 
with legislative power, explicitly provides: "The Privilege of the Writ of 
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of 
Rebellion or Invasion the public safety may require it" (Sec. 9, par. [2)). 
The very next paragraph reads: "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto 
law will be passed" (par. 3). Moreover, as far as a State of the Union is 
concerned, it is prohibited from passing "any Bill of Attainder, ex post 
facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts ... "(Sec. 10, 
par. [1]). It was not until 1791, however, when the first Ten Amend-
ments were adopted, that the United States was thought to have a 
comprehensive Bill of Rights. (It was supplemented by the so-called 
Civil War Amendments: the Thirteenth, ratified in 1865, prohibited 
slavery and involuntary servitude, the Fourteenth, in 1868, provided for 
national citizenship and required the conformity of state action to the 
standards of due process and equal protection, and the Fifteenth, in 
1870, assured the right to vote to any American citizen irrespective of 
race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The Nineteenth Amend-
ment in 1920 extended the right of suffrage to women.) It is thus 
apparent that as of 1791 the prime safeguards of American freedom 
became part and parcel of the United States Constitution. 
The civil liberties guaranteed in the original text and in the first 
eight Amendments identified, in Laski's formulation, "rights as bound-
ary marks which traced out areas of conduct the state [is] not normally 
entitled to invade."73 There was necessity, as far as the United States 
was concerned, for all ten of them. From the standpoint of the influence 
they were to exert in other lands and later times, only the First, Fourth, 
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth of these amendments call for further 
treatment. The First Amendment deserves to be quoted in full: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to 
petition the Government for a redress of grievances. 
Of equal importance for the rights of man is the due process amend-
ment, the Fifth: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in 
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual 
73. Harold Laski, The S1a1e in Theory and Praclice (New York: Viking, 1935),p. 35. 
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service in time of War of public danger; nor shall any person be subject 
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall 
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be 
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law, nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
This guarantee, as was noted, applies to state action under the Four-
teenth Amendment, which likewise assures equal protection. Moreover, 
the safeguards thrown around an accused include the prohibition 
against unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment: 
The right of the people to be more secure in their pers·ons, houses, 
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
The Sixth and Seventh Amendments safeguard the right to a speedy 
and public trial by an impartial jury with the assistance of counsel: 
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein 
the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by Jaw, and to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; 
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to 
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
In suits at common Jaw, where the value in controversy shall exceed 
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no 
fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of 
the United States, than according to the rules of the common Jaw. 
The Eighth Amendment provides: 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor 
cruel and unusual punishment inflicted. 
It is thus rendered clear that what is found in a constitution is a 
recognition, not a grant, or rights-and, at that, not a comprehensive 
one either. There was thus acceptance of the view as far back as 1791 of 
their being possessed by every human being. 
It was not too long ago (1963) that the New York University 
School of Law published a volume entitled The Great Rights, edited by 
the late Professor Edmond Cahn, containing the James Madison 
Lectures by four distinguished American jurists, Justices Hugo L. 
Black, William J. Brennan, Jr., Earl Warren, and William 0. Douglas. 
The volume opens with Cahn's essay emphasizing the great debt owed 
Madison for the American Bill of Rights. 
Something daring and novel was in the wind which caught the finest 
minds of the time and inflamed them. To men like James Madison, 
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the war against Britain was only the military aspect of an all-pervasive 
American Revolution and the question to be decided was not whether 
Americans should regain the rights that Englishmen had considered 
customary but whether for the first time in human history any man 
anywhere could enjoy the full political dignity to which all men were 
born. Though English notions of liberty were obviously useful, they 
were inadequate. What America promised must be nothing less than a 
new kind of society-fresh, equal, just, open, free, and forever respectful 
of conscience. (P. 3) 
To the question of how "to implement this vision and find consti-
tutional machinery" to lend it force and effectivity, he answered: 
The breakthrough came because Madison believed profoundly that in 
America the people were sovereign and the officials their mere trustees, 
agents and servants. He put it neatly: "In Europe," he wrote, "charters 
of liberty have been granted by power." And in America? "Charters 
of power granted by liberty." In Magna Carta where King John, though 
acting under coercion of powerful nobles, nevertheless spoke as monarch, 
"We will not" was deemed fitting (in Latin, of course, for the benefit 
of the common man.) In the English Bill of Rights where William and 
Mary, though accepting the conditions that Parliament had exacted, still 
spoke as sovereign, "ought not" was deemed bold enough for the protec-
tion of the rights of subject. But when the American people in 1789 
prescribed the acts that their new Federal Government must either not 
do or do only in a particular manner, they were entitled to say "shall 
not," the language of command. Thus, the old flaccid promises and 
pious exhortations were at last toughened into imperative law. (P. 5) 
What is embraced in the term "imperative law" is not limited to the 
literal language of the provisions as found, which in most cases are 
phrased in general terms allowing a great deal of discretion and 
flexibility in their application. Their history, of course, cannot be 
ignored. There is truth, moreover, in this observation of Justice Frank-
furter: "Deeply imbedded traditional ways of carrying out state policy 
... are often tougher and truer law than the dead words of the written 
text."74 The main reliance, though, in ascertaining the meaning right-
fully attached to the constitutional commands should be on U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions. For the United States Constitution is not 
merely law, it is the supreme law. It is the judiciary, then, ultimately the 
Supreme Court, which, in the language of Charles G. Haines, "inter-
preted and applied its terms as they did the language of statutes so that 
matters of great political import were passed upon apparently with the 
same ease, simplicity, and procedure as the interpretation of a contract 
or the defining of the rights of persons under a will."75 What is more, as 
74. Nashville C. & St. L. Railway v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362, 369 (1940). 
75. Charles G. Haines, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Gol'ernment 
and Politics, 1789-1835 (New York: Russell and Russell, 1960), p. II. 
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Charles Fairman noted: "It has seemed far more consistent with our 
polity that for the protection of individual rights the citizen look to the 
Courts rather than be dependent upon the fluctuating views of the 
legislature. "76 
A careful and precise appraisal and study of such decisions and the 
opinions rendered would require a painstaking analysis, but the neces-
sity for this is not apparent. Rather, viewed solely in terms of their 
impact on Asiatic constitutions, it may suffice to refer to the approach 
taken and the language employed to show adherence and fealty to the 
concept of fundamental rights, without ignoring, of course, the judg-
ment rendered. It may be that the ideals professed rather than the ideals 
realized may in the end prove to be more influential as far as foreign 
lands are concerned. It will also have the merit of treading on grounds 
of a none-too-familiar terrain. More simply put, the peculiar and 
singular circumstances of each case may not be too apparent to a 
foreign observer. Even if the identical phraseology of the provisions as 
found in the U.S. Constitution is followed in the Asiatic nations to be 
referred to, there has to be an appreciation of the varying conditions 
and the flux of circumstances of each country involved. This is not to 
deny, however, that where no deviation of wording exists, there is at 
least a prima facie case for the persuasive character of the United States 
Supreme Court decisions in the interpretation of the provisions in 
question. 
It only remains to be added that, considering the time when the 
Asiatic constitutions were framed, just after the close of World War II, 
aside from the deference and respect elicited by the majestic utterances 
of a Marshall, a Holmes, a Brandeis, or a Cardozo, the influence of the 
U.S. Supreme Court under the leadership of Chief Justice Hughes and 
Stone covering the period of 1930 to 1946 is quite apparent. 77 A 
word more about the present Constitution of the Philippines, which 
became effective on January 17, 1973. It was framed by the Constitu-
tional Convention, which opened its session on June I, 1971, and it was 
approved on November 30, 1972. It is not surprising, then, that traces 
of the Warren Court's leading decisions can be discerned in its Bill of 
Rights, 78 which, again not surprisingly, reiterated what was earlier 
76. Charles Fairman, "The Attack on the Segregation Cases," 70 Harv. Law Rev., 
85 (1960). 
77. The Constitutional opinions of both Chief Justices and. in the case of the latter, 
even those penned when he was an Associate Justice, received their due attention. From 
the late thirties and during this era, certain pronouncements on civil liberties by Justices 
Black, Douglas, Frankfurter, Jackson, Murphy, and Rutledge also came to be highly 
regarded. 
78. In addition to those of Chief Justice Warren, the views of Justices Black and 
Douglas, as could have been expected, as well as others were duly taken into account by 
the framers of the Philippine Constitution. 
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contained in the Commonwealth Constitution of 1935. In that sense, 
the debt owed to the earlier Hughes and Stone eras must be ac-
knowledged. 
The fundamental rights to which further reference will be made 
insofar as they have found their way into Asiatic constitutions may be 
categorized into freedom of belief and expression, whether religious or 
secular, including freedom of assembly and of association in accor-
dance with the First Amendment; the due process and equal protection 
guarantees, as ordained in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and 
in the case of the former, not only insofar as the procedural aspect is 
concerned but also insofar as it formerly constituted the main reliance 
for the protection of property interests; and the rights of an accused 
individual safeguarded by the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth 
Amendments. To repeat, while the rulings announced should be kept in 
mind, the aspect to be emphasized will be the constitutional objectives 
sought to be attained, even if, from a more detailed study of the 
technical and intricate questions raised, it may be difficult to resist the 
conclusion that, at times, performance did not match aspiration. 
The Philippine Bill of Rights 
The extent of the American influence in the Philippines so far as 
the liberties of the individual are concerned is easily discernible. All that 
needs to be done is to set forth the Bill of Rights as found in the 1935 
Constitution, reproduced well-nigh ipsissimis verbis in the present 
fundamental law. It was embodied in a single section (Article III, 
Section I) with the following paragraphs: 
(I) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without 
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of 
the laws. 
(2) Private property shall not be taken for public use without just 
compensation. 
(3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not 
be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be 
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of 
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
(4) The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits 
prescribed by law shall not be impaired. 
(5) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be 
inviolable except upon lawful order of the court or when public safety and 
order require otherwise. 
(6) The right to farm associations or societies for purposes not 
contrary to law shall not be abridged. 
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(7) No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment 
of religious profession and worship, without discrimination ~r pref-
erence, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be requ1red for 
the exercise of civil or political rights. 
(8) No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the 
Government for redress of grievances. 
(9) No law granting a title of nobility shall be enacted, and no person 
holding any office of profit or trust shall, without the consent of the 
Congress of the Philippines, accept any present, emolument, office, or 
title of any kind whatever from any foreign state. 
(10) No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 
(II) No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. 
(12) No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a 
poll tax. 
( 13) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted. 
(14) The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be sus-
pended except in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, when the 
public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be 
suspended wherever during such period the necessity of such suspension 
shall exist. 
( 15) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without 
due process of law. 
(16) All persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient 
sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt 
is strong. Excessive bail shall not be required. 
( 17) In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be presumed to be 
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be 
heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of 
the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the 
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the 
attendance of witnesses in his behalf. 
(18) No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. 
(19) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishment inflicted. 
(20) No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the 
same offense. If an act is punished by law and an ordinance, convic-
tion or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecu-
tion for the same act. 
(21) Free access to the courts shall not be denied to any person by 
reason of poverty. 
Nothing can be clearer than that the bill of rights provision in the 
1935 Constitution was patterned after that of the United States. That 
was the way the Filipinos wanted it, and it is easy to understand why. A 
great Filipino jurist, Claro M. Recto, as the President of the 1934 
Constitutional Convention, observed how firm was the conviction held 
by so many leading delegates, products of the American system of 
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education, that a constitutional democracy of the American type was 
the one most suited to Philippine conditions. Moreover, there was a 
practical reason. Care was taken by the Convention to avoid any 
radical departure from the United States constitutional system inas-
much as the Philippine Independence Act of 1934 contained a provision 
that the American President had to certify that the constitution drafted 
would provide for a republican form of government and contain a bill 
of rights. Without such certification, the Commonwealth of the Philip-
pines could not be established. Since the long-sought independence was 
promised after a ten-year Commonwealth transition period, it was 
imperative, in the thinking of the Filipino leaders then, that there be no 
obstacle to its coming into existence as soon as possible, which might 
not be the case if the proposed constitution were to be indicted for 
unorthodoxy. There was, moreover, another consideration present in 
the mind of the delegates. Government, if viewed as a science, involves 
problems and difficulties formidable in character. If the technique of 
leadership by which it is carried out is looked upon as an art, it is 
baffling and complex. There is need then for caution and prudence, not 
the duty but the necessity (to paraphrase Holmes) to keep continuity 
with the past, to adhere to what has been insofar as it proved beneficial 
or to the extent that it has formed part of the people's accustomed ways. 
Nor can it be doubted that, from the inception of the American tutelage 
at the beginning of the century, and even earlier for that matter, the 
Filipinos were aware of the need for a bill of rights. 
Moreover, by the time the Constitutional Convention met in 1934, 
the Supreme Court of the Philippines had for over three decades been 
busy at work construing the fundamental rights provisions of previous 
organic acts enacted by the United States for this country, with 
fundamental rights being embodied in nearly the very same language. 
That was an added reason for a bill of rights of a distinctly 
American cast. 
The Filipino people were thus familiar with such guarantees, and 
their retention as worded would be most natural. Some intellectuals 
with a European background and a number of the surviving leaders of 
the revolution-first against Spain and thereafter against the United 
States in the early years of American rule, as was noted-were desirous 
of incorporating some changes. They had in mind certain provisions of 
the 1898 Malolos Constitution of the Philippines. In their opinion, that 
was more in keeping with Filipino tradition and would reflect greater 
responsiveness to local needs and conditions. While they were unable to 
persuade the Convention to go as far as they might wish, they met with 
some measure of success. By and large, though, the Bill of Rights of the 
1935 Constitution adhered to what had been. Such a result, in light of 
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what has been said, had almost the imprint of inevitability. There was 
a contributing factor: The draft was prepared by a committee headed by 
Delegate, later Justice, Jose P. Laurel, the leading Filipino authority on 
the subject of constitutional law and a Doctor of Civil Laws graduate of 
the Yale Law School. He sponsored the draft, and he pressed for its 
approval with all the persuasive powers at his command, arising from 
the breadth of his scholarship and his gift of oratory. 
So much for the fundamental rights provision of the 1935 Consti-
tution, which is no longer in force. The present Constitution of the 
Philippines was drafted by the 1971 Constitutional Convention. It came 
into force and effect on January 17, 1973. The amendments to the Bill 
of Rights (now Article IV of the Revised Constitution) are minimal. 
Two new rights have been added, one being an express recognition of the 
right of the people to have "access to official records and to documents 
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions ... 
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law" (Sec. 6). The 
other new right assures the speedy disposition of cases "before all 
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies" (Sec. 16). The prompt-
ness required in the disposition of cases may be looked upon as implied 
in the due process clause. 
The search and seizure clause has been modified. It now reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature 
and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or 
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be deter-
mined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be author-
ized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complain-
ant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (Sec. 3) 
Thus any possible ambiguity as to this guarantee being applicable to a 
warrant of arrest has been dissipated. The former language gave rise to 
doubts, as a literal reading would confine its scope only to search 
warrants. Now there is the express requirement that for such arrest to be 
constitutionally permissible there must be a "probable cause to be 
determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be 
authorized by law .... " This last phrase is also an alteration. Where 
formerly it was only a judge who could do so, now legislation may be 
enacted vesting such competence in "such other responsible officer." 
This innovation may be fraught with undesirable consequences. With a 
judge, the element of impartiality is easier to attain: unlike a fiscal or 
some other executive official, he is under no pressure to have the party 
before him apprehended so that the prosecution can be started. 
In the 1935 Constitution it was made clear that communication 
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and correspondence "shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the 
court or when public safety and order require otherwise" (Art. III, Sec. 
I, par. [5]). A second paragraph has been added to Article IV, Section4, 
in the present Constitution. It is therein explicitly provided: "Any 
evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be 
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding." This is a most 
welcome feature of the new Constitution. 
The present Constitution is likewise notable for the added vitality 
accorded the guarantee against self-incrimination. It now reads: 
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any 
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have 
the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such 
right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which 
vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained 
in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.79 
The epochal American Supreme Court decision in Miranda v. Ari-
zonaso supplied the basis for this mandate in the present Philippine 
Constitution. If fully implemented, the opportunity for abusive prac-
tices committed against individuals interrogated under police custody 
would be minimized. Without such a safeguard, there were fears that 
their right against self-incrimination could be rendered futile. 
There was also an addition to the provisions dealing with the rights 
of an accused at the trial: "However, after arraignment, trial may 
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he 
has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified" (Sec. 19). 
Finally, it now suffices that the punishment be either cruel or unusual 
(Sec. 21), where formerly it had to be both, to be unconstitutional. 
Social and Economic Rights in the Philippines 
There is a feature of the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines, even 
more emphasized in the present Charter, that marked an advance in the 
field of fundamental freedoms. In addition to the traditional civil and 
political rights, there were provisions on social and economic rights, to 
which not much thought appeared to have been paid when the laissez 
faire theory was dominant. With the grave problem posed by the great 
number of the poor and the needy in the developing countries-and this 
observation would be applicable to most of the Asiatic nations, except 
possibly Japan-it was imperative that the State actively participate in 
its solution. Reliance on the free play of the market would not only be 
futile but would even exacerbate the problem of the rich becoming even 
79. Art. IV, Sec. 20. Only the first sentence was found in the former Bill of Rights, 
Art. III, Sec. I, par. (18). 
80. 348 us 436 (1966). 
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more affluent and the poor becoming even more penurious. To avoid 
any constitutional question, it was thought best to adopt guarantees of a 
social and economic character, referring to those claims that have to be 
attended to by the government to assure the promotion of individual 
welfare and well-being. It is ironic to speak of the human dignity to 
which everyone is entitled when decent living conditions still elude so 
many of the poverty-stricken inhabitants of Asia. 
In this regard, the American influence, as might have been ex-
pected, was minimal. While the United States can boast of a glorious 
tradition in the field of traditional political and civil rights expressive of 
the humanistic values that rightly elicited predominant judicial concern, 
social and economic rights hardly formed part of the judicial agenda. 
To repeat, in a developing country like the Philippines, that is a matter 
of urgency. Without such rights, constitutional democracy will fail of 
acceptance. So the 1934 Constitutional Convention believed, and it 
acted on such conviction. The 1935 Constitution represented a depar-
ture from, and to that extent could be said to be an improvement of, its 
American counterpart. That the Convention was moved to act thus was 
in large part due to the vigorous advocacy of Delegate Manuel Roxas, 
later the first President of the Republic of the Philippines. For him the 
Constitution that was to be drafted should have 
a definite and well defined philosophy, not only political but social and 
economic. A constitution that in 1776 or in 1789 was sufficient in the 
United States, considering the problems they had at that time, may not 
now be sufficient with the growing and ever-widening complexities of 
social and economic problems and relations .... If in this constitution 
the gentleman will find declarations of economic policy, they are there 
because they are necessary to safeguard the interests and welfare of the 
Filipino people because we believe that the days have come when in self-
defense, a nation may provide in its constitution those safeguards, the 
patrimony, the freedom to grow; the freedom to develop national aspira-
tions and national interests, not to be hampered by the artificial bound-
aries which a constitutional provision automatically imposes.s1 
One of the most vital national interests, an aspect of the country's 
aspirations, is the promotion of a social order truly concerned with the 
satisfaction of the primary needs of the common man. Accordingly, in 
the Declaration of Principles, an Article that was itself an innovation, it 
was expressly provided: "The promotion of social justice to insure the 
well-being and economic security of all the people should be the 
concern of the State" (Revised Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 5). This 
provision is supplemented by this requirement: "The State shall afford 
protection to labor, especially to working women and minors, and shall 
81. Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention, vol. 3 (S. Laurel, 
ed.), pp. 177-178. 
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regulate the relation between landowner and tenant, and between labor 
and capital in industry and in agriculture. The State may provide for 
compulsory arbitration" (Art. IV, Sec. 6). The power of eminent 
domain was expanded to carry out the policy of transferring the 
ownership of lands to tenants: "The Congress may authorize, upon 
payment of just compensation the expropriation of lands to be sub-
divided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals" (Art XIII, 
Sec. 4). There was another manifestation of the enlarged sphere of 
governmental power (Art. XIII, Sec. 6): 
The State may, in the interest of national welfare and defense, establish 
and operate industries and means of transportation and communica-
tions, and, upon payment of just compensation, transfer to public 
ownership utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the 
Government. (Art. XII, Sec. 6) 
As for social and economic rights, the changes in the present 
Constitution are extensive. The social justice provision in the 1935 
Constitution was limited to an expression of a general principle: "The 
promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic 
security of all the people should be the concern of the State" (Art. II, 
Sec. 5). There is a restatement of such a mandate in the present Charter 
less productive of doubts as to how far it can affect property rights: 
The State shall promote social justice to ensure the dignity, welfare, and 
security of all the people. Towards this end, the State shall regulate the 
acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and disposition of private prop-
erty, and equitably diffuse property ownership and profit5. (Art. II, 
Sec. 6) 
The duty cast on government as to its implementation is made explicit: 
The State shall establish, maintain, and ensure adequate social services 
in the field of education, health, housing, employment, welfare, and 
social security to guarantee the enjoyment by the people of a decent 
standard of living (Sec. 7). 
The age-old evil of tenancy was likewise sought to be met frontally: 
The State shall formulate and implement an agrarian reform program 
aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil and 
achieving the goals enunciated in this Constitution. (Art. XIV, Sec. 12) 
The constitutional policy on social justice in the 1935 Constitution was 
supplemented by the requirement that the State "shall afford protection 
to labor, especially to working women and minors" (Art. XIV, Sec. 6). 
The new fundamental law is much more definite: 
The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment 
and equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless 
of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and 
employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-organiza-
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tion, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and ~umane 
conditions of work. The State may provide for compulsory arb1tratwn. 
(Art. II, Sec. 9) 
The Bill of Rights in Other Asiatic Countries 
As far as the other Asiatic countries mentioned earlier are con-
cerned, it may be said that the influence of the United States Constitu-
tion in their fundamental laws was not as considerable as in the case of 
the Philippines, for which, as was noted, there is a historical explana-
tion. Of those nations, the constitutions of Japan and Korea contain a 
number of provisions of American origin. The fundamental laws of 
Burma, India, Malaysia, and Pakistan, to a lesser degree, bear traces of 
American concepts. The Constitution of Indonesia appears to have the 
least connection. 
Of the cognate rights of due process and equal protection, which 
contributed much to the growth of American constitutional law, there 
is no mention in those constitutions whatsoever of the former. Such an 
omission may be due to the fears entertained that (as was the case for a 
rather long time in the United States) due process could be availed of to 
press the right to property to unreasonable extremes. That would 
indeed be regrettable, for in all these countries, except perhaps Malay-
sia, social and economic rights are a prominent feature. 
The Constitution of Burma speaks of cultural and educational 
rights (Sec. 22) as well as economic rights (Sec. 23). India's Constitu-
tion in its Directive Principles of State Policy ordains: "The State shall 
strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting 
as effectively as it may a social order in which justice, social, 
economic and political, shall inform all the institutions of the national 
life" (Part IV, Sec. 38). Section 39 is specific: 
The State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing: (a) that 
the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate 
means of livelihood; (b) that the ownership and control of the material 
resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the 
common good; (c) that the operation of the economic system does not 
result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the 
common detriment; (d) that there is equal pay for equal work for both 
men and women: (e) that the health and strength of workers, men and 
women, and the tender age of children are not abused and that the 
citizens are not forced by economic necessity to enter avocations unsuited 
to their age or strength; (f) that childhood and youth are protected 
against exploitation and against moral and material abandonment. 
The Constitution of Indonesia provides for social welfare: 
Economy shall be organized cooperatively. Branches of production 
which are important to the State and which affect the life of most people, 
shall be controlled by the State. Land and water and the natural riches 
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therein shall be controlled by the State and shall be exploited for the 
greatest welfare of the people. (Chap. XIV, Art. 33, Sees. 1-3) 
The right to education is found in the Constitution of the Republic of 
Korea: 
(I) All citizens shall have the right to receive an equal education 
corresponding to their abilities. (2) All citizens who have children under 
their protection shall be responsible for at least their elementary educa-
tion and other education as required by law. (3) Such compulsory 
education shall be free. (4) Independence and political impartiality of 
education shall be guaranteed. (5) Fundamental matters pertaining to the 
educational system and its operation shall be determined by law. (Art. 
27) 
The right as well as the duty to work comes next: 
(I) All citizens shall have the right to work. The State shall endeavor to 
promote the employment of workers through social and economic 
means. (2) All citizens shall have the duty to work. The contents and 
conditions of the duty to work shall be determined by law in conformity 
with democratic principles. (3) Standards of working conditions shall be 
determined by law. (4) Special protection shall be accorded to working 
women and children. (Art. 28) 
Provision is then made for the right to association and collective 
bargaining: 
(I) The right to association, collective bargaining, and collective action of 
workers shall be guaranteed within the scope defined by law. (2) The 
right to association, collective bargaining, and collective action shall not 
be accorded to workers who are public officials, except for those 
authorized by the provisions oflaw. (3) The right to collective action may 
be either restricted or may not be recognized in accordance with the 
provisions of law for public officials and workers engaged in State, local, 
autonomous governments, state-run enterprises, public utility businesses, 
and enterprises which have serious influence on the national economy. 
(Art. 29) 
What is more, there is recognition of the goal of decent human 
existence and social security: 
(I) All citizens shall be entitled to a decent human life. (2) The State 
shall endeavor to promote social security. (3) Citizens who are incapable 
of making a living shall be protected by the State in accordance with 
the provisions of law. (Art. 30) 
The Constitution of Japan, after mentioning the right and obligation to 
work, requires that standards for wages, hours, rest, and other working 
conditions shall be fixed by law, and children "shall not be exploited" 
(Art. 27). Article 28 guarantees the "right of workers to organize and to 
bargain and act collectively." 
So much then for substantive due process, which, as formerly 
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interpreted by courts in the United States, could be attended with 
mischievous consequences for the welfare of those at the bottom of the 
economic pyramid. Procedural due process, however, even if not 
referred to by such term, is not ignored. The Constitution of Burma is 
quite clear: "No citizen shall be deprived of his personal liberty, nor his 
dwelling entered, nor his property confiscated, save in accordance with 
law" (Sec. 16). The same may be said of the Constitution of India: "No 
person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according 
to procedure established by law" (Part III, Sec. 21 ). The Constitution of 
Japan is well-nigh identical: "No person shall be deprived of life or 
liberty, nor shall any other criminal penalty be imposed, except accord-
ing to procedure established by Jaw" (Art. 31 ). The Constitution of 
Korea is worded in a similar fashion: "All citizens shall enjoy personal 
liberty. No person shall be arrested, detained, seized, searched, inter-
rogated, punished, subjected to involuntary labor, or branded as se-
curity risk except as provided by law" (Art. 10, par. [1]). The Constitu-
tion of Malaysia is categorical: "No person shall be deprived of his life 
or personal liberty save in accordance with law" (Part II, Art. 5, par. 
[1]). The same thought in language that is not distinguishable appears 
in the Constitution of Pakistan: "No person shall be deprived of life or 
liberty save in accordance with law" (Part II, Chap. I, Sec. I). 
Equality is an ideal highly prized by the Asiatic peoples. The 
Constitution of Burma is explicit on the matter: .. All citizens irrespec-
tive of birth, religion, sex or race are equal before the law; that is to say, 
there shall not be any arbitrary discrimination between one citizen or 
class of citizens and another" (Sec. 13). Then: "There shall be equality 
of opportunity for all citizens in matters of public employment and in the 
exercise or carrying on of any occupation, trade, business or profes-
sion" (Sec. 14). After which comes a provision that is a step in the 
direction of sexual equality: "Women shall be entitled to the same pay 
as that received by men in respect of similar work" (Sec. 15). The 
Constitution of India has an expanded equal protection clause: "The 
State shall not deny to any person equality before the law, or the equal 
protection of the laws within the territory of India" (Part III, Sec. 14). 
The guarantee is made more specific: 
The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only 
of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. No citizen 
shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any 
of them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition 
with re~ard to: (~) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places 
of pubhc entertamment; or (b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, 
roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of 
St~te f~nds or dedicated to the use of the general public. Nothing in 
this article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for 
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women and children. Nothing in this article or in clause (2) of Article 
29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the 
advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citi-
zens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. (Sec. 15) 
There is also equality prescribed for public service: 
There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating 
to employment or appointment to any office under the State. No citizen 
shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of 
birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated 
against in respect of any employment or office under the State. Nothing 
in this article shall prevent Parliament from making any law prescribing, 
in regard to a class or classes of employment or appointment to an 
office under the Government of, or any local or other authority within, 
a State or Union territory, any requirement as to residence within that 
State or Union territory prior to such employment or appointment. 
Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision 
for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward 
class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately 
represented in the services under the State. Nothing in this article shall 
affect the operation of any law which provides that the incumbent of an 
office in connection with the affairs of any religious or denominational 
institution or any member of the governing body thereof shall be a per-
son professing a particular religion or belonging to a particular denomi-
nation. (Sec. 16) 
The concept of equality is set forth in the Constitution of Japan in 
these terms: 
All of the people are equal under the law and there shall be no dis-
crimination in political, economic or social relations because of race, 
creed, sex, social status or family origin. Peers and peerage shall not be 
recognized. No privilege shall accompany any award of honor, decora-
tion or any distinction, nor shall any such award be valid beyond the 
lifetime of the individual who now holds or hereafter may receive it. 
(Chap. III, Art. 14) 
The Constitution of the Republic of Korea provides for the matter thus: 
(I) All citizens shall be equal before the law, and there shall be no 
discrimination in political, economic, social, or cultural life on account 
of sex, religion or social status. (2) No privileged castes shall qe recog-
nized, nor ever be established in any form. (3) The awarding of decora-
tions or distinctions of honor in any form shall be effective only for 
recipients, and no privileged status shall be created thereby. (Art. 9) 
The Constitution of Malaysia has an equal protection clause similar to 
that of India: "All persons are equal before the law and are entitled to 
the equal protection of the law" (Part II, Art. 8, par. [1]). The next three 
paragraphs of this article expand the guarantee thus: 
(2) Except as expressly authorized by this Constitution, there shall be 
no discrimination against citizens on the ground only of religion, race, 
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descent or place of birth in any law or in the appointment to any 
office or employment under a public authority or in the administration 
of any law relating to the acquisition, holding or disposition of property 
or the establishing or carrying on of any trade, business, profession, 
vocation or employment. (3) There shall be no discrimination in favour 
of any person on the ground that he is a subject of the Ruler of any State. 
(4) No public authority shall discriminate against any person on the 
ground that he is resident or carrying on business in any part of the 
Federation outside the jurisdiction of the authority. 
The Constitution of Pakistan, as does those of India and Malaysia, has 
a similar version of the equal protection clause: "All citizens are equal 
before the law and are entitled to equal protection of law" (Part II, 
Chap. I, Art. 15). It also prescribes non-discrimination in respect of 
access to public places: 
In respect of access to places of public entertainment or resort, not 
intended for religious purposes only, there shall be no discrimination 
against any citizen on the ground only of race, religion, caste, sex or 
place of birth, but nothing herein shall be deemed to prevent the making 
of any special provision for women. (Art. 16) 
By Way of Conclusion 
Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the United States Consti-
tution has had an impact, both deep-seated and profound, on the 
fundamental laws of practically all the Asiatic countries that have 
recently attained their statehood, as well as of Japan. That is easily 
understandable. The United States has the oldest living written Consti-
tution. It has stood the test of time and circumstance. Through its 
judicious construction, it has been made adaptable to the constant flux 
of events. It has more than proven its worth. It is a living instrument. 
To paraphrase Justice Frankfurter, it is not a printed finality but a 
dynamic process. 
There is this caveat, however. Necessarily, in view of the difference 
of conditions in Asiatic countries, there cannot be literal adherence in 
most cases to its leading constitutional law doctrines, even on the 
assumption that they are possessed of the highest merit. Environmental 
facts and the social milieu have to be taken into account. It cannot be 
denied, though, that the spirit that informs a constitution, namely, as 
the instrument to assure the welfare and well-being of the inhabitants of 
a country, has a significance that transcends national boundaries. To 
that extent, Asia has kept the constitutional faith. 
More specifically, the Bill of Rights as a limitation on the powers 
of government is appreciated and to a great extent followed notwith-
standing emergency or crisis conditions. Where judicial review is con-
cerned, even now the landmark decision of Marbury v. Madison 
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commands the utmost respect and provides an authoritative guide. 
Lastly, there may be need to mention anew that in the sphere of social 
and economic rights, in an area where the grave problems of poverty 
and disease continue to plague the governments, the reliance on Ameri-
can concepts is understandably not as great, the United States having 
the good fortune to have more than its share of the goods of existence 
and to be blessed with affluence. 
IX 
Singapore 
Editorial Note 
Singapore, roughly two-thirds the area of New York City, with two and 
one half million residents, generates well over twice the export income 
of Indonesia, whose population is sixty times greater. On a similar scale 
of contrast Singapore's approximate $6,000 per capita gross national 
product contrasts with Indonesia's $100. These statistics serve merely to 
illustrate the singularity of Singapore. 
Autonomous in 1959, except for defense and foreign affairs, 
Singapore was subsequently coupled, reluctantly, with peninsular Ma-
laya, Sarawak, and Sa bah, to form the Federation of Malaysia in 1963. 
The vicissitudes of the Confrontation with Indonesia, exacerbated by 
Malay fears of potential domination of the Federation by Singapore 
Chinese, led to Singapore's severance and emergence as an independent 
nation two years later. 
Beginning as Southeast Asia's preeminent entrepot, independent 
Singapore under the tutelage of Lee Kuan Yew rapidly expanded 
processing, trade, manufacturing, and industrial sectors. Precision 
engineering, sophisticated electronics, shipbuilding, and textile manu-
facture represent the scope of exploitation of Singapore's only resource, 
labor. 
Note: This chapter was written in December 1977. 
(179) 
180 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
The problems of miniscule territory, mushrooming population, and 
absence of natural resources contributed to partial movement away 
from democratic government and toward personalist rule and a one-
party system. Communalist conflict, though hardly so severe as in 
Malaysia, reflects the division among 76 percent Chinese, 15 percent 
Malays, and 7 percent Indians. Elections today are aptly described as 
"Gallic referenda." 
For treatment of the background of Singapore's legal apparatus, 
see the chapter on Malaysia. 
May 1978 ROGER K. PAGET 
Introduction 
The Singapore Constitution 
and the United States Constitution 
S. J ayakumar 
Dean of the Faculty of Law, University of Singapore 
A quick overview of Singapore's constitutional development is essential 
to our subsequent discussion.' Singapore's constitutional development 
can be separated into four phases. The first phase was the colonial 
phase. From the founding of Singapore in 1819 and until 1959, the 
British administered Singapore as a colony. Until the Japanese Occupa-
tion Singapore was part of the Straits Settlements, but after World War 
II, in 1946, Singapore was administered as a separate Crown Colony. 
The second phase was that of self-government. In 1959 Singapore 
achieved self-government and then received a new constitution from the 
United Kingdom providing for a wholly elected legislature having 
control over all matters except defence and foreign affairs and with a 
limited role in internal security. The United Kingdom was responsible 
for defence and external affairs. Third, there was the Malaysian phase, 
when Singapore (together with the two Borneo states of Sabah and 
Sarawak) became part of the Federation. Singapore, apart from now 
being subject to the Malaysian federal constitution, also received then a 
new state constitution. Singapore was part of Malaysia from September 
16, 1963, until August 9, 1965. The final phase is the post-independence 
era. Due to various irreconcilable differences between the Singapore 
government and the Malaysian federal government, it was agreed by 
both sides that Singapore would separate and become an independent 
nation. This was effected through a mutual agreement, the Indepen-
dence of Singapore Agreement, August 7, 1965.2 
To the question of whether the Constitution of the United States 
has influenced the Singapore Constitution, the candid answer must be 
I. For a brief introduction to Singapore constitutional law, see the writer's Consti-
tutional Law. with Documentary Materials (No. I in Singapore Law Series), 1976. 
2. Singapore Government Gazette Extraordinary No. 66 of 1965; also in Interna-
tional Legal Materials, 932 (1965). 
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in the negative. This, however, ought not be surprising, because (as was 
seen in the preceding paragraph) prior to independence as well as after 
independence there has not been a very intense relationship between the 
political and legal systems of the two countries. 
If the constitutional systems of any other countries have influenced 
Singapore's Constitution, they are those of the United Kingdom and 
Malaysia. The United Kingdom's influence on Singapore's constitu-
tional law can be appreciated in the light of the British colonial 
administration of Singapore over a long period, bringing with it the 
influence of the English legal system, legal concepts, and law. In today's 
independent Singapore, the legal system and much of the laws are still 
influenced by English parallels, and indeed in some areas English law is 
directly applicable. In the area of constitutional law, even though 
Singapore has a written constitution and the United Kingdom has not, 
English influence is nonetheless prominent, particularly in the parlia-
mentary system of government which operates instead of a presidential 
system like that of the United States. Furthermore, Singapore courts 
have also been influenced by English judicial decisions in certain areas 
of constitutional law such as that concerning preventive detention. The 
facts that all the older-generation legal practitioners received their legal 
training in the United Kingdom and that several key political leaders 
studied in the United Kingdom are also important explanatory factors. 
More recently, however, Malaysian influence on Singapore's con-
stitutional development has been significant. One factor explaining this 
is that both Singapore and the states which make up the Malaysian 
federation were administered by Britain, and this common feature 
resulted in many similarities concerning the administration of law and 
legal systems. Even now when the two countries are separate inde-
pendent sovereign states, it is quite common for courts in both coun-
tries to refer to each other's judicial decisions in various fields, including 
constitutional law. The Malaysian constitutional influence on Singapore 
came to a climax when Singapore was part of Malaysia from Septem-
ber 16, 1963, to August 9, 1965, during which period Singapore was 
governed by the federal Constitution. After Singapore separated from 
Malaysia, the Malaysian influence was maintained to a large extent 
because independent Singapore's legislature provided that certain Arti-
cles of the Malaysian Constitution would continue to have force in 
Singapore (including most of the provisions dealing with fundamental 
liberties). Therefore, Malaysian judicial decisions interpreting these 
provisions are also relevant to Singapore. For these reasons, much of 
what the Honourable Tun Mohamed Suffian, Lord President of Ma-
laysia, has said in his chapter in this book would, mutatis mutandis, be 
applicable for Singapore, too, especially his comments on the scope of 
the provisions for fundamental liberties. 
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The relevance and extent of the Malaysian influence can best be 
illustrated by reference to the perspectives of the 1966 Constitutional 
Commission of Singapore. This commission, chaired by the Chief 
Justice, was appointed to make recommendations to the government, 
inter alia, on constitutional provisions to safeguard rights of minorities 
and to prevent discrimination. In its Report the Commission made it 
clear that, regarding fundamental rights, it was of the opinion that the 
preexisting influence of Malaysian constitutional provisions should in 
the main be maintained and in this connection stressed the "common 
destiny" of the peoples of the two countries: 
We approached this task bearing in mind that the provisions of Part 
II of the present Constitution of Malaysia-being provisions dealing with 
fundamental rights-were applicable to Singapore when it was a part of 
Malaysia and continue with one exception to apply in Singapore since 
its separation from Malaysia. We have looked at a large number of 
Constitutions which contain provisions dealing with fundamental rights 
and freedoms, but believing, as we do, that it would be wise, desirable 
and practical, having regard to the past, the present and the future, to 
preserve the common destiny of the peoples of Singapore and Malaysia, 
we do not propose in our recommendations on fundamental rights to 
depart, except where we think it is necessary and desirable, from the 
form and substance of similar provisions in the Malaysian Constitution.J 
Notwithstanding such English and Malaysian influences, the con-
stitutional law of Singapore has its unique characteristics, which will be 
brought out later in this chapter. 
Extent of American Influence 
on Singapore's Constitutional Documents 
One index of contemporary American influence would be the extent to 
which legislators and draftsmen, when addressing themselves to major 
constitutional questions, borrow ideas from the United States Consti-
tution. The evidence that is available does not disclose any significant 
direct American influence on the drafting and development of Singa-
pore's constitutional documents. Three different instances may be 
considered. 
The 1963 Constitution for the State of Singapore, promulgated 
when Singapore joined Malaysia, was legally effected by a United 
Kingdom Order-in-Council.4 It must, however, be viewed as a negoti-
ated document, as the draft was annexed to the Malaysia Agreement. 
This 1963 Constitution, which with later amendments continues to be 
the republic's Constitution, does not reveal any special influence of the 
3. Report of the Constitutional Commission 1966, par. 14. 
4. The Sabah. Sarawak and Singapore (State Constitutions) Order in Council 
(1963) 2 U.K. S.l. 2656 (No. 1493). 
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U.S. Constitution apart from the "supremacy clause,"5 which provided 
that statutes inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution would 
be invalid. It cannot be disputed that this "supremacy clause,'' which 
can be found in the modern constitutions of many nations, owes its 
origins to the constitutional doctrine of supremacy of the Constitution 
and judicial review established by the United States Supreme Court in 
the classic case of Marbury v. Madison.6 
Next, we may consider the Report of the 1966 Constitutional 
Commission. The Commission discussed in detail important questions 
of fundamental liberties, including the concepts of equality and equal 
protection. An American scholar might logically have thought that this 
would be a likely occasion where American constitutional concepts and 
doctrine might have been discussed. The Report, however, does not 
disclose this; there is no express reference to the provisions or position 
in the United States (although on other matters the Commission 
referred to the positions of Guyana and Scandinavian nations). It 
should be mentioned that the Commission recommended a new provi-
sion to deal with fundamental liberty: 
No person shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
punishment or other treatment. 7 
This bears a close resemblance to the Eighth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, which prohibits "cruel and unusual punishments." 
The Commission did not say that it was borrowing from the U.S. 
Constitution, but it did say that it looked "at other written constitu-
tions" and found this right to be acknowledged and protected in 
all of them. 
It could well be that American constitutional provisions were 
discussed in the proceedings of the Commission, but, unfortunately, 
there is no published record of its detailed deliberations. (We should 
here recall that the Constitutional Commission in its Report revealed 
its inclination to maintain as much as possible of the provisions for 
fundamental liberties inherited from Malaysia). 
It is also useful to consider the Singapore Parliament's debate on 
the Report of the 1966 Constitutional Commission, for that represents 
the latest major legislative debate in Singapore on constitutional ques-
tions. In this parliamentary debate at least twenty-five legislators 
5. S. 52 reads" Any law enacted by the Legislature after the coming into operation 
of this Constitution which is inconsistent with this Constitution shall, to the extent of the 
inconsistency, be void." 
6. I Cranch 137, 2 LEd. 60 (1803). 
7. This, together with certain other recommendations of the Commission which 
were in principle acceptable to the government, has not yet been incorporated in the 
Constitution. 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA 185 
participated, including three Cabinet Members (Prime Minister, For-
eign Minister, and Minister for Law). Here again the record of the 
legislative debate shows that none of the legislators who spoke on the 
Commission's proposals referred to provisions of the U.S. Consti-
tution. 
It is interesting, on the other hand, to note that several speakers 
referred to the American experience, especially with regard to the 
question of moulding a united nation out of a cosmopolitan popula-
tion. That this should have been their preoccupation is understandable, 
since Singapore is multi-racial, and one of the specific matters dealt with 
by the Commission was the safeguarding of minority interests to ensure 
non-discrimination. Thus the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, 
referred to the American experience in making his point that the 
American multi-ethnic society was distinguishable from Singapore's 
multi-racial society: 
I am not suggesting that a multi-racial society is the ideal society in all 
circumstances. In fact, the great powers of this world today consist of 
nations which are ethno-centric in composition. True, both the Ameri-
cans and the Russians have more than one single race or one single 
language group or one single religion. But there is in both countries one 
single race or ethnic group which shares one common language and 
whose culture is, by reason of its dynamism or aggressiveness, far in 
dominance over the others comprised in the nation. Be that as it may for 
aspirants to world powers, we are confronted, as a young migrant 
community, with the problem of continuing a tolerant, meaningful 
society for some two million people nearly all of whom cannot trace their 
links with the Republic for more than 150 years. s 
Similarly, the Foreign Minister referred to the American multi-racial 
situation: 
If you were to read the history of modern nations, for example Britain-I 
used to read English history when I was a boy-you will discover that 
once upon a time, there was no such thing as "Britain." There were 
"English," "Saxons" and "Normans." They thought of themselves as 
minority groups. Only 100 years ago, there was no such thing as a 
German nation; there was no such thing as an Italian nation. In fact, 
there was no such thing as an American nation when Malacca was 
founded. There were Poles, immigrants of all kinds-just like us. Then 
over a period of years, the Americans had to constitute themselves into a 
nation. It was necessary. For example, the early settlers of America 
thought of themselves as Dutch, French, German, English and Irish and 
over a period of 100 years or more, they had learned to think of 
themselves as Americans. They have not yet completed the process, but 
today, a Dutchman or even a Japanese or Chinese or Negro from 
America will tell you that he is an American.9 
8. Parliamentary Debates, Republic of Singapore, Official Report, Vol. 25, 
col. 1283. 
9. Ibid., at col. 1363. 
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Influence of American Judicial Decisions 
From what has already been said about the little influence of the United 
States Constitution on Singapore's constitutional concepts and institu-
tions, it should not be surprising that American judicial decisions are 
seldom mentioned in judgments by Singapore courts in constitutional 
Jaw cases. Because of the influences of the English legal system and the 
affinity with Malaysian constitutional provisions, Singapore courts are 
influenced more by United Kingdom and Malaysian judicial decisions. 
Indian constitutional Jaw judgments are also heavily drawn upon as 
persuasive authorities; this is also the position in Malaysia. The expla-
nation for the relevance of Indian judgments in Singapore and Malay-
sian courts is that the Malaysia and Singapore constitutional provisions 
in several respects have close similarity with the provisions of the Indian 
Constitution (concerning, e.g., public servants, fundamental liberties, 
emergency powers, and preventive detention). However, where the 
courts feel that the position here is different, they will not follow the 
Indian judgments. 
The last reported instance when a Singapore court had to assess 
the relevance of American authorities was in Lee Mau Seng v. Minister 
for Home Affairs, Singapore and Anor. 10 Here a person detained under 
preventive detention legislation had been denied for twenty days after 
his arrest his constitutional right to counsel. In an application for 
habeas corpus it was argued that this amounted to an abuse of power 
justifying an order for release. United States and Indian authorities 
were cited. 
Chief Justice Wee Chong Jin, who decided the case, held, however, 
that "habeas corpus is not an available remedy to a person who, after 
his arrest by the police and under lawful detention by the police under 
powers conferred [by the legislation], has been refused by the police his 
constitutional right under article 5 (3) of the Constitution to be allowed 
to consult a legal practitioner of his choice." The learned judge felt that 
some other available remedy ought to be sought. 
In handling the American authorities cited by counsel, Chief 
Justice Wee Chong Jin distinguished them by saying: 
The American authorities all deal with the Sixth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States of America, the relevant provisions 
of which provide that "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to have the assistance of counsel for his defence." 
As I understand the law in America to be, it has been decided that under 
the Sixth Amendment, unless an accused at his trial has waived his 
right to be assisted by counsel, "compliance with this constitutional 
mandate is an essential prerequisite to a Federal Court's authority to 
10. [1971) 2 Malayan Law Journal (hereinafter cited at M.L.J.). 
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deprive an accused of his life or liberty," so that a conviction of a 
person who did not effectively waive his constit~tional .rig.ht .to. counsel 
for his defence is void as having been rendered Without JUnsdlctwn thus 
entitling the accused person, to whom expiration of time has rendered 
relief by way of application for a new trial or by appeal unavailable, to 
habeas corpus as an available remedy (Johnson v. Zerbst 11 ). In America, 
therefore, habeas corpus is available because a conviction being void, 
the convicted person's imprisonment is unlawful. 12 
In a recently decided Singapore constitutional law case, Lee Keng 
Guan and Ors. v. Public Prosecutor, 13 the Court of Criminal Appeal 
had to decide a significant argument on equal protection of the law. 
However, no American cases were referred to in the judgment; instead, 
the Court accepted certain principles enunciated in an Indian decision. 
The Written Constitution 
It could be said that Singapore's constitutional system is similar to that 
of the United States and Malaysia in that Singapore's Constitution also 
is in written form. However, unlike the United States or Malaysia, 
which have their constitutional provisions in one single composite 
constitution (at least their federal constitutions), this is not the case in 
Singapore. In Singapore there is a plurality of basic constitutional 
documents, and therefore reference has to be made to the following 
three basic constitutional documents: The Constitution of Singapore 
(including amendments made after Singapore's separation); The Re-
public of Singapore Independence Act 1965 (No. 9 of 1965); The 
Constitution of Malaysia, certain provisons of which were made applic-
able by The Republic of Singapore Independence Act 1965.'4 
The "Constitution of Singapore" refers to the state constitution 
which Singapore received when it joined Malaysia. When it separated 
from Malaysia, this continued to have legal effect, but being a state 
constitution it was inadequate in many respects for an independent 
nation. Since separation this document has been amended on several 
occasions. The Republic of Singapore Independence Act 1965 is a 
significant statute enacted by Singapore's legislature four months after 
separation to provide, inter alia, "that all existing laws shall continue in 
force on or after Singapore Day.'' But this was subject to "modifica-
tions, adaptations, qualifications and exceptions as may be necessary to 
bring them into conformity with this Act and with the independent 
status of Singapore upon separation from Malaysia.'' Certain provi-
sions of the Constitution of Malaysia were made applicable in Singa-
pore as a result of Section 6 of the aforementioned Republic of 
II. 58 S.Ct. 1019. 12. [1971] 2 M.L.J. 141. 13. [1977) 2 M.L.J. 95. 
14. The texts of these three documents are set out in the appendices in the writer's 
book Constitutional Law (cited in n. I above). 
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Singapore Independence Act, which prescribed that certain specified 
provisions of the Malaysian Constitution (including most of the provi-
sions concerning fundamental liberties and emergency powers) would 
continue to have force in Singapore. This was because the Singapore 
state constitution lacked these provisions. Thus, although the Singa-
pore Constitution was not expressly amended to incorporate these 
Malaysian provisions, there is no doubt that these Malaysian. pro-
visions are an integral part of Singapore's constitutional law. The 
Republic of Singapore Independence Act, in this regard, must be 
viewed not as routine legislation but as fundamental legislation enacted 
by Parliament in exercise of its constituent power. 
In 1970 the government indicated that a new composite Constitu-
tion was in the making, but, as this has not yet been promulgated, the 
above mentioned plurality of constitutional documents continues. 
Supremacy of the Constitution 
The Singapore Constitution can be said to have a similarity with United 
States constitutional law in that it embodies the concept of the 
supremacy of the Constitution. Article 52 of the Constitution provides 
that "Any law enacted by the Legislature after the coming into opera-
tion of this Constitution which is inconsistent with this Constitution 
shall, to the extent of this inconsistency, be void. "15 
A constitutional lawyer, however, must recognize that the efficacy 
of the concept of the supremacy clause and of the general concept of a 
written constitution limiting legislative powers depends on several other 
factors. One such factor is whether the constitution can be easily 
amended. 
In this regard the Singapore Constitution, with the exception of 
one Part, is very flexible. Article 90 provides that the Constitution can 
be amended "by a law enacted by the Legislature"; that is, the pro-
cedure for amending the Constitution is the same as that for amending 
any other law. The exception is that Part 28 of the Constitution 
(Protection of the Sovereignty of the Republic of Singapore) can be 
amended only if there is support of not less than two-thirds of the total 
number of votes cast by electors at a national referendum. 
These provisions on amendment of the Singapore Constitution can 
provide an interesting basis for discussing the following remarks of 
Chief Justice Marshall in the celebrated American case of Marbury v. 
Madison: 
It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the Constitution 
controls any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the Legislature may 
15. The date of coming into operation was September 16, 1963. 
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alter the Constitution bl' an ordinarl' act. Between these alternatives 
there is no middle grou~i The Cons.titution is either a superior para-
mount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with 
ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when the 
Legislature shall please alter it. If the former _of . the. alternativ~s 
be true, then a legislative act contrary to the ConstitutiOn IS not law; If 
the latter be true, then written Constitutions are absurd attempts, on the 
part of the people, to limit a power in its own nature illimitable. 
(Emphasis added.)l6 
The fascinating question is whether the Singapore Constitution is 
"middle ground," which Chief Justice Marshall claims can never exist. 
It is true that most of the provisions of the Singapore Constitution may 
be altered by the legislature "by an ordinary act." But this does not 
mean that the Singapore Constitution is "an absurd attempt ... to limit 
a power in its own nature illimitable" because, as was pointed out, 
where a statute is in conflict with the constitutional provisions, Article 
52 states that the statutory provision shall be void. The courts have 
proceeded on the basis that they can strike down a statute for invalidity. 
However, if every statute that conflicts with the Constitution is to 
be regarded as an "implied amendment" to the Constitution, then the 
supremacy clause would be rendered otiose and the courts would never 
be able to strike down a statute as invalid for inconsistency with the 
Constitution. It is interesting to note that in the few occasions where the 
courts had to consider the constitutional validity of statutory provi-
sions, the argument of implied amendment has not been raised. 
Fundamental Liberties 
In General 
Most of the articles on fundamental liberties in the Malaysian 
Constitution are still applicable in Singapore. In view of this, much of 
what the Honourable Tun Suffian, the Lord President of Malaysia, has 
said (in his chapter on Malaysia) on fundamental liberties would be also 
descriptive of the position in Singapore. Therefore I shall not repeat all 
the points mentioned by him. There are, however, two important 
qualifications concerning the applicability of the Malaysian funda-
mental liberties provisions in Singapore. 
The first qualification is that, in my view, the Malaysian consti-
tutional provisions apply in Singapore as they stood on August 9, 1965, 
the date of separation and date of operation of the Republic of 
Singapore Independence Act, 1965, and I submit that this is the proper 
interpretation of the Act.I 7 Thus, amendments to the Malaysian provi-
sions made by the Malaysian legislature after the operative date do not 
16. I Cranch 137 at 177. 
17. See pp. 6 and 7 of the writer's Constitutional Law. 
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apply in Singapore. This point is important because after separation 
Malaysia amended some provisions of the Constitution, including those 
on fundamental liberties. 
The second qualification is that one provision dealing with funda-
mental liberties found in the Malaysian Constitution was expressly 
declared by the Singapore legislature to cease to have effect in Singa-
pore.18 This was Article 13, which stated that no person shall be 
deprived of property ··save in accordance with law" and that no law 
shall provide for compulsory acquisition or use of property "without 
adequate compensation." The statements made in Parliament suggest 
that the government was not in favour of this provision insofar as it 
allowed judicial review over the quantum of compensation.'9 
"Due Process of Law" and "In Accordance with Law·· 
The Honourable Tun Suffian has pointed out that while in Ameri-
ca no person shall be deprived of his life, liberty, or property "without 
due process of law," the Malaysian Article 5 (1), which applies in 
Singapore, states that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal 
liberty "save in accordance with law." 
In an article published ten years ago,2° well before the provision 
was considered by Singapore or Malaysian courts, I considered the 
possible interpretation of the Malaysian provision and also considered 
an Indian case, Gopalan v. State of Madras, 21 and a Burmese case, 
Tinsa Maw Naing v. Commissioner of Police, Rangoon. 22 These two 
cases had interpreted "in accordance with law" in the Indian and 
Burmese constitutions to mean merely compliance with enacted law. I 
analyzed these cases and argued that "reliance on these cases is unwise 
in interpreting our provision," and stated that while "opposition to the 
adoption of a controversial concept such as the substantive due pro-
cess" is understandable "there appear to be no good reasons why Article 
5 (1) should be incapable of being interpreted to require any law (or 
executive act) depriving persons of life or personal liberty to comply 
with the rules of natural justice. It will be interesting to await the 
interpretation which the judges will give to this provision."23 
In Comptroller General of Inland Revenue v. N.P. 24 and in 
Arumugam Pillai v. Government of Malaysia25 the Malaysian courts 
18. S. 6 (3) of the Republic of Singapore Independence Act 1965, Act No.9 of 1965. 
19. See statement of Minister for Law, Mr. E. W. Barker, Singapore Parliamentary 
Debates, Official Report, vol 25, col. 1054. 
20. "Constitutional Limitations on Legislative Powers in Malaysia" (1967) 9 
Malava Law Review 96. 
·21. A.I.R. (1950) S.C. 27. 22. 1950 Burma Law Rep. 17. 
23. "Constitutional Limitations . . . , " n. 20 at p. I 0 I. 
24. [1973] I M.L.J. 165. 25. [1975] 2 M.L.J. 29. 
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have indeed interpreted Article 5 (I), though not in a detailed manner. 
These two decisions suggest that the courts follow the Indian and 
Burmese cases in holding that "law" means only enacted law and that 
there was no scope for including rules of natural justice as a criterion 
with which to assess the validity of laws. It is most likely that, if the 
question arose in Singapore, the Singapore courts would take a similar 
approach. 
Right to Counsel 
The Singapore courts interpreted the Malaysian Article 5 (3) in the 
same way as the Malaysian courts (see the chapter on Malaysia). Thus, 
it was held in Lee Mau Seng v. Minister for Home Affairs, Singapore 
and Anor.26 that: 
The language of Article 5 (3) of the Constitution is clear and simple. 
If a person who is arrested wishes to consult a legal practitioner of his 
choice, he is, beyond a shadow of doubt, entitled to have this constitu-
tional right granted to him by the authority who has custody of him 
after his arrest and this right must be granted to him within a reason-
able time after his arrest. (Emphasis added.) 
Note that the Court did not say that the right must always be granted 
from the moment of arrest. Thus the position is different from the right 
to counsel in the United States. 
Other Similarities and Differences 
When the Singapore and United States constitutions or constitutional 
systems are compared, their other similarities and differences can be 
summarized as follows: 
Absence of Federalism 
Singapore is a unitary state, and the federal principle has never 
operated within Singapore, although Singapore had a taste of federal-
ism when it was a constituent state within Malaysia. Therefore, all rules 
and concepts of American constitutional law turning on the federal-
state division of powers find no analogy in Singapore. 
Parliamentary System of Government 
While the United States has the presidential system, Singapore, like 
Malaysia, is influenced by the United Kingdom and has the parliamen-
tary system, whereby the Prime Minister and his Cabinet colleagues are 
members of the legislature and elected as such. Certain concepts which 
are unwritten conventions in England are expressly incorporated in the 
26. [1971] 2 M.L.J. 137. 
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Singapore Constitution, such as the principle of the Cabinet's collective 
responsibility to Parliament. 
It is true that in Singapore there is a President, but like the English, 
Indian, or Malaysian heads of state he has no major discretionary 
functions, and the general rule is that he must act on advice of the 
Cabinet. 
Unicameral Legislature 
Singapore, being a small, compact country, has always had a 
unicameral legislature and in this respect differs from the U.S., the 
U.K., Malaysia, and India, which have bicameral legislatures. It should 
be pointed out here that there exists a Presidential Council for Minority 
Rights,27 which, while not part of the legislature, performs an advisory 
role to the legislature and is linked with the legislative process because 
the Council has to consider all legislative bills28 and report whether 
there are any provisions which are discriminatory. 
27. Part IV A of the Singapore Constitution. 
28. But the following legislative bills are excluded: a money bill; a bill certified by 
the Prime Minister as being one which affects the defence or the security of Singapore or 
which relates to public safety, peace, or good order in Singapore; or a bill certified by the 
Prime Minister to be so urgent that it is not in the public __ interest to delay its enactment. 
Biographical Sketches of 
the Asian Authors 
Mr. Justice Abu Sayeed Chowdhury, BANGLADESH 
Abu Sayeed Chowdhury was born in Tangail on January 31, 1921, during the 
British colonial period. He graduated from the Presidency College in Calcutta 
in 1940, and went on to earn his M.A. and Bachelor of Laws degrees from 
Calcutta University. In 1947 he was called to the English Bar from Lincoln's 
Inn. As a student he was General Secretary of the Presidency College Union 
and, in 1946, President of the British Branch of the All-India Muslim Students 
Federation. 
The positions Mr. Justice Chowdhury has held include the following: Advo-
cate-General of East Pakistan, 1960-61; Member of the Constitution Conven-
tion, 1960-61; Judge, Dacca High Court, 1961-1972; Member, United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights, 1971-74; Member or Leader of the Delegation 
of Bangladesh to many international conferences, including Leader of the 
Bangladesh Delegation to the 30th Session of the United Nations General 
Assembly in 1975; and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Dacca. 
In 1971 he organized and led the Bangladesh liberation movement abroad, 
with headquarters in London. He was sworn in as the first President of 
Bangladesh on January 12, 1972. He was reelected by Parliament for a five-year 
term in the spring of 1973, but served in that capacity only until he took a 
position as Cabinet Minister on December 24, 1973. He was Foreign Minister 
of Bangladesh when a change of government in November 1975 led him to 
move to London, where he resides at present. He visited Bangladesh in 1977. 
Mr. Justice Chowdhury married Begum Khurshid Chowdhury in 1948; they 
have one daughter and two sons. His hobbies are reading and gardening. 
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Professor Herbert Han-Pao Ma, REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
Herbert H. P. Ma was born on November 27, 1926, in Hankow, Hupei 
Province, China. He attended National Futan University in Shanghai, China, 
from 1944 to 1947. He received his LL.B. degree from National Taiwan 
University in Taipei, Taiwan, in 1950. He conducted advanced research in law 
at Harvard University in 1964 and again during the 1975-76 academic year. 
Professor Ma taught in the School of Law of the University of Washington 
(Seattle) in 1971. 
From 1966 to 1971 he was Executive Secretary, China Council on Sino-
American Cooperation in Humanities and Social Sciences of the Academia 
Sinica. He held the appointment of Research Professor, National Science 
Council, Republic of China, 1969-71, and received the Distinguished Service 
Award of that nation's Ministry of Education in both 1967 and 1971. 
Professor Ma is currently Professor of Law at National Taiwan University, 
and Member, Examination Yuan, Republic of China. His scholarly publica-
tions include such works as Essays on Western Legal Thought (in Chinese), 
General Principles of Private International Law (in Chinese), Trade and 
Investment in Taiwan: The Legal and Economic Environment in the Republic 
of China (in English), and numerous articles. 
Dr. Pradyumna Kumar Tripathi, INDIA 
P. K. Tripathi was born on May 24, 1924, in Bhanpura, Madhya Pradesh, 
British India. He graduated from Maharaja Shivaji Rao High School, Indore, 
in 1940, and then attended Holkar College in Indore, from which he received a 
diploma in intermediate science (1942), a B.S. (1944), and his LL.B. (1946). In 
1949 he earned the LL.M. degree from the University of Delhi, and completed 
his work for the J.S.D. at Columbia University in New York in 1957. In the 
same year he married Kusum Tendulkar; they have one son, Pradar. 
In his academic career, Dr. Tripathi progressed from Lecturer ( 1949-59) to 
Reader in Law at the University of Delhi (1959-61 ), to Professor and Head of 
Department (University of Allahabad, 1961-65; University of Delhi, 1965-71). 
From 1971 until late 1977 he served as a Member of the Law Commission of 
India and its Executive Committee and then returned to his professorial duties 
at the University of Delhi. He was Parker Fellow at the Law School of 
Columbia University ( 1955-56), visiting Professor of Law at the University of 
Singapore (1963), and Leverhulm Visiting Fellow at the Law School of the 
University of Melbourne, Australia, in 1971. Dr. Tripathi is also a member both 
of the Legal Education Committee of the Bar Council of India, and of the 
Executive Committee of the Indian Law Institute. He was National Lecturer for 
Law, 1971-72, and was the first Indian academic lawyer to present the Kashi-
nath Trimbak Telang Endowment Lectures in 1971. His lectures were published 
by Bombay University as Some Insights into the Fundamental Rights. Besides 
his other book, Spotlights on Constitutional Interpretation (Bombay, 1972), he 
has published many papers in Indian journals and in American legal 
periodicals. 
Chief Justice Dr. Oemar Seno Adji, INDONESIA 
Oemar Seno Adji was born in Solo, Central Java, on December 5, 1915, 
when most of present Indonesia was the Dutch East Indies. He earned his 
degree from the Faculty of Law, Gajah Mada University, Yogyakarta, in 1949. 
In 1964 Dr. Seno Adji visited the United States on an Eisenhower Exchange 
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Fellowship. Before assuming his present duties as Chief Justice of the Supre~e 
Court of the Republic of Indonesia, Dr. Seno Adji served as Minister of Justice 
(1966-1974) and Professor and Dean of the Faculty of Law, University of 
Indonesia, Jakarta. He represented Indonesia at the United Nations Conference 
on Crime Prevention. Among his writings are Innovation in Criminal Justice in 
Indonesia, "Indonesia Rechstaat," "Press Freedom, Mass Media, and the 
Law," and publications on criminal law. He is married and has eight children. 
Professor Nobushige Ukai, JAPAN 
Nobushige Ukai was born on March 9, 1906, in Tokyo, Japan. He received 
his B.Juris. degree from Tokyo Imperial University in 1930, and taught at Seoul 
Imperial University in Korea from 1931 to 1946, except for studies at Harvard 
Law School and teaching at Carleton College in 1940. He received his D.Juris. 
degree from the University of Tokyo in 1955, where he was Professor from 1947 
until 1961, and Director of the Social Science Research Institute in 1952 and 
1953. In this country, he has lectured extensively, at such schools as Southern 
Illinois University, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts 
University ( 1960-61) and Stanford University ( 1956-57). He served as President 
of International Christian University in Tokyo from 1961 to 1967, and returned 
to teaching at Seikei University (1968-75) and Senshu University (1975). 
Professor Ukai has been President of the Japan Public Law Association, and 
member of such agencies as the Experts Committees of the Ministry of Local 
Autonomy and the National Personnel Authority of Japan, the Library Com-
mittee of the Supreme Court, and the Public Safety Commission of the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Government. He has also been associated closely with the work 
of the Grew Foundation, the Bancroft Foundation, and the American Studies 
Foundation of Japan. 
Among Professor Ukai's numerous publications in Japanese are books on 
Japan's constitutional law, administrative law, local government system, public 
employee laws, civil liberties, and judiciary, as well as on America's juris-
prudence. His writings in English on civil liberties, politics, and law in Japan 
have appeared in several American law and social science journals. 
Lord President Tun Mohamed Suffian bin Hashim, MALAYSIA 
Tun Mohamed Suffian was born on December II, 1917, at Kota Lama Kiri 
near Kuala Kangsar, Malaysia. ("Tun" is a title conferred by His Majesty the 
King of Malaysia.) He was educated at Clifford School (Kuala Kangsar, 
Perak). From Gonville and Caius ~ollege, Cambridge University, he earned his 
M.A. and LL.B. degrees. He became Barrister-at-Law in 1941 after studies at 
the Middle Temple, London. Tun Suffian served as a radio announcer on All-
India Radio ( 1942-45) and on BBC (London, 1945-46). He was in the Malayan 
Civil Service in 1948 and the Malayan Judicial and Legal Service from 1949 to 
1961. In international service, he was Malayan delegate to the U.N. Confer-
ences on the Law of the Sea in Geneva in 1960 and 1961. He was awarded an 
Eisenhower Exchange Fellowship in 1964, and the Ramon Magsaysay Award 
(the Philippines) in 1975. 
Tun Suffian played a notable role as advisor in the drafting of the Malayan 
constitution ( 1956), and was honorary advisor on constitutional matters to the 
Sultan of Brunei in 1959. He has served as President of the Council for the 
Promotion of Higher Education in Malaysia ( 1973-76), and Pro-Chancellor of 
the University of Malaya (1963- ). Before assuming the position of Lord 
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President of the Federal Court of Malaysia in 1974 (the equivalent of the U.S. 
Chief Justice), he was Solicitor General (1959-61) and a member of the 
appellate bench. He is author of An Introduction to the Constitution of 
Malaysia, and the famous "Suffian Report," as Chairman of the Royal 
Commission on Salaries in the Public Service. Tun Suffian has long been an 
active member of the Advisory Editorial Board of The Malal'an Law Journal. 
He is married to Toh Puan Bunny. · 
Senior Associate Justice Enrique M. Fernando, THE PHILIPPINES 
Enrique M. Fernando was born in 1915 during the period when the Philip-
pines was under American sovereignty. He earned his law degree, magna cum 
laude, at the University of the Philippines in 1938, and obtained his LL.M. 
degree in 1948 after studying as the first Filipino Sterling Fellow at Yale 
University. While serving on his nation's highest tribunal, he retains his 
positions as George A. Malcolm Professor of Constitutional law at the Univer-
sity of the Philippines, and Professor of Law in the Lyceum of the Philippines, 
and Santo Tomas University. His past positions of responsibility have included 
the following: legal advisor to three Filipino Presidents (R. Magsaysay, C. P. 
Garcia, and F. E. Marcos); Philippines' representative to four United Nations 
Southeast Asian Regional Seminars on Human Rights; Co-Chairman, Philip-
pine Delegation, U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, 1968; 
Member, Philippine Delegation to the United Nations, 1977. Justice Fernando 
has twice been chosen Chairman of the Civil Liberties Union of the Philip-
pines. He has written and spoken frequently on human rights and the Constitu-
tion of the Philippines, in recent years under a martial law situation. He was a 
major speaker at the World Peace Through Law Conference in Washington, 
D.C., in 1975, and in Manila in 1977, when he was Chairman of the 
Resolutions Committee. He was invited to present the First Tun Razak 
Memorial Lecture in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in 1977. He is the author of a 
treatise on the Constitution of the Philippines. 
Justice Fernando is married to Emma Quisumbing, also a member of the 
Philippine Bar; they have five children. 
Dean S. Jayakumar, SINGAPORE 
S. Jayakumar is Associate Professor and Dean of the Faculty of Law, 
University of Singapore, where he has been teaching since 1964. He earned his 
law degrees from the University of Singapore (LL.B.) and Yale University Law 
School (LL.M.). From 1971 to 1974 he served as Singapore's Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations and as High Commissioner to Canada 
with the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. 
His articles and notes on issues of constitutional law, international law, and 
legal education in various law journals are many. He has published three books: 
Public International Law Cases from Malaysia and Singapore ( 1974); Constitu-
tional Law Cases from Malaysia and Singapore ( 1976, 2nd ed.); and Constitu-
tional Law, No. I in the Singapore Law Series (1976). 
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